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Johanna Siméant, Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle and 
Isabelle Sommier
Is there anything left to say about transnational activism and the alter-
global movement? It may seem doubtful, given all the research that has 
piled up on the topic, the publication of a handbook on World Social Forums 
(Smith et al., 2011), and even a certain weariness from watching the forums 
go by, one after another – and even if the World Social Forum (WSF) pro-
cess does not equate with the whole alter-global movement. But before 
we conclude that the topic has been exhausted, we should keep in mind 
two things. First, the feeling of weariness is mainly found among Western 
observers (journalists and academics), who have indeed been the most 
influential in drawing attention to this public issue. It may in fact reflect 
the geographical displacement of alter-globalization from its birthplace in 
the Latin world to other regions of the globe, particularly Africa. Hence, the 
intrinsic interest of studying the WSF held in Dakar in January 2011. Second, 
the spate of research is now dated; it dried up around 2007, when the cause 
was declared to be dead and buried – again from a Western-centric point 
of view. As often happens, the epitaph had a performative effect, but it was 
misleading because, all in all, the alter-global cause was still very much 
alive and researchers were the ones who, apart from a few exceptions, had 
abandoned it in midstream. Was this a case of postcolonial occultation? 
In any event, ten years after the f irst forum, it was necessary to pick up 
the research where it was left off, on a continent belatedly incorporated 
into alter-global networks but crucial to the production of their discourse.
Furthermore, the events that make up social forums, especially when 
they claim to possess a worldwide dimension, are research objects that have 
helped to give the sociology of social movements an international vantage 
point. In so doing, these objects are not only interesting in themselves or 
because of our interest in them, but also because they question the ordinary 
categories we use when we ponder the nature of movements, organizations, 
commitment, etc.
This book is the result of a methodological reflection on how to conduct 
a sociological survey in an international context and the importance of 
thinking about the issue of the division of activist labor in this specif ic 
context. If, from a Weberian perspective, the task of the social sciences is as 
much to provide historical context as to make general statements, then the 
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challenge consists precisely in knowing how to contextualize meaning and 
observable practices in this type of international setting. In this sense, we 
perceive the Forum not only as an object in itself – as a “little world” (though 
it is that, too) – but also as revealing and analyzing broader processes at 
work (activist internationalization, division of labor, etc.).
1 Methodological reasons for observing a WSF in Africa
The WSF held in Dakar in January 2011 was the second such event organized 
in Africa, following the Nairobi Forum in 2007. Aside from the Polycentric 
World Forum in 2006, in which Africa was one of the three sites, all the 
earlier ones had taken place in Latin America or Asia. One of the primary 
reasons for specif ically studying this Forum lies in the role assigned to 
Africa in the alter-global movement. Despite its original link to Latin 
America, Africa is usually described within the movement as a continent 
victimized by economic globalization (Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011). 
There is much to learn from examining the issues and particular constraints 
on global justice advocacy at such a site; this is especially true when we 
recall that the movement has undergone a decade of geographical and 
organizational change.
In addition to the content, there was a methodological advantage in 
choosing to conduct a collective, systematic survey in Dakar: it brought out 
the diff iculties of f ieldwork in international contexts, a problem increas-
ingly encountered by researchers studying social movements. The call for 
“multi-sited ethnography” has unfortunately become a slogan, a magic 
bullet that does not do justice to Marcus’ text (1995). To grasp transnational 
activism, it may be useful to look at “knots,” i.e. international organiza-
tions, rightly described by Sidney Tarrow as “coral reefs” (Tarrow, 2001) of 
transnational activists, or other moments in which international actors 
coalesce. The situations that bring together actors from different national 
contexts (conferences of major organizations, international meetings of the 
G8, the IMF or the summit of the Americas, or huge activist gatherings like 
social forums, etc.) provide exceptional survey opportunities.
This book is based on just such a large-scale, collective study, at once 
quantitative and qualitative. It is well-known that the use of INSURA 
(INdividual SUrveys in RAllies), which Isabelle Sommier discusses here, 
has expanded a great deal over the last 15 years. The method has been 
practiced less frequently at World Social Forums, however, than at local or 
regional forums, where there was less linguistic and geographical diversity 
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within the survey population. This diversity is precisely what we decided 
to tackle at the Forum in Dakar, through a survey in f ive languages handed 
out by a multinational team to nearly 1,100 people during the f ive days of 
the forum (see technical appendix for a longer exposition of the method).
The heuristic dimension of transnational surveys should be underlined 
here. They help denaturalize the routine categories of social science surveys 
and their ability to account for comparable realities in other countries 
(whether they refer to socio-professional categories or levels of education). 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was used to circumvent the in-
creased diff iculties of ceteris paribus statistical analysis in an international 
configuration, in which the variables and the practises they measure mean 
different things to different individuals, depending on their nationality. 
MCA (see the two chapters by J. Siméant), combined with agglomerative 
hierarchical clustering, enables the meaning of sociographic variables to 
be checked more accurately according to reconstructed national groups. 
Ilka Vari-Lavoisier, in her chapter, shows how useful it can be to analyze 
systematically Non-response in order to understand diverse feelings of 
political competence, or self-censorship.
Our approach to forums claims to be more than strictly quantitative. 
Although it is not always possible to conduct ethnographic research at these 
events (if by that we mean being immersed for a long period of time in a 
circle of people who are familiar with each other),1 the fact that they have 
a dimension of theater (Rucht, 2011) and performance lends them to very 
rich, qualitative observation. This theatrical dimension is fundamental, due 
to the unif ied time and place of the event, its f inality and groups mobiliz-
ing in front of what they perceive to be a global audience to stage what is 
at stake worldwide (the effects of globalization, the future of the planet, 
global inequalities, international solidarity, etc.). It is therefore particularly 
instructive to observe such events in a systematic way. Given the limited 
time available to researchers and their lack of familiarity with the local 
context, this presupposes engaging in collective observation and whenever 
possible by multinational teams to prevent ethnocentric interpretation. In 
both cases, the participation of the whole group at every step in the research 
process, together with accommodations for the group in the same place, 
which enabled evening debrief ing sessions, was a powerful tool to ensure 
rigorous “qualitative” as well as quantitative results.
1 Even though such investigations were possible due to the fact that most members of 
our expanded research team also met with an activist network at the Forum to work more 
specif ically.
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We had already adopted a comparable approach (collective and reflexive, 
with an ethnographic dimension) in Nairobi (Pommerolle and Siméant, 
2011) in 2007 (on the benefits of collaboration in participant observation 
at intense, multifocal events, see also Mazie and Woods, 2003). At that 
time, we were seeking to understand how Africa was described and staged, 
how the idea of a capability for action specif ic to the inhabitants of the 
African continent was generated and how pan-African and anti-imperialist 
discourses were mobilized in the process. During the study, which involved 
some 25 veteran and junior researchers, both French and Kenyan, we en-
gaged in systematic observation of around one hundred workshops selected 
from the general forum program. The observation guide (Sommier and 
Agrikoliansky, 2005) encouraged researchers to pay attention to the way 
the participants expressed themselves in public, the composition of the 
assembly, whether speakers referred or did not refer to Africa, the degree 
of expertise mobilized at the workshop, and the role of NGOs, among other 
variables. Each workshop was observed by a binational duo, which made it 
possible to grasp points that could be identif ied only by someone familiar 
with the alter-global movement, Kenya, or a specif ic language (Spanish, 
Swahili, etc.). Working in multinational teams proved to be useful not only 
from the standpoint of language and social familiarity, but it also revealed 
that the research teams functioned like a microcosm of the international 
event: some topics that seemed unimportant to some members of the team, 
who went so far as to stop observing them, were seen on the contrary as 
absolutely central by the others (e.g. the topic “Young People and the Future 
of Africa,” which seemed trivial to some young French researchers but 
extremely important to Kenyan students). Naturally, incidents that occurred 
on the sidelines of the 2007 Forum were also scrutinized (such as the looting 
of a Forum dining room operated by someone close to the Kenyan Minister 
of the Interior, which was experienced as a moment of radical concrete 
protest against “the politics of the belly”) (Bayart, 2009).
This qualitative, ethnographic aspect of the study, though less developed 
in Dakar where we focused on the survey by questionnaire, is nevertheless 
present in this book. The chapter by William Herrera, Alice Judell, and 
Clément Paule is intended precisely to show the advantages of using an 
approach inspired by Erving Goffman to grasp the theatrical dimensions 
of the event. By choosing an object as insignif icant as waste management 
at the Forum, the authors show how the political dimensions of the forum 
can be understood not only through discourses but also through practices 
and performances designed to be exemplary (even if they did not always 
succeed). Delimiting the area of the rubbish dump was also a way of drawing 
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a map of Forum boundary lines separating those who belonged from those 
who were excluded. The chapter by Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle, which 
examines symbols of nationalism at the Forum, and Julie Castro’s chapter 
on gender dimensions make similar points.
There would be no reason to highlight the methodological aspect of 
the survey in an international activist situation if all we did was present 
research procedures, no matter how satisfying they may be. Our methodo-
logical reflection is tied to two core issues that nourished this study: the 
international division of activist labor (Siméant, 2013), and the contexts of 
transnational collective action.
2 The division of labor and the paradoxes of activist 
internationalization
Through experience we have found that focusing on the division of labor 
is an especially fruitful approach to the study of activism, particularly in 
international contexts. By “division of labor” we mean both the effects of 
the international division of labor between activist organizations and the 
forms of division of labor within transnational activist movements (e.g. 
networks that claim to be rooted in the North as well as the South) or within 
the alter-global world.
Thinking about these aspects of the division of labor means grasping the 
asymmetries within a space that challenges them and tries to overcome 
them.
With few exceptions (Rothman and Oliver, 2002; Wood, 2005; Smith et al., 
2011) the sociology of transnational movements has failed to devote much 
attention to the southern part of those movements, and still less to the social 
characteristics of southern activists. It is therefore diff icult to test in the 
South the interesting hypothesis proposed by Sidney Tarrow according to 
which the participants in global justice movements, mainly from northern 
countries, are both “rooted and cosmopolitan” (Tarrow, 2005).
A few works show genuine sensitivity to the contradictions and dif-
f iculties of transnational activist cooperation (Smith and Johnston, 2002; 
Bandy and Smith, 2005; Bandy, 2004; Chase-Dunn et al., 2008). Some deal 
in particular with the disparities that may be increasing between the local 
agendas of southern activists and those of their international supporters 
(Fireman, 2009), or why some of them receive international support and 
others do not (Bob, 2001). Even fewer recall the way organizations that 
operate in the South distinguish between their international and local 
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workforces.2 Finally, certain researchers analyze how the transnational 
social movement has been unif ied by global narratives (Nepstadt, 2001; 
Smith and Johnston, 2002; Smith, 2002). But as soon as one shifts from the 
f ield of discursive studies to examine the concrete conditions of activist 
internationalization, based on a materialist sociology, a “sociology of the 
plane ticket” as it were, the research work grows scarce. It is as if the f ield of 
alter-globalization studies combined an ultra-macrosociology of contexts 
referring to economic globalization with an idealistic sociology of activists 
without borders (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), who seem to float about freely, 
eager to align their international ties through discourse.
We can therefore regret that the international division of activist labor, 
when it is mentioned, tends to reflect thinking on global economic inequali-
ties, even if it tries to challenge that thinking. Thus, in one of the very few 
items (taken from a quantitative study of a World Social Forum) that focuses 
on the differences in the positions of activist workers from the North and 
South, the protest potential is analyzed as a reflection of their positions 
in the divisions between core, semi-periphery and periphery, in line with 
world systems theory (Kwon et al., 2008). But do all the inequalities that 
limit participation really stem from the structure of world capitalism?
Our approach aims to examine and qualify this point and draw attention 
to the material aspects of activism. The traditional problems of the iron law 
of oligarchy, now familiar to activist organizations, are compounded in in-
ternational configurations where travel expenses can sometimes represent 
months of wages for activists in poor countries. In Nairobi, we had already 
engaged in the “sociology of the plane ticket” and observed that not a single 
African participant would have been able to come to the Forum without 
funding from a northern organization, which put the spotlight on NGO 
patronage of African “activism.” But the relationship to the material basis 
of activism also concerns the extent to which WSFs have become gather-
ings of organization professionals (in Dakar, 20% of survey respondents 
were currently employed and 12.5% previously employed by an NGO, a 
trade union, etc.).3 The connection with activist professionalization is even 
stronger on the African continent, given the importance of the development 
2 Thus, Lesley Wood (2005) points out that southern organizations belonging to the Peoples’ 
Global Action network clearly distinguish their work and cooperation with NGOs lobbying the 
North from their participation in popular movements.
3 It should be noted, nevertheless, that in Dakar, 25% of the European respondents were em-
ployed, in such organisations, compared with 15% of the African respondents. Travel expenses, 
combined with the professionalization of the associative world in Europe, certainly explain the 
high percentage of salaried employees in the f irst group.
intrOduc tiOn 17
industry. The issue not only fuels recurrent debates over legitimate forms 
of mobilization (NGOs v. social movements), but also reflects the problem 
of increasingly moderate types of mobilization. Some activists experience 
NGOs primarily as a sector of jobs and resources, which may preclude 
more radical forms of protest. A form of “mobilization without protest,” 
embodied by advocacy and highly expert types of activism, has now been 
accepted by this world.
Such an approach also implies identifying the dividing lines within 
the alter-global movement itself, from the twofold perspective of social 
composition and the causes proclaimed. The most obvious divide – between 
North and South – f irst comes to mind. But cleavages between different 
“Souths” are equally important. This is the focal point of the chapter by 
Hélène Baillot, Isaline Bergamaschi, and Ruggero Iori. The authors reveal 
the inequalities not only between northern and southern activists, but also 
between activists in the South (in this respect, the advent of the BRICS 
countries is confirmed within alter-global activism as well). These cleavages 
translate into different relationships with the alter-globalization cause 
and with the role of politics, as Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro, and 
Héloïse Nez show with regard to the Latin American participants at the 
Forum in Dakar. The same holds for gender aspects, as Julie Castro explains, 
which are interpreted differently according to the participants’ origins and 
activist traditions, which result in practices that are not always attentive 
to these issues.
In addition to these aspects of the division of labor, the international 
meeting situation itself can produce paradoxical effects. One of the best ex-
amples of these effects is the issue of nationalism. Marie-Emmanuelle Pom-
merolle shows that expressions of nationalism and defense of sovereignty 
were widespread at the World Social Forum in Dakar. In this historically 
international and internationalist event, nationalist symbols and slogans – 
Brazilian flags, Palestinian keffiyehs, T-shirts proclaiming “Guinea is back,” 
Congolese hymns – seemed to be ordinary activist repertoires provided 
they were not contested by other groups of participants. The controversies 
that arose in Dakar over violent or insistent nationalist claims (Saharawi 
v. Moroccan; Venezuelan patriots) shed light on more accepted national-
ist practices and symbols. Why and how do nationalism and sovereignty 
become legitimate repertoires of internationalized activist claims? M.-E. 
Pommerolle demonstrates that the World Social Forum is a delocalized place 
of encounters, where people are often drawn together by basic national ties 
as well as around common causes based on “working misunderstandings” 
(Sahlins, 1981). Structured by anti-imperialist discourses, the World Social 
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Forum accepts nationalist or secessionist claims as legitimate as long as 
they come from the global South. Disconnected from their own territories, 
these claims benefit from the distance and match the diverse expectations 
of the participants: nationalist intellectuals from the South, anti-imperialist 
activists from the North, and politicians from everywhere invest nationalist 
symbols and discourses with their own purposes and in line with their own 
ideas. These various investments produce different sorts of long-distance 
nationalism4 in the context of an internationalist activist event.
Beyond even working misunderstandings, the Forum in Dakar offered 
an opportunity to observe the “activist taste for others,” a form of enthu-
siasm peculiar to international encounters, where exoticism mixes with 
cultural goodwill, if only through clichés that reproduce certain national 
stereotypes. But such an assessment presupposes that the observations are 
more deeply rooted in contexts of collective action.
3 Contexts of international collective action
“All politics is local politics.” This truism reminds us, quite rightly, that even 
in the area of transnational activism, local practices and strategies matter, 
provided the term “local” is used with care. No doubt the most accurate way 
of formulating this would be: “All political activity (even international) takes 
place somewhere.” Hence the importance of identifying that “somewhere,” 
of localizing it. How can this rule of interpretation be applied to the WSF 
in Dakar?
First of all, by understanding what this Forum represented in local poli-
tics, both at the Dakar level and in Senegalese political life. We know that 
representatives of the “Y’en a marre” (We’re fed up) movement spoke out 
during the event and that this group played an important role later on in chal-
lenging the rule of Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade. More broadly, it is 
necessary to grasp what the organization of this type of event tells us about 
the f ield of activism in Senegal, and even about its relationship to political 
power, which is more complex than clear-cut opposition to the authorities. 
In contrast, among the NGOs that participated in the Forum, we observed 
a form of associative activism sometimes closely linked to the authorities’ 
patronage networks. Beyond the Senegalese political f ield, we might note 
that the representations of political legitimacy may differ widely from one 
4 Signif icantly, long-distance nationalism has been inadequately studied in transnational 
social movement studies; for an exception see Guidry et al. (2000).
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national group to another and some of the most confrontational forms find 
less support among African participants than among Europeans, for example.
Contrary to the claims of space-blind social sciences, places are impor-
tant (Gieryn, 2000 and on forums, Reese et al., 2011) and they are another 
component of context. Of course we are referring here to physical locations 
and the constraints they place on organization, such as the campus of 
Cheikh Anta Diop University. But the history of places and the memories 
associated with them also count. The fact that the Assembly of the Social 
Movements (the concluding assembly of the WSF) was held in the main 
amphitheater of Cheikh Anta Diop University is signif icant: it was the same 
amphitheater in which Nicolas Sarkozy, then president of Senegal’s former 
colonial ruler, gave his all-too-famous speech in Dakar in 2007, asserting 
to the Senegalese intelligentsia that Africans had not “suff iciently entered 
into history.”
The advantage of this type of study is that researchers can simultaneously 
work on the overall survey population and then come back to focus on a 
national population (the two main ones here were the French and the Sen-
egalese) or a continental population (three large blocs were distinguished 
in Dakar: Europeans, Africans, and Latin Americans).5 The value of arriving 
at cautious generalities about alter-globalists is shown by Isabelle Sommier 
with regard to the French, Johanna Siméant with regard to the Senegalese 
and the French, and Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro, and Héloïse Nez 
with regard to the Latin Americans. At the same time, close-ups on national 
context reveal what certain aff inities with activism and protest practices 
owe to local activist traditions or to the influence of the organizations in 
the home country. Isabelle Sommier correctly emphasizes that it is diff icult 
to deduce a trend in the alter-global movement from the comparison of 
events that took place under the same label but in very different locations, 
involving different travel expenses and issues depending on the group. 
Thus, she asks, does the increase in the number of participants aff iliated 
to religious groups at the last two WSFs reveal the growing involvement of 
these groups in alter-globalism or simply that the African participants are 
more religious than their European counterparts? Similarly, the chapter 
by Johanna Siméant shows the considerable difference between Brazilian 
trade unionists who were not opposed to violent forms of protest, Senegalese 
participants who were wary of any form of dissent – even moderate, and 
left-wing Christians from France in favor of non-violent modes of action.
5 The number of participants from Asia and Oceania was extremely limited: the total number 
of respondents from Asia and Oceania accounted for 5.5% of the survey population.
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Therefore, if we limit the contextualization of transnational collective 
action to the processes of international mobilization in a local space (usually 
understood as referring to a national organizational f ield), we run the risk 
of neglecting the impact of certain international f ields and configurations. 
But that would mean reconstructing the most relevant aff iliations of the 
individuals at these events by determining which ones are national and refer 
to specif ic groups, training (in human rights, environment, etc.), special 
status (NGO employees, academic, etc.) and the meaning they take on in 
various contexts.
One last point to highlight an important lesson of this study: the value 
of multinational research teams. Due to lack of more plentiful funding, 
we kept the division of labor to a minimum within our research group. 
These moments of scientif ic and communitarian utopia, marked by shared 
commitment, helped to create a relatively limited division of scientif ic 
labor, culminating in research and data production practices that were at 
times the envy of other, better-endowed colleagues from other nationalities. 
They convinced us that it is sometimes possible to engage in social science 
differently.




Since the rise of the global justice movement (GJM), a number of surveys 
have been conducted, particularly on the composition of the social 
forums. This article examines the main surveys (Fisher, Ibase, Reese, 
Della Porta, Agrikoliansky and Sommier) and the possibility of their 
cumulative study, a task that curiously has not been undertaken until 
now. What do these surveys tell us about the activists’ socio-biological 
characteristics, political, and organizational aff iliations and ideological 
beliefs? We will see that, despite their common scientif ic interests, any 
comparison is delicate because of the methodology used and the way the 
questions are formulated. The surveys nevertheless paint a homogeneous 
portrait of the attendees.
Since its inception, the global justice movement (GJM) has been the topic 
of numerous studies. Some of the research has made use of a relatively 
recent method in the social sciences, i.e. conducting surveys during dem-
onstrations. This method has been consolidated and even become a routine 
procedure through regular use at protests over the past ten years. Known as 
INSURA (INdividual SUrveys during RAllies), it had been used only on rare 
occasions until it was given a methodological framework by Pierre Favre and 
his colleagues (Favre, Fillieule, and Mayer, 1997).1 Subsequently, the method 
came into systematic use with the emergence of the new movement oppos-
ing neoliberal globalization. It has accompanied this movement since the 
pioneering work of Della Porta et al. at the anti-G8 event in Genoa during the 
summer of 2001 (Andretta et al., 2002), followed by the quantitative surveys 
carried out at the European Social Forms (ESF) and the World Social Forums 
(WSF) up to and including the 2011 event in Dakar. Alter-global events are 
particularly well suited to this tool by their very conf iguration (usually 
1 Favre et al. cite three experiences prior to their 1994 survey: the f irst was at an antinuclear 
demonstration in Washington, D.C. on May 6, 1979, the second at a demonstration against 
Margaret Thatcher in Sheff ield in April 1983, and the third at a demonstration in favor of public 
school education in France on January 16, 1994 (Favre et al., 1997: 16-17).
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indoor meetings, protest camps or villages, and less frequently at marches 
where administering questionnaires is more delicate) and their audiences, 
which are usually willing to cooperate in answering survey questions. What 
is the real value of this research? What does it tell us about the activists’ 
socio-biological characteristics, political and organizational aff iliations 
and ideological beliefs? These questions have already been raised in a com-
parison made by Fillieule and Blanchard (2008) of two surveys conducted 
in France in 2003. Our study and its conclusions are in line with theirs, but 
it differs in two respects: it is less ambitious from a theoretical standpoint: 
the earlier researchers were seeking to assess the benefits of a method one 
of them had helped to invent, after it had been applied elsewhere. On the 
other hand, our research is more ambitious in terms of the number of studies 
included in the comparison – 20 surveys from 2000 to 2011 (presented in 
Part I). As we shall see, the surveys paint a homogeneous sociographic 
portrait of the attendees, but we will also have occasion to point out how the 
formulation of the questions can make comparison a delicate process, thus 
weakening the results or sometimes making it impossible to draw a conclu-
sion (Part II). Nevertheless, as Fillieule and Blanchard note (2008: 14), while 
“INSURA is certainly well suited to explore the demographics of alter-global 
events, as well as relational networks of individuals and multiple belongings 
(...) organization networks and the movement’s boundaries are far more 
diff icult to explore through, a fact that seriously limits international cross 
comparisons of movements based on that tool.” Like any survey concerned, 
by def inition, with individuals, it provides a realistic snapshot of them at 
a given time and is therefore necessarily ephemeral. As a result, it is not 
really designed to track the evolution of the multi-organizational f ield 
over time (Part III). We will conclude by looking at more heuristic research 
approaches that take advantage of INSURA’s contributions while at the 
same time allowing us to step back and grasp the connection between the 
micro-sociological level of the activist and the meso-sociological level of 
the organizations – something the automatic use of the INSURA method 
fails to bring out.
1.1 Data and methods
Contrary to the assertion of Reese et al. (2011: 64), many quantitative surveys 
have been conducted at alter-global events. One could sense this intuitively 
at social forums, for example, from the large number of researchers who 
were present or who were asking each other to f ill out questionnaires. 
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For our assessment, we chose twenty surveys on the necessarily selective 
basis of their academic reach, i.e. the fact that the results were published 
in research works or in French- or English-speaking peer-review journals. 
This means a great deal of research has not been included, either due to 
the language or because they were intended for a very small audience, 
such as grey literature or student theses. Social scientists clearly supported 
the alter-global movement in its early stages (Alberoni, 1981) beginning 
in 2000. Without a doubt, they promoted it, along with media coverage, 
giving it visibility and often legitimacy by adopting an empathetic or even 
committed viewpoint.2 Like most journalists, they began to turn away 
from it from 2007, with some exceptions, as evidenced by the drying up of 
new publications on the subject (but not reissues like Sen and Waterman, 
2012, Smith and Karides, 2014). Also, the book edited by Reese in 2011 (and 
reissued the following year) contains half of the articles already published 
in the mid-2000s on events prior to 2008. In short, this survey conducted in 
2011 in Dakar is the f irst large project for seven years. This academic interest 
and its subsequent discontinuation can be explained in three ways: f irst, 
the Western background of the researchers – of the seven teams, only one 
was from the “South” (Brazil), three were from Europe, two from the United 
States, and one from Australia; second, the changing form of the Forum, 
which has obviously become more routine and therefore less attractive in 
recent years, particularly in Western countries; third, the circularity of the 
GJM (i.e. the ties that developed between alter-global activists and move-
ment researchers may have initially led them to share their enthusiasm 
and later their disappointment).
Of the twenty studies (see Table 1), eight were conducted at WSFs (Ibase, 
2005 and 2007, Reese et al., 2011, Pommerolle et Siméant 2008), seven at 
counter-forums (Fisher et al., 2005, Andretta et al., 2002, Fillieule et al., 
2004), three at European Social Forums (Della Porta, 2009, Agrikoliansky 
and Sommier, 2005) and two at local social forums (Bramble in Australia, 
Reese et al. in the US). Though the questions were quite similar, as we will 
see in the next section, there was a perceptible difference in their sampling 
methods. With the help of WSF off ice support, the Brazilian Institute of 
Social and Economic Analyses (Ibase) built a stratif ied sample divided 
into four groups (Brazilian participants; Latin American participants; 
Participants from other countries; and Campers) according to the off icial 
2 In addition to Ibase (Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas), which conducts 
research on the WSF and is one of its main promoters in Brazil, we might also mention Tom 
Bramble, a co-organizer of the Australian GJM events that he also studies.
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registration database. The other surveys had no knowledge of the contours 
of the constellation of participants and either had to adopt a totally random 
selection method or weight their sample in varying ways. This could be done 
a priori by doubly saturating the sample, following very detailed survey 
preparation ahead of the event: f irst they studied the program to f ind the 
widest possible panel of lectures where survey team members would be 
present to distribute questionnaires, by comparing the discussion topics 
with the organizations represented on the platform; second, by setting up 
research teams to be present simultaneously at all the sites.3 The weighting 
could also be done a posteriori by adjusting the sample using the attend-
ance f igures provided by the main organizations at the anti-G8 in Genoa 
(Andretta, 2002: 221-222) or the regional and country-level registration data 
released by the WSF Organizing Committees in 2005 and 2007 (Reese 2008b, 
with sometimes surprising results as we will see later on). One f inal control 
technique, in keeping with the INSURA method (Favre et al., 1997: 21ff; 
Fillieule and Blanchard, 2008), consisted in giving very strict instructions 
on how to administer questionnaires.4
The surveys also varied according to the number of languages used, 
which was obviously higher for WSFs and reduced to a single vernacular 
language for local events such as the anti-G8 mobilization in Genoa in 2001 
or the Australian forums studied in 2004 by Bramble. Surveys differed above 
all in the number of questions asked, from the “lightest” version (e.g. the 
Fisher surveys contain only 6 short questions) to the longest: 56 questions 
at the last WSF in Dakar in 2011. It should be pointed out that only the 
latter survey distinguished between administered questionnaires (24% of 
the total number collected) and self-administered questionnaires (75%).
This article will focus primarily on surveys at the social forums for two 
main reasons. On the one hand, because they are the key innovation of the 
GJM and in a way symbolize it, even if they do not exhaust it. On the other 
hand, it is best to compare what is comparable; forums, counter-summits, 
and transnational campaigns do not mobilize exactly the same public 
insofar as the offer of commitment is not the same. The audience is more 
reflexive and expert in the forums, attracting a signif icantly older one with 
more institutional memberships, at least now (see later).
3 For example, at the anti-G8 protest in Evian (“forum of alternatives,” alternative camps – cf. 
Fillieule et al., 2004: 18) and the second ESF (Agrikoliansky and Sommier, 2005: 15), hence the 
volume of samples.
4 For the Fisher survey, for example, every f ifth person standing in line to enter a rally area, 
and at other events, choosing every f ifth person in a line or row, as determined by the researcher 
working in a particular area.
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Table 1.1  Chart summarizing the various surveys used (2000-2011)





2000-2002: 5 counter-summits 
(netherlands, uSa, canada)5
Fisher 1514 english, French, dutch, 
and German
July 2001: anti-G8, Genoa, italy della Porta 762 italians italian
november 2001: First eSF, 
Florence, italy
della Porta 2384-2579 english, French, italian, 
Spanish and German
may 2003: anti-G8, evian, France Sommier 2282 english, French, italian, 
and German
november 2003: Second eSF, 
Paris, France
Sommier 2198 english, French, italian, 
Spanish and German
may and September 2004: 
brisbane and Sydney Social 
Forums 
bramble 210 australians english
WSF 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007
ibase 2540 (for 2005) Portuguese, French, 
english and Spanish
2005: WSF, Porto alegre, brazil chase-dunn 625 Portuguese, english and 
Spanish
2005: WSF, Porto alegre, brazil reese 639 Portuguese, english and 
Spanish
2006: fourth eSF, athens, Greece della Porta 1058-1144 english, French, italian, 
Spanish and German
2007: WSF, nairobi, Kenya reese 535 Portuguese, english and 
Spanish, French, Swahili
2007: uSa Social Forum, atlanta reese 582 americans english and Spanish
2011: WSF, dakar, Senegal Siméant 1069-1169 english, French, Spanish, 
Portuguese and Wolof
* the research is obviously the work of more or less large teams; our decision here to use the name 
of the main initiator is intended to facilitate reading and certainly not to personalize the surveys. 
** the possible variation in the number of surveys can be explained by the variable number 
of questionnaires analyzed depending on the team’s researchers and/or the time required for 
statistical processing.
5 November 13-24, 2000: the “Human Dike” at the 2000 Conference of the Parties-6 (COP-6) 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Hague, the Netherlands 
(interviews with 204 protest participants from 25 countries); 2) February 2, 2002: the “Another 
World Is Possible March” at the 2002 World Economic Forum, New York City (316 surveys with 
participants from four countries.); 3) April 20, 2002: the “A20 Stop the War at Home and Abroad/
Mobilization for Global Justice” at the spring 2002 meetings of the World Bank/IMF, Washing-
ton, DC (177 participants from 28 of the 50 United States); 4) June 26-27 2002: the 2002 “G-6B 
Demonstration” during the G-8 meetings, Calgary, Canada (Eighty-six protesters from four 
countries); 5) September 28 and 29, 2002: the “Mobilization for Global Justice” at the fall 2002 
meetings of the World Bank/IMF, Washington, DC (730 participants from 11 countries).
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1.2 The seemingly convergent portrait of the alter-global 
activist
At f irst glance, the surveys would appear to be easy to compare, given the 
similarity in the questions asked by the researchers: basic demographic data 
(sex, age, diplomas, social position); membership in activist organizations 
(number and type of organizational aff iliations); political orientation: 
degree of politicization through the individual’s environment and use of 
political information tools, particularly the Internet; classif ication on the 
left-right scale; degree of trust in institutions and organizations, from the 
most grassroots level such as Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) to 
supranational bodies (UN, regional organizations) and the various ter-
ritorial authorities of the country of origin. The fact that the questions 
coincide can of course be explained by similar sociological backgrounds 
of the researchers and the routine academic propensity to ask standard 
questions regarding, for example, ideological or political self-positioning 
to make them comparable with off icial or traditional surveys, as well as 
the circulation and borrowing of questionnaires.6
Under closer scrutiny, however, these seemingly convergent questions 
produce results that are much less clear-cut and comparison ultimately 
proved more arduous than expected. In its broad strokes, the portrait that 
emerges of the alter-global activist remains homogeneous throughout a 
decade of surveys and corresponds to the usual depiction in that activists 
have more resources than the overall population average and these charac-
teristics are even more accentuated in this specif ic case. GJM activists are 
in a situation of “biographical availability,” to borrow McAdam’s now classic 
notion (1986: 70), characterized by the absence of family responsibilities 
(e.g. 60% of the participants at the 2005 WSF had no children under 18 
years of age) and youth, which reflects the era of classif ications and the 
uncertainties noted in studies on generations. According to Reese’s surveys, 
70% of the 2005 WSF respondents, 50% of the 2007 WSF respondents, and 
59% of 2007 USSF respondents were 35 years old or younger. They made up 
48% of attendees at the second ESF (but 35.2% of the activists who are very, 
regularly, and strongly involved in antiglobal mobilizations and have already 
participated in several no-global events are under 35 years of age) and 75% 
of attendees at the anti-G8 (see Table 2 for an overall demographic view).
6 The questionnaire used by the Della Porta team at the anti-G8 in Genoa and above all the 
f irst ESF provided the f irst model; it largely inspired the French surveys in 2003, which were in 
turn imported to Australia by Bramble.
What can quantitative SurveyS tell uS abOut GJm ac tiviStS? 27
Table 1.2  General socio-demographic data on social forum attendees (2002-2011) 
[in %]
ESF 2002 ESF 2003 WSF 2005 
(Ibase)
ESF 2006 WSF 2007 
(Reese)
WSF 2011
Female 46 51.1 49.4 45.1 47.6 43.20
Male 54 48.9 49.6 54.9 52.4 56.80
Under 25 years 
of age
47.5 24.5 42.2 29.3 24.7 11.34
College or 
university level
32.5 69.5 77.7 80.3 53 77.5
Alter-global activists possess a very high degree of cultural capital, which 
signif icantly distinguishes them from their non-activist compatriots. The 
survey shows that the activists also have a very high educational level: 51.6% 
of the participants in the second ESF had a post-graduate degree (more than 
3 years of university) and 17.9% a graduate degree (2 or 3 years of university); 
34% and 19%, respectively, among the 2003 No-G8 activists. This means that 
53% of no-global activists and 69.5% of ESF attendees have college or uni-
versity degrees. As a comparison, according to the European Social Survey, 
at the same period no more than 43% of French people had a comparable 
level of education. Two-thirds of the participants at Australian Social Forum 
meetings in 2002 had a graduate or postgraduate degree (Bramble, 2006). 
More than 50% of all respondents at the three meetings studied by Reese had 
16 or more years of education. USSF Atlanta respondents were the most highly 
educated (69%). In contrast, the WVS (World Values Survey) found that 
only 12% of respondents in the general public reported having a university 
degree, while the GSS reports that only 28% of US respondents reported 16 or 
more years of education (Reese, 2008b). The number of university-educated 
participants grew from one forum to the next (with the exception of Nairobi 
in 2007), including the WSF held in Dakar. The conclusion is beyond dispute, 
but we should not lose sight of the effects of widely varying educational 
systems from country to country, or of subtleties in the wording of the ques-
tions – e.g. asking whether an individual has reached a given level of study 
or whether he/she has obtained the f inal diploma – that can yield quite 
different results. Thus, we can take the example of the surveys conducted in 
parallel at the WSF in 2005 and 2007: 77.7% of the participants in 2005 had 
“begun or completed a university education” in the Ibase survey, whereas 
49% had an educational level of “16 or more years” according to the Reese 
survey. In 2007, the respective f igures were 82% and 53%.
28 iSabelle SOmmier 
Unfortunately, the social position of activists is diff icult to compare 
because the surveys, with the exception of the French questionnaires, either 
paid little attention to the question (Ibase) or did so in a highly impres-
sionistic fashion (see Table 3).7 The surveys conducted by Reese et al. claim 
to grasp social position through a feeling of class identity (upper, upper 
middle, lower middle – the most frequently declared –, working, lower 
class) and a catch-all category called “employment status,” aggregating 
full-time, part-time, temporary basis, self-employed, investments/savings, 
volunteer, unemployed, retired, student, and “dependent on family income,” 
with the total amply exceeding 100%. The Della Porta team included in the 
same “employment status” category: blue- and white-collar workers (26.5% 
of the attendees at the fourth ESF), upper class (professionals, managers, 
employers: 14.3%), teachers (9.2%), unemployed (5.5%), retirees (6.8%) and 
students (37.6%). We will therefore base our interpretation on the French 
surveys, as they deal with this subject more specif ically by comparing 
different questions: one open question (“What is your profession?”) and 
two closed questions concerning the respondent’s current occupational 
situation and his/her main area of activity today (or in the past for retirees).
Attendees at the second ESF clearly held high social positions (Gobille 
and Uysal, 2005): among those with an occupation, 42% were executive 
managers or working in a high-level intellectual occupation and 44.1% a 
mid-level occupation. The main categories in these two groups were mid-
level occupations in the healthcare and social work f ields (20.7%), college 
or university professors and scientif ic occupations (14%), schoolteachers 
(9.8%) or jobs in information technology, communication, and the arts 
(11.4%). Low-level occupations were dramatically underrepresented: white-
collar workers accounted for only 8.4% (40% from the public sector) and 
7 There are several hypotheses that could explain the extreme variations in the amount of 
attention given to questions pertaining to socio-professional status: 1) the aims of the research 
undertaken, which may have little to do with this topic (e.g. Fisher’s interest in mobilizing 
organizations conveyed through six questions or Della Porta’s focus on the internal workings of 
SMOs and their relationship with institutions, in line with the European Union call for tenders 
on the contribution of social movements to democracy, or at the opposite extreme, the activist 
orientation of the surveys conducted by Ibase); 2) the different disciplines of the teams, not 
always sociology of social movements like Della Porta or the French researchers (e.g. Bramble 
is an economist and trade unionist, Reese a specialist on the Welfare State and women, Fisher 
on the environment, etc.); 3) the specif icity of the professional nomenclatures used in France 
(the socio-professional “categories” since the post-war period, inspired by constructivism), a 
fortiori in a sociology inspired by Bourdieu, no doubt destined to disappear with the project to 
harmonize European Union socio-economic classif ications (ESeC), inspired by the opposing 
Anglo-Saxon model.
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blue-collar workers 2.2%. In France, these two categories represented 
56.5% of the active population in 2002. This particular sociological prof ile 
was reinforced by the social origin and social position of the respondent’s 
husband or wife. Half of the activists’ spouses belonged to the public sector, 
40% were managers or engaged in a high-level intellectual occupation, 
34% were in mid-level occupations, 3% were blue-collar workers, and 10% 
white-collar workers. Among the parents of the activists in our sample, 
53% of the mothers worked in the public sector (often as teachers – 10.5% 
in all) or mid-level healthcare and social workers (10.3%); 42% of the fathers 
worked in the public sector. Managers and high-level intellectual occupa-
tions are overrepresented – 34% of the fathers of our sample. White-collar 
workers (12% of the fathers) and blue-collar workers (15% of the fathers) are 
underrepresented, whereas these three categories represented, respectively, 
10%, 15%, and 40% of the fathers of French people in their thirties at the 
same time.
This breakdown, which is the reverse social stratif ication of the general 
population, was (remarkably!) conf irmed at the WSF in Dakar. In that 
case, too, executives and high-level intellectual occupations (43.3%) and 
mid-level professions (26.48%) were predominant; among those, teachers 
(19.47%), healthcare and social workers (12.81%) were the most numerous. 
Working class categories were very much underrepresented: 5.4% white-
collar workers, 3% blue-collar workers, 1.45% farmers, and 5% artisans, 
shopkeepers and small businessmen (15.37% without job). Of course one 
might reasonably conclude that the method actually discourages those 
with the least cultural and social capital, who are probably less inclined 
to agree to f ill out a questionnaire, but this bias is not enough to explain 
such a strong contrast nor does it invalidate the observation that the alter-
global population is well integrated in the workplace. These trends can be 
explained in two ways. On the one hand, the effects of the form of action 
itself: a forum is similar to an academic conference where people come to 
learn and discuss – and already, one must know its existence, contrary to 
a demonstration, for example, which one can cross by chance. It can be 
intimidating to those without (rightly or wrongly) political or intellectual 
competence, a fortiori if it stands in a place dedicated to knowledge, such as 
a university as was the case in Dakar. On the other hand, this strong social 
selectivity induced by the “forum form” has probably increased over the 10 
years of experience, as we shall see later.
The activists’ social circles also appear to be very socially committed. Less 
than 20% of participants at the second ESF and the Evian No-G8 declared 
that neither their colleagues nor their family or friends were “rather active 
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activists”; 34% of them declared that two or three of these three social circles 
were (Fillieule and Blanchard, 2008). Furthermore, 54% of the respondents 
talked about politics often or very often with their colleagues at work, 65% 
at home with their families, and 80% with their friends. Among their social 
relations, 36% were active and 12% very active in the alter-global movement 
(Fillieule et al., 2004). The osmosis appeared even stronger in 2011: 66.8% 
of the friends of WSF participants, 71.51% of their colleagues, and 31.62% 
of their families were either very or rather active.
The “middle class radicalism” (Cosgrove and Duff, 1980) of alter-global 
activists can be explained by their interest in politics and a feeling of 
political competence nurtured by their very high level of education and 
highly qualif ied jobs, often linked to professions involving social control 
(healthcare, teaching, social work). They have a very critical attitude 
towards institutions: 70% of the attendees at the second ESF did not 
trust regional authorities, 82% national ones, 72% political parties, 76% 
European authorities, 62% the UN. They were less suspicious of municipal 
authorities (50% trust them) and the degree of confidence increased with 
the proximity of the institution: 54.5% trust trade unions, 77% NGOs, 90% 
grassroots associations (Gobille and Uysal, 2005: 115). The degree of distrust 
Table 1.3  Change in the participants’ occupational situation (2002-2011) [in %]




WSF 2007 WSF 2011**
Student 54.8 23.7 51 38.3 17.3 16.28 





retired 2.0 12.2 n.a. 6.5 5.7 9.35
unemployed 5.1 10.0 n.a. 5.7 11.4 6.55
Working 
population
37.5 53.2 n.a. 49.5 87.5*** 66.7****
total 100 100 100 124.7 100.4
valid cases 2429 2120 1144 1069
* andretta & Sommier 2009: 116; in comparison, at the same period students represented 6.6% of 
the european population and retirees 21.5% 
** For 2011, calculated using a binary method (yes/no) in which some respondents checked several 
categories, therefore no total % 
*** aggregation of full time (34%), part time (9.5), temporary basis 5.5), self-employed (19), 
investments/savings (1.7), volunteer (17.8%); unweighted data 
**** aggregation of 47% who said they worked full time, 11.69% part time and 8% unstable 
employment
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was higher at the 2005 WSF: 82.1% distrusted banks and 81.6% international 
companies, but 35% trusted trade unions, 58.3% NGOs, and 70.6% social 
movements (Ibase). These results are, to say the least, as expected within 
an activist arena like the GJM and therefore have little to teach us.
The widespread distrust of institutions and their representatives does 
not, however, lead to a loss of interest in politics or a withdrawal from public 
life; on the contrary, 76% of the participants at the second ESF declared they 
systematically voted in elections and 11% often did so (respectively 65.1% 
and 15.5% of attendees in Dakar). 18% currently belonged to a party and 
16.2% had done so in the past, but the percentage was higher among more 
active activists (respectively 31% and 19.8%). 78% positioned themselves 
on the left (31% of them on the far left), only 3.4% of them in the center or 
on the right. 18% refused to declare their position. The tendency was the 
same among participants at the 2005 WSF, although the categories were 
different: 60.1% left; 19.8% center-left; 4.5% center; 0.6% center-right; 1.6% 
right, and 13.4% No position (source: Ibase). Here, too, the question itself 
and the comparison are of only limited interest, as the meaning of the terms 
“left,” “far left,” “right,” etc. varies from one country to the next.
The high degree of social integration and political participation of 
alter-global activists validates the theory of Sidney Tarrow (2001), who 
describes them as “rooted cosmopolitans.” Indeed, the ability to project 
oneself into transnational issues and events presupposes solid resources 
and national roots. The French researchers developed Tarrow’s idea by 
assessing these cosmopolitan aptitudes using three indicators: multilingual 
skills, experience of living abroad and the number and type of ties kept up 
with foreigners. From all of these points of view, the participants in the 
second ESF are very specif ic about their relationships with the world: 76% 
speak one or more foreign languages besides French (33% one, 30% two, 
9% three).8 To the question “Do you have ties in other countries?” 34% gave 
a positive answer for professional reasons, 45% gave a positive answer for 
family reasons, and 76% gave a positive answer for friendship reasons. 37% 
of them had lived abroad, 19% for a year or less, 18% for two or more years, 
72% for professional reasons, 14% for personal reasons, 6% due to exile 
or emigration, and 4% to travel. 23% went to other countries to engage in 
political activism: 17.7% sometimes and 5% often, 70% to Europe (Gobille 
and Uysal, 2005: 115ff).
From a sociographic standpoint, certain changes can be discerned over 
the long term: the ratio of male to female activists has grown consistently 
8 In 1996, only 37% of French people declared they could speak a foreign language.
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higher, the average age of activists is higher and there are correlatively 
fewer student activists. The median age was 25 in Florence, 35 in Paris, 31 in 
Athens, and 40 in Dakar, and the percentage of student attendees dropped 
from 53% in 2002 to 12.5% in 2011. This overall evolution was particularly 
pronounced at the last WSF, whereas the 2005 WSF was an exception to 
the rule – young people and students were particularly overrepresented 
and far more numerous than at previous forums: 31% of attendees were 
under age 25 in 2003 and 37.4% in 2004. The absence of quantitative 
surveys between 2008 and 2011 makes it diff icult to interpret the shift: 
was the last forum unusual or did it merely accentuate earlier trends? 
Although the indicators of membership in professions and organizations 
are few and far between and hence hard to compare, they may perhaps 
provide a key to interpretation or at the very least a plausible hypothesis. 
But interpreting them makes the problem of survey comparability even 
more acute.
1.3 The evolution of the multi-organizational field of alter-
globalism: a delicate comparison
Knowing that activist groups attract different audiences, one might think 
that these sociographic changes partly reflect the evolution of the multi-
organizational f ield (Curtis and Zurcher, 1973). Monitoring at three ESFs 
from 2002 to 2006 already revealed the increased professionalization of 
alter-global activists, along with a higher percentage of males from one 
event to the next. As we noted earlier (Andretta and Sommier, 2009: 119), 
“while the gender of professional activists was very balanced in 2003, the 
number of males in positions of responsibility had jumped signif icantly 
four years later, bringing the ESF back to the usual unequal division of 
political labor between genders (60% men versus 40% women).”9 The same 
trend was found at the WSFs: unsurprisingly, the farther the activists had 
to travel from home to attend the Forum and therefore the higher the cost 
of their activism, the more pronounced the gender gap became. Activist 
employment in the private sector has clearly declined, whereas there has 
been a spectacular increase in jobs in NGOs, which rose from 1.2% in 2002 to 
9 When we consider the country of permanent residence of the professional activists, we 
notice a great disparity between countries, ranging from 48.5% of men in Greece (the only 
country where professional activists are predominantly feminine) to 71% in Italy, 63.6% in 
Germany, 58% in Belgium, France, and Spain, and 55% in Great Britain.
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30% in 2011 (see Table 4). Does the growth of employment in NGOs indicate 
professionalization of the GJM? It is diff icult to determine the number of 
employees of organizations due to variations in the formulation of survey 
questions (when they are known, which is not the case for the Reese 
surveys).10 At the second ESF, 21% (420 people) of organization members 
declared they were paid-staff members or members of the leadership; the 
figure was 38% (326 people) at the fourth ESF, an increase of 17%. “Ordinary” 
activists without responsibilities or mandates represented respectively 
79% and 62% of the sample (Andretta and Sommier, 2009: 118-119). Leaders 
and paid-staff members accounted for 48.1% at the 2007 WSF and 66.1% 
at the 2007 USSF (Reese, 2011: 69) – sizable f igures that can perhaps be 
explained by the number of participants who came as representatives of 
their organization (77.4% and 68%, respectively). At the last WSF, 21.35% 
stated they were currently paid staff members of an organization and 13.31% 
had been previously.
Table 1.4  Attendees’ employment sectors (2002-2011) [in %]
Employment 
sector 
ESF 2002 ESF 2003* WSF 2005 
Ibase
ESF 2006 WSF 2011
Public sector 50.8 46.1 17.5 47.5 25.88
Private sector 48 21.6 8.9 29 18.82 (5.75 
in informal 
sector)
associative sector 1.2 20.8 11.5 23.5 30.07
Self-employed 
professionals
n.a. 8.1 8.4 n.a. 11.76
agriculture n.a. n.a. 5.75
Others n.a. 3.4 12.9 (students 
make up more 
than 40.8%)
n.a. 7.19
*total of people in employment only n = 1,215 
n.b.! For 2011, the binary method (yes/no) was used to calculate the numbers for each sector and 
some respondents checked several choices, hence no total in terms of %.
10 For the 2003 WSF, the question was formulated as follows: “Are you, or have you ever been, a 
permanent and/or paid staff member of an organization?” For the 2011 WSF: “Are you or have you 
ever been a paid staff member of an organization?” (Note that the question is more restrictive 
than the previous ones because it excludes leaders who are not necessarily paid.) But for the 2006 
WSF: “What is your position in this group?” with 5 possible choices: member of the leadership, 
paid staff member, voluntary activist/campaigner, ordinary member, not actively involved in 
the group.
34 iSabelle SOmmier 
Over the 10-year period under study, a cluster of indicators appears to con-
firm the growing presence of seasoned participants increasingly supervised 
by their organizations. Over the long term, aside from 2007 (80.4%), the 
percentage of f irst-time participants dropped by half, from 60.7% in 2005 
to 33% in 2011. All of the audiences declared in steadily larger numbers that 
they were members of a group, even in 2007: 78% in 2003, 80.4% in 2005, 
85.1% in 2007 and 94% in 2011. At the 2011 WSF, nearly 70% even declared 
they had come on behalf of an organization, which paid the travel expenses 
of 44% of them.
To examine further the hypothesis of a changing organizational balance, 
which would explain the professionalization or even the gradual “NGOiza-
tion” of the alter-global movement glimpsed at the fourth ESF, it would be 
necessary to reconstruct in minute detail the multi-organizational f ield 
from one event to the next. On the crucial question regarding membership 
in an activist organization, however, the possibilities for comparison are 
discouragingly limited. The fourth ESF survey, directed by D. Della Porta, 
framed one question differently from the way it was asked in other inquiries 
(“Have you ever been involved in any of the following kinds of voluntary/
campaign groups?”). As a result, it cannot be compared because taking 
part in an event in no way signif ies belonging to a group.11 Reese and Ibase 
show little interest in this problem and base their approach on a typology 
that notably contrasts NGOs with SMOs (social movement organizations). 
The interest of this opposition in the case of GJM would deserve a thorough 
discussion that this chapter does not allow (a social movement is often 
composed of formal organizations such as NGOs, interactions, and networks 
of individuals)12. At this point we will just mention that the interpretation 
is diff icult insofar as the authors give no explanation of the principles that 
have guided their typology (see Table 5).
Consequently, there is little benefit to be gained from this comparison, 
except to point out the decline in the participation of trade unions and 
unaff iliated individuals, on the one hand, and the increased number of 
political parties and religious groups on the other. A valuable comparison 
would require working from strictly identical empirical protocols. For now, 
to chart the evolution of the GJM “multi-organizational f ield,” we will once 
again use the comparable surveys conducted by the French teams (see Table 
6). They reveal notable changes. The alter-global groups in the true sense 
11 Unsurprisingly, the results are consistently much higher than when the question pertains 
to activist aff iliations.
12 On this discussion, see for example Diani, 1992.
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appear to have diminished considerably, as their membership has fallen 
from 1st place in 2003 to 4th place in 2011. Human rights organizations are now 
in f irst place, having nearly doubled from 16% to 28.6%. Four other groups 
show signif icant increases: peasant groups, with f ive times more members; 
feminists were three times more present in 2011 and even more when they 
are aggregated with the “women’s associations” category (16.4%), which 
was added to neutralize the negative effect feminist activism sometimes 
has; neighborhood associations and religious groups, with twice as many 
participants. Keeping in mind the growth of the NGO sector and the number 
of paid organizational staff members mentioned earlier, there are indeed 
convergent signs of a gradual “NGOization” of the GJM, perhaps accentuated 
by the effect of the location of the 2011 WSF, with the preponderance of 
human rights associations acting as a source of job creation as much as of 
activism in Africa. The rise of transnational aid organizations and human 
rights defense organizations, however, had already been noted by Byrd et 
al. (2010) over the period 2003-05. Further investigations are necessary to 
confirm this NGOization and to see if it refers to the same phenomena as 
those studied by Lang (2013): professionalization, institutionalization, and 
bureaucratization.
Even if those surveys had followed an identical protocol, the comparison 
would have soon revealed the limits of the INSURA method. Indeed, alter-
global events primarily mobilize a local population and hence take place in 
a given socio-cultural space and a particular political and historical context. 
Table 1.5  Organizational affiliations (2003-2011) [in %]




WSF 2007 USSF 2007 WSF 2011
nGO n.a. 33.8 41.3 56.2 33.7 n.a.
labor unions 24 15 21.8 11.6 19.6 14.78
Political 
parties
18 11.3 20.6 6.8 7.7 24.23
SmO n.a. 28.5 36.3 17.4 52.3 n.a.
Government 
agencies
n.a. n.a. 3.2 1.9 3.7
religious 
groups
7 n.a. n.a. 10.7 5.9 13
Others n.a. 11.3 n.a.
no affiliations 22 44.6* 19.6 14.9 11.1 6
* the above figures relate to 55.4% of individuals reporting a membership; we added the figure 
of 44.6% that correspond to 44.1% without affiliation and 0.5 nS/nO. note the considerable 
difference between the results obtained by reese and ibase for the same 2005 WSF event!
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For example, 80% of the respondents at the 2005 WSF came from Brazil and 
8.8% from the rest of Latin America;13 83% of those at the second ESF were 
French, which no doubt explains the overrepresentation of attendees from 
the public sector (46% of the participants were public sector employees), the 
choice of “defending public services” as a mobilizing topic and the presence 
of trade unions and the French Communist Party. The data collected at the 
WSF in Dakar shows more balanced results with 50% of the participants 
13 The interpretation of the results is therefore quite different when they are broken down into 
sub-populations. For example, the overall percentage of participants with a master’s degree or 
a PhD is 9.8%, but 9.9% among Latin Americans, 10% among Brazilians, and 29.4% among the 
individuals from other countries.
Table 1.6  Present memberships (2003-2011) [in %]
Type of organization No-G8 2003* ESF 2003* WSF 2011
GJm 35 40 22.21
environmental 22 18 19.46
Political party 22 18 24.23
humanitarian 20 22 24.86
trade union 17 24 14.78
migrants, anti-racists 17 12 18
Peace 16 17 14.78 (+ 14.31 peace-
building, post-conflict
human rights 16 16 28.57
Students 15 7 14.6 (with youths)
youth 13 7 -
charity, social aid 13 12 10.57
Squatters 9 5 n.a.





religious 7 6 13
unemployed, without house 6 7 7.6
consumption 5 5 7.4
Gay and lesbian 3 4 4.5
Farmers 2 3 11




Others 17 11 7.7 (but not comparable)
* Fillieule and blanchard 2008
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from Africa (28% from Senegal), 32% from Europe (20% from France), and 
12.5% from the American continent.
The fact that the participants at so-called “global” events mainly come 
from the host country is clearly reflected in the aff iliations claimed at the 
2005 WSF in Porto Alegre (Ibase data). The aff iliations refer in large part 
to specif ically Brazilian issues: 23.9% belonged to groups from “areas of 
action” including education (21.9%), social aid (19.5%), anti-discrimination 
(18.7%), arts and culture (18%), public organization/participation (17.3%), 
HESCER (human, economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights) 
(15.7%), environment (15.2%), agriculture and land issues (14.5%), defending 
and promoting rights (advocacy), and 14.1% public policies/public budget. 
And no doubt researchers show sensitivity to the local prism by focusing on 
what appear to be key issues, a fortiori when they are citizens of the country 
hosting the event, or by totally ignoring others. Thus ethnic composition is 
totally absent from European surveys but central to Anglo-Saxon question-
naires, whereas some contain special items such as the categories of “arts 
and culture” (18.7% of the organizations) or “Public policies/Public budget” 
(14.1%) shown by Ibase in its study on the 2005 WSF in Porto Alegre; or 
those of “cooperatives and tontines” and “right to education” adopted by 
the researchers who went to Dakar in 2011.
It is therefore a delicate matter to infer any change at all in the overall 
GJM from the comparison of events that take place, under the same label, in 
extremely different locations, and therefore do not imply the same costs or 
the same issues, depending on the group. Does the increase in the number 
of members of religious groups attending the last two World Social Forums 
express their growing involvement in the GJM or simply a greater degree 
of religious aff iliation among African participants than Europeans?14 Is 
the increase in peasant organizations more than a mere artifact masking 
varying degrees of mobilization depending on the continent? Indeed, it is 
quite possible that some participating groups use GJM events to put forward 
national demands through the “boomerang effect” described by M. Keck 
and K. Sikkink (1998). A transnational activist event like the WSF neces-
sarily gives rise to intense strategies on the part of associations to ensure 
their legitimacy in the eyes of their sponsors as well as their competitors; 
“naturally international” NGOs will come in search of local grassroots 
14 Religious beliefs have not always been surveyed in the questionnaires, and when they 
have been, it was through noticeably different questions. At the 2003 WSF, 75% of participants 
declared they were unbelievers and 54.6% of those at the USSF in 2007, but 28% at the WSF 
held the same year and 30% at the last WSF.
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constituencies, “as close to the f ield as possible,” whereas the ability for 
national groups to attend is an appreciable opportunity to stand out and 
“rise above” the others.
1.4 Conclusion
Finally, the absence thus far of any analytical assessment of the various 
surveys is perhaps due to modesty. The portion of common questions that 
are worth comparing (and above all likely to be compared) is essentially 
limited to the most basic data: sex, age, diplomas, and the overall volume 
of organizational aff iliations. Others (political self-positioning, degree of 
trust in institutions or “solutions” recommended to achieve the goals of the 
cause such as “reform” or “abolish” capitalism) yield anticipated results. 
Hence there is not much to say about them,15 except to emphasize the aspect 
of self-presentation and playing the activist role expected at mobilization 
events, which the method and the situation necessarily generate. Only 
in-depth, face-to-face interviews outside the context of such events would 
provide a clear picture of the activists’ world of values. On the other hand, 
the comparison clearly fails on two essential points: professional affiliations 
and the type of organizational memberships, which seemed to interest only 
the French teams.
Beyond what the INSURA method can (or cannot) say, these problems of 
comparison (and hence the low degree of cumulative survey results) also 
testify to the assumptions made by many researchers when conducting their 
studies that create an enchanted vision of this “new” cause shared with the 
activists. These assumptions fall into two categories:16 f irst, that the GJM is 
unif ied, therefore authorizing discussion of a single alter-global movement 
as a homogenous whole, regardless of the type of event or where it is held; 
second, that the GJM is truly “global,” i.e. freed from “cumbersome” national 
features to express an “international civil society.” Such assumptions are 
implicit in surveys providing only aggregated data that does not distinguish 
varying results according to the national origins of the attendees or fail 
to take the precaution of pointing out method biases. They are obviously 
less frequent in research such as surveys at local forums (like Bramble 
15 That is the reason why we did not use them, or the questions on Internet.
16 In fact three categories, when we add the assumption about the “radically new” nature of the 
GJM, which we will not discuss here. Regarding these three assumptions and their implications 
for the research undertaken, cf. the introduction to Sommier et al., 2008.
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in Australia) or the anti-summit in Genoa with only Italian respondents 
(Andretta et al., 2002). Should the survey focus therefore be strictly local? 
We think not.
In addition to taking traditional methodological precautions, there are 
three ways to employ the INSURA method in working with data from the 
“global” mobilizations of the GJM that do justice to the extreme heterogene-
ity of the audiences and how the cause is used. They also indicate avenues 
for future research if the surveys are used again or even systematized. 
One of them (Sommier, forthcoming) consists in monitoring the morphol-
ogy of a national delegation over time, from one mobilization episode to 
another, thereby confronting the transnational assumption head-on. This 
approach notes the specif icities of a particular population (e.g. the rooted 
cosmopolitans) and maps the changes in the transnational involvement of 
movement families in a given country. The two dimensions – individual and 
organizational – are interwoven. Indeed, it would seem that the increased 
age and feminization of French participants at WSFs reflect a shift in the 
center of gravity of the multi-organizational f ield from the original social 
issue to growing advocacy.17 Two other interpretations of the survey results 
at “global” events have already succeeded in making a genuine contribution 
to our knowledge. They both emphasize the plurality of WSF audiences. 
The f irst breaks down attendees into sub-samples, based either on the 
geographical distance separating the participant’s country of origin from 
the event location,18 or on his/her degree of involvement,19 thus linking the 
individual to the collective or the micro- and meso-sociological levels. The 
17 If this hypothesis were to be conf irmed, it would indicate rampant “NGOization” of the 
global justice movement in France, in line with the overall changes in “forum”-type events, 
notably expressed in the change of name from altermondialisme to GJM. On this point, cf. 
Sommier et al., 2008.
18 Connections with an organization are obviously more frequent among the non-local protest 
participants, as the surveys conducted by Fisher (2005) clearly show: 47.4% of them heard about 
the event from an organization (versus 30.5% for the local ones); 51.8% came to the protest with 
an organization (versus 22.8%), and about 31% received organizational support to attend the 
protest events (versus 5.2%). This was also true at the Anti-G8 event in Evian: 49% of the foreign 
activists belonged to one of the groups organizing the event, compared with 39% of the Swiss 
and French. “59% of the foreigners asserted that an organization was behind their decision to 
participate, compared with only 39% of the Swiss and French activists; moreover 42% of them 
came directly with their organizations, versus 24% of the French and the Swiss” (Agrikoliansky 
and Gobille, 2009: 152). Cf. the chapter devoted to Latin Americans in the present volume.
19 Fillieule et al. (2004) divide the anti-G8 population into four groups: the uncommitted (23%); 
the mono-committed (18%), particularly present in young, politicized GJM organizations; those 
involved in 2-6 organizations (49%) and those involved in 7 or more organizations (9%), with 
a broader range of commitments among the 21 types proposed.
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second gauges the effects of the repertoire of available actions on the form 
of activist involvement.20 It is thus care to avoid considering different WSF 
episodes as equivalent, by measuring the impact of “forum”-type events 
on the form of activism. The article by Agrikoliansky and Gobille (2009) is 
noteworthy in that it compares two events held close together in time and 
space based on similar survey protocols. On the one hand, the social forums 
give priority to “forms of actions combined with intellectual know-how” and 
encourage “aptitudes for consultation and dialog with public authorities, 
especially the municipalities” that host the events; on the other hand, the 
more confrontational forms such as anti-summits attract “young, macho 
activists” (2009: 164). The authors offer an interesting hypothesis to explain 
the evolution of WSFs: after initially contributing to the emergence of the 
GJM, the counter-summits declined under the effects of police repression in 
favor of more controlled and controllable social forums which attract a less 
confrontational public; in the process, they lost the support of the younger, 
more radical elements (who perhaps turned to other types of struggle such 
as the indignados and Occupy movements). Clearly, these approaches do 
not invalidate the INSURA method itself but merely its routine use and they 
invite researchers to show some sociological imagination (Wright-Mills, 
1959) and depart from the method’s fetish for scientism.
20 On this question, cf. Chapter 3 by J. Siméant in the present work.
2 Activist encounters at the World Social 
Forum
Nationalism and sovereignty in an internationalized event
Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle
Abstract
Expressions of nationalism and defense of sovereignty were many at 
the World Social Forum in Dakar. In this historically international and 
internationalist event, nationalist symbols and slogans – Brazilian flags, 
Palestinian keffiyeh, T-shirt “Guinea is back,” Congolese hymns – seem to 
be ordinary activist repertoires as long as they are not contested by other 
groups of participants. Why and how do nationalism and sovereignty 
become legitimate repertoires of internationalized activist claims? Our 
main hypothesis is that the World Social Forum is a delocalized place of 
encounters where people often gather around basic national ties as well as 
around some common causes based on “working misunderstandings” (M. 
Sahlins). Disconnected from their own territories, these claims benefit 
from this distance and match the diverse expectations of the participants: 
nationalist intellectuals from the South, anti-imperialist activists from 
the North, and politicians from everywhere invest nationalist symbols 
and discourses for their own purposes and along their own schemes.
Flags, costumes, songs – national symbols are plentiful at World Social 
Forums, in their grand marches, the crowds amassed in front of podiums 
and the workshops. “Country tents” are mounted in the middle of activist 
stands, where “compatriot” militants gather among themselves – Congolese, 
Brazilians, or Moroccans.1 In Dakar in 2011, those symbols sometimes 
accompanied f iery nationalist speeches (concerning the Western Sahara 
or Ivory Coast, which was in crisis at the time), generating controversies 
over the legitimacy of such issues at an alter-globalist site. At the meeting 
of the International Council of the WSF to assess the Dakar event just after 
it ended, Gus Massiah, one of the movement’s historic f igures, denounced 
1 I would like to thank the whole research team for sharing information, observations, and 
analysis throughout the survey as well as the participants at the conference “Enquêter sur (et dans) 
des événements militants internationaux”, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, April 13, 2012
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the violence displayed over the issue of the Western Sahara and asked that 
“tents” for national delegations be prohibited at future forums. He also 
condemned the presence of political leaders, now a routine occurrence, 
which in his view is contrary to the “spirit” of the WSF. Nationalists and state 
representatives would thus no longer be welcome at WSFs. What accounts 
for the profusion of nationalist symbols, practices, and discourses and the 
controversies they engender in a cosmopolitan forum aspiring to carry on 
the legacy of internationalism?
By nationalist symbols, discourses, and practices, I mean the traditional 
forms of sociability of the citizens from the same country, as well as the ac-
tivation of national stereotypes in “encounters” with others and, of course, 
nationalist claims. The latter are sometimes accompanied by sovereignty 
claims, defending states and leaders of the global South and celebrating 
the nation-state. I argue here that the proliferation of these nationalist and 
sovereigntist registers refers not only to an ideological discourse that is 
more or less debated within the open space of the alter-global movement, 
but also to the specif ic social dynamics of this type of internationalist 
“event” which is f irst and foremost a space of cosmopolitan encounters. It 
is these encounters, both familiar and novel, that dictate the production 
of nationalist discourses, which are discourses on oneself for oneself and 
for others. The study of “long-distance nationalism” by Benedict Ander-
son begins with an evocative statement made by a British politician and 
thinker in the 1860s: “Exile is the nursery for nationalism,” indicating the 
extent to which nationalisms have historically depended on leaders in 
exile and travel has revealed and promoted the feeling of national identity 
(Anderson, 1998: 59). In this case, nationalist causes are shaped by processes 
of internationalization within the WSF and reconf igured by its space: 
geographical distance euphemizes and lends them enchantment and, at 
the same time, they are strongly determined by the prevailing social and 
political dynamics in the national space concerned. To see how nationalist 
discourse is produced via this internationalizing process, we must view 
the WSF as a space of encounters and examine the social interactions that 
take place within it.
The WSF has already been studied as both a cosmopolitan and colonial 
“contact zone” (Alvarez et al., 2008; Chase Dunn et al., 2009; Conway, 2011, 
2012; Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011). These research works mainly analyze 
the structurally asymmetrical relationships between participants from 
the North and the South. Their purpose is to highlight the material and 
symbolic inequalities within a space intended to combat them and note 
whether those with the fewest resources are able to make their voices 
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heard. Without denying these asymmetrical relationships, in this chapter I 
will focus instead on the productivity of encounters between participants 
who share certain alter-globalization codes but sometimes have divergent 
expectations and perceptions of such an event. I maintain that these 
misunderstandings are precisely what enable them to unite around 
common causes, particularly nationalist causes supported by some and 
unfamiliar to others. WSF participants from diverse backgrounds come 
together to join in shared activist practices, even if their objectives and 
expectations are different. The concept of the “working misunderstand-
ing,” f irst employed to think about “colonial encounters” (Bayart, 1993; 
Marshall, 1981) and other postcolonial situations such as tourism (Chabloz, 
2007; Doquet, 2005), is useful for analyzing these cosmopolitan activist 
encounters. It provides a unif ied way to think about unequal positions, 
how stereotypes are activated in international contexts and the diverg-
ing and even contradictory expectations and interests and converging 
practices that form the core of such encounters and the assessment of 
alter-global events. Such a forum can therefore be grasped as an event in 
itself, producing new interactions and practices, and also as a projection 
of local social worlds.
To explore national and nationalist practices more specif ically in this 
context, I also refer to research on social relationships within internation-
alized spaces (international institutions or transnational networks). The 
few sociological studies we have pertaining to the diplomatic profession 
emphasize the need to consider international space as a social space in 
which the expectations of several social (and professional) circles are 
intertwined (Ambrosetti, 2010; Barnett, 1998; Buchet de Neuilly, 2009; 
Kingston de Leusse, 1998): those of direct interlocutors (the people with 
whom one negotiates), those in the national delegation and those at the 
national headquarters. The diplomat’s task is to play on these different 
expectations in an ongoing process of constructing what is all too often 
taken for granted: “the national interest.” This understanding of interna-
tional space can be transposed to the WSF. The participants construct a 
discourse and adopt practices they deem suited to their multiple audiences 
and interlocutors, their own convictions and those to whom they will be 
held accountable for their activities. The nationalist discourses formulated 
at the WSF, whether in favor of decolonizing the Western Sahara (presented 
as the “last African colony”2) or demanding “Neither military intervention 
2 This expression was the title of a workshop listed in the program of the WSF in Dakar, but 
f inally canceled after rather violent conflicts erupted at the start of the workshop.
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nor secession, but rather negotiated solutions” in Ivory Coast, are forged at 
the point where these diverse constraints come together: the intersection 
of anti-imperialist discourse (the crucible of alter-globalization), pacif ism 
and a taste for “militant exoticism” and activism on the part of participants 
from the North. Sometimes such discourse takes on nationalist issues and 
registers that are by no means consensual at these forums (particularly 
regarding sovereignty and violence) and arouse heated debate. The rela-
tionship between internationalized social practices and the nation-state 
is also at the heart of thinking about how international organizations 
work and how the state relates to international civil servants (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 1999; Haas, 1992). Contrary to realist and functionalist theories, 
the (historical) sociology of international organizations shows that the 
strength or weakness of relationships between national and international 
spaces depends on the political situation and how institutionalized the 
international organization has become as much as on the leeway and ability 
of experts and international civil servants to negotiate with their national 
government. These studies demonstrate very clearly that loyalty to the 
nation-state does not dissolve in the international space of these institu-
tions. What is particularly interesting in our case is that it does not dissolve 
in activist international spaces either: the ordinary forms of sociability in 
international situations even help to blur the boundary line between state 
and non-state sectors.
The eleventh WSF generated an unusual amount of controversy over 
nationalism and the role of states, due especially to the visibility of 
nationalist discourses (Saharawi and Moroccan, Ivorian, Venezuelan). 
I have therefore decided to explore the social processes at work at this 
internationalized event that account for the abundance of such practices 
and discourse.
2.1 Internationalized nationalism and sovereignty
The relationships of social forum participants with their home countries 
and governments are not simple or homogeneous. As a meeting place 
and an experience of expatriation for non-Senegalese participants, the 
Forum encouraged national sociabilities that challenged the opposition 
between state and social movement and cemented some forms of national 
identif ication. On the other hand, there was much less consensus regard-
ing sovereignty claims, revealing a more ambivalent North-South divide 
concerning nationalist claims, as we shall see.
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Expatriate sociabilities and ordinary nationalism
Being uprooted from their countries of origin often allows expatriates 
to bond very quickly, a phenomenon intensif ied by the more or less brief 
length of these social relationships (Wagner, 2007). The feeling of sharing 
the same values brings people even closer to their compatriots at social 
forums, as it does during humanitarian missions (Dauvin and Siméant, 
2002). Along with the experience of cosmopolitan encounters, powerful 
national sociabilities are maintained in a more or less organized way, which 
helps to reproduce “ordinary nationalism” (Martigny, 2010) but at a distance. 
The gatherings of compatriots at the WSF in Dakar varied signif icantly, 
depending f irst on whether these national practices were decided and 
planned beforehand or improvised on site; whether they brought together 
people who traveled as a group (and stayed together) or individuals who 
normally lived far apart; and whether or not they included public authori-
ties. The latter appeared to play an active role in organizing and supervising 
the national sociabilities and their presence helped to blur the boundaries 
between the state and “social movements,” despite constant challenges 
from the alter-global movement.
Many participants came in national “delegations”. One of them – the 
French CRID (Research and Information Centre for Development) – even 
proudly proclaimed itself the “biggest delegation” at the WSF. The Ven-
ezuelans clearly formed a delegation: during the opening march they 
paraded behind a huge f lag and portraits of Hugo Chávez, the Venezuelan 
president; they often took part as a group in workshops and ultimately 
f lew home together, dressed in identical athletic outf its decked out in 
their national colors (obviously benef iting from a diplomatic privilege 
negotiated with the Senegalese government).3 Above all, they seemed to 
be totally loyal to the Chávez regime.4 The Brazilians also seemed to have 
come as a group with funding from Petrobras, the Brazilian national oil 
company.5 The French participants were grouped together with the CRID; 
they shared the same housing and all their activities outside the Forum 
were planned from breakfast meetings to evening gatherings. The organi-
zation of participants into national groups also seems to have applied to 
3 Observations at Dakar Airport, February 11, 2011.
4 The f ive Venezuelans interviewed during the survey were members of a branch of Chávez’ 
party and indicated an event linked to the political itinerary of the president as their “f irst 
mobilization.” All f ive of them voted for the party in power in the last national elections.
5 See Chapter 7 by Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro, and Héloïse Nez in this book.
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a portion of Moroccan attendees, who were f inanced by the government 
and whose presence was obviously intended to destabilize the Saharawi 
militants. The homogeneity of this delegation was a subject of debate 
and was not conf irmed by the answers of the Moroccan participants 
interviewed during our survey.6
Participants with fewer organizational resources met at the Forum and 
organized joint activities for specif ic purposes, such as the Cameroonians 
in Nairobi in 2007, who gathered under the same f lag for the opening 
ceremony. This was even more evident in the case of Congolese from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, who came together under the “Congolese” 
tent in Nairobi and in Dakar. Those who frequented the tent expressed 
the desire for an opportunity to get together “among compatriots”, away 
from the centrifugal forces at work: those of northern donors who required 
their southern partners to participate in their workshops and those of 
the vast, chaotic Congolese political space causing dispersion, exile, and 
immigration. In Dakar, the nationalist symbols at the Congolese tent were 
highly traditional: a banner bearing a f lag and the inscription “Republic of 
Congo” with “WSF” underneath; a map of Congo recalling the unity of the 
different regions and a patriotic song from the 1960s, with the eloquent 
title: “Our Congo will always be united.”7 At the social forum in Nairobi, the 
discourse in the Congolese workshop was similarly patriotic. It should be 
noted, however, that tensions and conflicts surfaced at meetings attended 
only by Congolese, when the participants were not seeking to represent 
Congo but rather to talk among themselves. Such situations arose, for 
example, during an evening reception organized by the Congolese at a 
Nairobi hotel, and at another organized by the French ambassadress to 
Kenya.8
6 Among the 29 Moroccans interviewed, twelve stated they voted for the opposition, six for 
the party in power; only one mentioned the Saharawi cause as his f irst rally and the underlying 
reason for his involvement. Those who seemed very active in this cause (there were f ive of them) 
were thoroughly integrated in specif ic associations and organizations. One Spanish-Moroccan 
was a member of the “Royal Consultative Council of Saharan Affairs,” another was a member of 
the “Forum of Support for Tindouf Separatists,” and yet another mentioned the Green March for 
the liberation of the Sahara (1975) as his f irst mobilization. The involvement of the two others 
was less clear.
7 “Notre Congo sera toujours uni et gardera toujours son unité [Our Congo will always be 
united]... Kivu, Katanga, Kasaï, Kinshasa, Équateur, Orientale, Bandundu, Bas-Congo qui for-
ment le Congo,” Video recording, February 9, 2011.
8 See the contributions of Alphonse Maindo, Nathanaël Tsotsa, and Thomas Atenga in Pom-
merolle and Siméant (2008b).
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Nationalism and blurring the divide between the state and social 
movements
Incidentally, ordinary forum sociabilities disregard and even challenge 
commonly accepted cleavages (between social movements and the state 
or defenders of the South against imperialists of the North). Off icial and 
unofficial encounters between government representatives and WSF par-
ticipants underscore the vagueness of boundary lines separating states from 
social movements and the NGO world or between civil servants and activists 
(they are often both simultaneously), despite the militant language used to 
reinforce them.9 National loyalties linked to the converging interests of “alter-
globalists” seeking funding and state recognition and diplomats or political 
leaders seeking NGO support are thus also maintained at WSFs, sometimes 
at the expense of or along with other loyalties. For instance, after initially an-
nouncing they would not accept the invitation from the French ambassador 
in Senegal because their foreign “partners” were not invited, the members 
of CRID later changed their minds and took part in large numbers. At the 
embassy event, the ambassador emphasized the “French values” defended 
by the Forum, the proximity of alter-global ideas to those of the government, 
and f inally, the community of interests and values of the NGO activists in 
attendance and the embassy: they were all working together as “development 
partners for the benefit of the Senegalese people.”10 The boundary was thus 
drawn between those who give and those who receive, between NGOs and 
governments in the North and the populations of the South.
The Brazilians also broke an alter-global taboo by setting up their delega-
tion in a tent f inanced by Petrobras, a nationalized oil company. In this 
case, they were criticized more for commercializing the Forum than for 
demonstrating nationalism. Their large, air-conditioned tent adorned with 
green plants at the entrance was singled out because it reflected Petrobras’ 
f inancial power. On the other hand, there was ideological controversy over 
the Brazilian government model,11 but the presence of off icials from the 
country where the WSF originated went unchallenged.
The relations between official authorities and NGO representatives seem 
to have been marked by the relationships experienced at home between 
governmental and non-governmental actors. When the Cameroonian 
ambassador to Senegal received some ten compatriots who had come to 
9 30% of Europeans and 21% of Africans surveyed are state agents.
10 Observations and audio recording, February 9, 2011.
11 See Chapter 7 by Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro, and Héloïse Nez.
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take part in the WSF, he offered to give each member of the delegation 
70,000 CFA francs (140 US dollars). The practice of redistribution among 
those claiming to be part of “civil society” is commonplace in Cameroon and 
always triggers debate, as it did in this instance among the delegates: some, 
particularly the least socialized in forum practices, were tempted to accept 
the offer, but in the end they all rejected it. These moments of conviviality 
reactivate a feeling of national aff iliation, even when it is expressed by 
contradiction and refusal. Here again, the “long-distance nationalism” is 
produced through ordinary practices.
Nation-state, sovereignty, and North-South divisions
Beyond the encounters between NGO and government actors, opinions dif-
fer considerably on the role of the state and national governments in solving 
the issues raised at the Forum, depending on the national identity of the 
participants (determined here by continent). Interviewees from the South 
seem more inclined than those from the North to prefer the framework of 
the nation-state to guard against the effects of neoliberal globalization. 
This recourse to sovereignty is echoed in the more legitimist relationships 
between militants in the South and their governments.
In answer to the question about which level of political authority should 
remedy the ravages of neoliberal globalization, African interviewees were 
overrepresented among those in favor of “strengthening national govern-
ments;” 60% of them “agreed” or “totally agreed” with this opinion, compared 
with 40% of Europeans.12 The breakdown of the European replies was the 
reverse of the Africans: those who “totally agreed” were underrepresented 
and those who “disagreed” were overrepresented.13 Slightly more than 60% 
of American interviewees (mainly South Americans in fact) agreed with 
this solution. The reply concerning “strengthening national governments” 
was the only one among the proposed choices that resulted in a real division 
among nationalities: the other levels and types of political authority were 
supported by the participants, all nationalities combined, but to different 
degrees: slightly more than 50% of the participants agreed or totally agreed 
12 These calculations were made on the sample of interviewees, excluding the individuals 
that did not respond regarding their nationality and those from Asia and Oceania (these groups 
were too small to permit signif icant bivariate analysis). All the following calculations with 
nationality as a variable were carried out this way. 
13 On the other hand, there is no observable link between the opinion concerning strengthen-
ing national governments and two other general characteristics of the persons interviewed: sex 
and level of diploma (having or not having obtained a college or university degree).
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on strengthening regional organizations, and slightly more than 60% agreed 
with the idea of strengthening the United Nations. The rate of agreement 
is even more noticeable for non-governmental solutions: continental and 
international civil society or local solutions received 80% approval no 
matter which continent the interviewees came from. So it is indeed the 
question about the role of the state that differentiates European, African, 
and American participants, with the latter two groups unhesitatingly in 
favor of strengthening it.
Trust in the state or the belief that it could be a solution, which is 
expressed by the interviewees from the South, is echoed in their more 
legitimist attitude towards their own national governments. A solid link can 
be observed between nationality and voting for the party in power. While 
most interviewees said they had voted for opposition parties, the percent-
age varied widely depending on their continent of origin. Africans were 
underrepresented among those who said they voted for an opposition party 
and overrepresented among those who voted for a party in power or did not 
answer the question. Almost 70% of all interviewees who voted for a party 
in power in the last national election were Africans and 28% of African 
respondents voted for a party in power.14 The percentage of American survey 
respondents (i.e. mostly South Americans) who declared they voted for a 
party in power was even higher at 32%.15 The legitimism of the African and 
South American interviewees can be explained in various ways: the low 
rate of demonstrations in Africa by a more repressive context and a less 
frequently used repertoire;16 the legitimist attitudes in some Latin American 
countries by close ties between ruling parties and alter-global movements 
14 We can perhaps help clarify the link between these two variables by noting that there is 
also a connection between 1) educational level and votes (those without college or university 
diplomas are overrepresented among interviewees who said they voted for a party in power and 
underrepresented among those who said they voted for an opposition party) and 2) the level of 
diplomas and nationality: Africans are underrepresented among those with college or univer-
sity degrees (67% compared with 87% and 89% of the American and European interviewees, 
respectively) 
15 Unlike the other two continental groups, the European interviewees are underrepresented 
among those who voted for a party in power and very overrepresented among those who said 
they voted for an opposition party: the latter represented 81% of the European interviewees.
16 Indeed, a signif icant link can be observed between nationality (measured by continent) 
and the fact of having taken part in a demonstration (an event) against one’s government policy 
during the previous year. Africans are overrepresented among those that did not respond to 
the question (20%) and above all underrepresented among those that had taken part in such 
a demonstration (48% of the African interviewees stated they had demonstrated against their 
government, compared with 60% of Americans and more than 73% of Europeans). Furthermore, 
greater reluctance to demonstrate was reflected in a reduced tendency to demonstrate against 
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(Smith and Wiest, 2012). Similarly, when survey respondents defend the 
nation-state framework and sovereignty, they may well be referring to very 
different experiences of the state: a state that inspires pride and a readiness 
to join in its struggle in the case of Latin America17 or a state that, despite 
its institutional weaknesses, is still viewed as a sphere of protection by 
Africans. In Nairobi, too, African participants expressed the least criticism 
of their own leaders; they did so only in discussions among themselves and 
refused to allow anyone else to engage in it (Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011).
The ideas supported by a number of Africans and Americans (above all 
Latin Americans) in the International Council regarding alliances between 
the WSF and political leaders were thus consistent with the practices and 
opinions of the participants from those continents. The opinion voiced by 
Gus Massiah in the International Council of the WSF18 seems to have been 
in line with that of European survey respondents but it met with strong 
resistance from the representatives of the other two continents present 
at the meeting. Divergent views on this topic as on others did not keep 
forum participants from coming together around shared activist causes and 
practices, even if they meant different things to each group. That is what we 
are going to explore now, by observing the internationalized production of 
nationalist causes within the alter-global space.
2.2 The misunderstanding that produces nationalist 
commitments
Alter-global space, made up historically by, among others, organizations 
that originated in anticolonial and Third World struggles at least in France 
and elsewhere in Europe (Sommier, Fillieule, and Agrikoliansky, 2008), 
claims to have directly descended from these causes: the issue of a people’s 
right to self-determination when those peoples are ‘oppressed,’ ‘colonized,’ 
or ‘anti-imperialist’ therefore has a rightful place in the World Social Forum. 
The nationalisms authorized to express themselves were those of the South, 
as evidenced by the absence of f lags of northern countries at the WSF in 
Dakar or their removal when they were displayed,19 and by the visibility of 
other targets (FMI, etc.) and less frequent use of this repertoire in general. See Chapter 3 by 
Johanna Siméant in this book.
17 See Chapter 7 by Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro, and Héloïse Nez.
18 See Introduction.
19 At a meeting to set up an international ATTAC network, ATTAC France was criticized for 
unfurling the only national banner at the opening march. It was suggested that the banner be 
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strictly nationalist slogans and attributes of the South: T-shirts with ‘Guinea 
is back’ or ‘Ivory Coast is back’ printed on the back and Brazilian flags worn 
like scarves or capes. In the latter case, it was unclear whether the flag was 
a reference to the site of the f irst World Social Forums, the country of the 
Workers’ Party and its former president, Lula, or the home of a football 
team revered across the world. The nationalist signif ier manifestly carries 
a positive charge, allowing each individual to invest it with his or her own 
militant, political, and/or sports club imagery.
Nevertheless, apart from a very small number of consensual issues, 
not every cause or cause supporter enjoys the same degree of legitimacy. 
Such legitimacy has to be re-negotiated at each forum, depending on the 
particular concrete interactions and confrontations that take place during 
the event.
In Dakar, all the participants, except for the Senegalese, were of foreign 
origin. Those who defend national causes at WSFs are therefore doing so 
from abroad, like the exiles that Anderson considered the main promoters 
of nationalisms. Being far from home makes them the sole experts and 
spokespersons for their cause. This allows them to construct a selective 
discourse, suited to an ill-informed audience eager for “good causes” to 
endorse during the Forum period. The distance that enables interaction 
with activists from diverse countries also internationalizes national causes 
and makes them resonate with the creed of alter-globalization.
Shared repertoires and activist enchantment
Some nationalist discourses generate broad consensus, not least because 
they have few spokespersons present to defend them. In Dakar, this was true 
of the Palestinian cause, which attracted such wide support it was virtually a 
metonym for alter-globalism: the Forum’s grand concert was dedicated to it20 
and, as a French pro-Palestinian activist noted with satisfaction, there were 
keffiyehs “everywhere, in the demonstrations, on stage, etc.,”21 not to mention 
around the neck of a Senegalese attendee and hanging at the entrance to 
the stand run by the French association “Survie.” Workshops devoted to 
cut in order to remove the name of the country (observations by Hélène Baillot, quoted in this 
book). Furthermore, French and European f lags were visible only on the brochures and posters 
for cooperation projects f inanced by these donors.
20 The concert brought together militants (like the rapper Didier Awadi) and more consensual 
performers like the Senegalese star Youssou N’dour who drew a wide audience.
21 Report by an activist in the civil campaign to protect the Palestinian people, available at: 
www.protection-palestine.org/spip.php?article10136.
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the cause were less popular.22 That did not keep Palestinian speakers from 
addressing forum participants at the opening and closing ceremonies or the 
sole Palestinian identif ied at the International Committee meeting from 
being applauded – even before he spoke. The legitimacy of the Palestinian 
cause is simply indisputable and in fact seldom discussed at the Forum.
Other discourses generate more debate and they are produced not 
through the use of consensual symbols but by various expectations 
converging in shared activist practices. Traveling to a WSF from far away 
requires an individual investment that promises to be remunerated in 
diverse ways, especially communing in a surge of united militancy – even 
if the cognitive, emotional, and material interests and investments of 
each participant differ implicitly. Concrete encounters between activists 
from Latin America, Europe, and Africa take place through familiar prac-
tices commonplace in the alter-global world: lectures, exhibition stands, 
speeches, and occasionally petitions or demonstrations (which happened 
in Dakar during the opening ceremony and protest marches against migra-
tion policies). Sharing a common repertoire allows individuals to make 
demands as a group, even though those demands may not be understood 
by everyone in the same way. Ivorian nationalist activism, especially the 
signing of a petition Non à toute intervention militaire en Côte d’Ivoire (No 
to military intervention in Ivory Coast) passed around on the last day of 
the WSF, was a good example of how effective a “working misunderstand-
ing” can be in an international event.23 At the time, the situation in Ivory 
Coast was explosive: the “international community” was threatening to 
intervene militarily following the contested election results between the 
outgoing president, Laurent Gbagbo, and his challenger, Alassane Ouat-
tara, the acknowledged winner. Despite the extremely divided situation, 
pro-Gbagbo militants, who were not overtly taking sides, mobilized to 
circulate a petition against outside intervention, emphasizing the rejection 
of imperialist interference.
Wearing brightly colored T-shirts bearing the messages mentioned 
earlier, several dozen Senegalese students from the university, recruited 
for the day by their sociology professor, stopped participants along the 
campus lanes. The petition, which insisted on the need to guarantee 
peace in Ivory Coast and avoid any violence or international involvement 
22 Observations from workshops on the f lotilla to Gaza and the Russell Tribunal on Palestine, 
February 8, 2011 (Isabelle Sommier).
23 This reflection was suggested by Johanna Siméant at the seminar of the Dakar WSF research 
group. 
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(particularly by the French), called on “people of culture and science in 
Africa, the West and the World” to join a more or less prestigious group of 
signatories, without any explicit reference to a political party. A few of those 
names might have alerted the signers, had they not been uninformed and/
or only too happy to take part concretely in a struggle against imperialism 
and in favor of peace.24 The initial signatories included Calixthe Beyala, a 
French-Cameroonian writer who was very involved with the Gbagbo camp; 
at the bottom of the distributed text, the list of speakers at workshops to 
be held the same day were just as clearly politically oriented – but they 
were unknown to the general public.25 Ivorian websites were thus able to 
announce: “More than 6,000 democrats signed a petition for the cause of 
peace in Ivory Coast.”26
At the Forum, the visible promoters of the Ivorian – in fact pro-Gbagbo 
– “cause” played on the general misunderstanding and distance from the 
actual situation by qualifying the terms of the conflict and providing 
unverif iable “proofs” of the rightness of their cause. Using the same word-
ing as the petition, the Ivorian representative who spoke at the opening 
ceremony of the Forum after the representatives of Egypt and Tunisia, 
asserted his refusal to see Ivory Coast become “the prey of imperialists, 
war makers and arms dealers.” He spoke of young people, the African 
intelligentsia, a possible reunif ication between North and South, and 
ended with a few statements redolent of the nationalism expressed by the 
nationalist leader and f irst Ivorian president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny: “(...) 
Let us fraternize, let us rediscover our role as the engine of the economy, of 
development and of a higher standard of living for Africa in general (...).”27 
The call for Ivorian fraternity was much less peaceful and far more radical 
in the workshops organized on the last day of the Forum. In a tent crowded 
mostly with students, the atmosphere was tense as “patriotic” militants 
spoke one after another in a loop, defending the Gbagbo camp without ever 
attacking their adversaries head-on. They distributed proofs of their just 
cause in the form of reconstructed reports of the presidential election on 
November 28, 2010 showing the “fraudulent total” and “real total” of votes 
received by the candidates in certain regions. Speaking at a distance of 
24 Among them, the author of these lines... and at least two colleagues!
25 Among those present was Geneviève Bro Grebe, coordinator of the women patriots who was 
arrested a few weeks later by the French and Ivorian authorities, along with Laurent Gbagbo.
26 Cf. Fernand Dindé’s blog and the Radio Djibi TV website: www.djibitv.com/photo/8365/Pl
us+6000+d%C3%A9mocrates+pour+la+paix+en+C%C3%B4te+d%E2%80%99Ivoire (accessed 
on April 4, 2013). 
27 Audio recording, February 6, 2011.
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several thousand kilometers from where the conflict was taking place,28 
with no one to contradict them, the activists did not shy away from provid-
ing material evidence to bolster their discourse. While the WSF participants 
were not necessarily fooled about the hidden agenda of these nationalist 
delegations,29 they were nevertheless thrilled, by signing a petition and 
meeting militants, to have f irst-hand contact with local causes and see the 
embodiment of struggles they were familiar with – and supported – often 
from afar. Such encounters became a kind of enchantment, facilitated by 
the misunderstanding maintained by each of the protagonists.30 Similarly, 
the enthusiasm over Egyptian or Tunisian participants, observed on several 
occasions, was genuine, and for many participants, the joy of experiencing 
together the fall of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (which took place 
during the event) apparently remains one of their most cherished memories 
of the Forum.31 This empathy for revolutions in the making and the causes 
of the South thus enables promoters of nationalist causes to interact with 
sympathizers around objects produced by and for this internationalized 
space, a sort of euphemized, internationalized nationalism.
Reciprocal legitimizing
The internationalized space of the Forum is also a place where national-
ist causes can attract outside support and join forces with other causes. 
Testifying to a sort of universality or at least to recognition from outside 
the country, this international connection allows nationalist causes to shed 
their overly local connotations (isolationism, exclusion of others) and adopt 
the internationalist register that fuels alter-global discourse. In Dakar, as at 
28 The opinions of the workshop participants were far from unanimous and the discussions 
were heated, particularly between the Senegalese and Ivorian organizers. Similarly, at the 
Assembly of Social Movements, a speaker who introduced himself as an Ivorian, reminded 
the audience that the “socialism” various speakers were calling for could also be claimed by a 
president designated as a murderer (he was referring to Laurent Gbagbo, member of a socialist 
party). Finally, the political preferences of the ten Ivorian respondents to the questionnaire 
were quite varied: f ive said they voted for an opposition party and two for the party in power; 
four said they belonged to a party in the ruling coalition, one to an opposition party. 
29 At a meeting of ATTAC International, the participants suggested avoiding the topic of Ivory 
Coast, after observing the partiality of the Ivorians who were present (observations by Hélène 
Baillot, February 10, 2011).
30 On the enchantment of the tourist encounter maintained by these multiple misunderstand-
ings, see Chabloz, 2007.
31 These historic moments were recalled several times at the International Committee meet-
ing, and considered to have signif icantly “politicized” the forum.
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the Nairobi WSF, international recognition was achieved by “africanizing” 
nationalist causes or claiming they were identical to those of other African 
participants. Though there was widespread agreement on the Palestinian 
cause, it was nevertheless regularly tied to the struggles of Africa and Afri-
cans as the title of a workshop organized by a University of Dakar teacher 
indicates: “Africa-Palestine, let us resist together.”32 Academics helped in 
large part to link (African) nationalist causes to each other, among them 
Malick Ndiaye, a professor who coordinated the Ivory Coast workshops, 
and two Ivorian professors who were outspoken defenders of the Western 
Sahara cause (i.e. the Moroccan side). The political and NGO aff iliations 
of these two individuals highlight the kind of relationships – by no means 
fortuitous – that are forged at these international events. Both men belonged 
to a pro-Gbagbo political party and one of them mentioned the patriotic 
youth demonstrations in 2002 as his f irst mobilization experience. They 
came to Dakar on behalf of (and funded by) the Friends of the Moroccan 
Sahara Association.33 One of them gave a manifestly pro-Moroccan talk on 
the Western Sahara at a workshop off icially devoted to “the trade union 
movement in the face of the crisis of capitalism” but visibly on the side of 
the Moroccan nationalist cause.34 Defending the integrity of African ter-
ritories and state sovereignty, he praised the Moroccan model of Saharawi 
territorial development: “When you fly over Laayoune [the main city of the 
region], the area is so lit up it looks like New York,” he said at the workshop. 
The previous day, he had taken part in setting up the “World Federation 
of Friends of the Western Sahara” and was elected its president. These 
pan-African nationalist networks are reminiscent of the ones created by 
the independence movements in the 1950s; in reality, they are closer to the 
pro-government, pro-sovereignty tendency that developed after independ-
ence than to the radical movements, which were soon supplanted following 
the end of colonization.
32 In Nairobi, at a workshop on “Memories of struggle,” a Palestinian delegate who had spoken 
on the stage at the opening ceremony stigmatized Israel by evoking the Falachas, the Ethiopian 
Jews who, she said, had been taken by force to Israel and now suffered real discrimination in 
that state where “racism is a central concept” and which, again according to her, “rejects black 
blood.” Observations by the author, January 21, 2007.
33 Apart from these shared characteristics, the two men had very different prof iles: one was 
a young evangelist who had always lived in Ivory Coast, whereas the other was older, a Muslim, 
and had often spent time broad. 
34 Workshop on the Democratic Organization of Labor – Morocco, “The trade union movement 
in the face of the effects of the crisis of capitalism,” Faculty of Medicine, Amphitheatre 2, UCAD, 
February 9, 2011, observed by Raphaël Botiveau.
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As we saw with the Ivorian petition, the participants from the North 
are asked to support a given cause. Their support is conditioned, however, 
and may be disqualif ied in the debates opposing nationalist militants of 
the South. International legitimacy is not automatically granted and has 
to be negotiated at the time of each interaction, in accordance with various 
attributes. For example, a Spanish EU parliamentary representative, who 
defended the Saharawi cause in Dakar, was accused by the National Council 
of Moroccans of Senegal of violating international law, attacking Moroccan 
sovereignty35 and engaging in “paternalistic behavior.”36 He was also accused 
of interference and partiality by another Spaniard, who introduced himself 
as “President of the Association of Moroccan-Spanish Friendship.” He had 
dual citizenship and was living in Laayoune, and therefore considered 
himself more legitimately positioned to talk about the cause and defend 
“negotiated solutions” (the position of the Moroccan government).37
The limits of misunderstanding
The principle of the WSF as an open forum guaranteeing free speech ex-
plains why it is so easy for causes to develop and thrive at these events, even 
if based on misunderstandings. Yet such causes cease to be “operational” 
when one of the groups involved thinks that the rules of the Forum have 
been flouted. In the end, nationalist controversies, like all the others, are an 
occasion to uphold what are considered the basic principles of the Forum 
and a struggle over who has the legitimacy to defend them (Haeringer and 
Pommerolle, 2012).
The eruptions of physical violence between Saharawi and Moroccan 
participants were the most visible transgressions of the accepted standards 
of debate within a social forum. These intense debates emerged in Dakar 
because of its geographical proximity with Morocco and the involvement 
of both governmental-supported delegations and Saharawi activists. In that 
sense these interactions were exceptional but express well the importation 
of national causes in an internationalized context and the limits of its 
eff iciency. These violent debates occurred during a workshop organized 
35 Press release dated February 9, 2011, collected at the WSF.
36 Comments of Spanish and Mexican interpreters after the workshop in which this European 
parliamentarian had spoken (Observations: Lisbeth Gasca Agudelo, February 7, 2011).
37 ”Forum social mondial Dakar 2011: Des voix s’élèvent contre le séparatisme et le morcellement 
des Etats,” Quotidien Le Matin (Bénin), February 14, 2011, available at: <quotidienlematin.com/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2719:-forum-social-mondial-dakar-2011-des-voix-se-
levent-contre-le-separatisme-et-le-morcellement-des-etats-&catid=9:internationale&Itemid=42>.
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by the Saharawi delegation, which was f inally canceled, as well as during 
the opening march, in a workshop on Tunisia and in front of the Moroccan 
tent, making this nationalist antagonism especially visible.38 The fact that 
WSF security agents and the police were called in indicates that these 
interactions were out of control and the shared rules were seen to have 
been seriously violated.39 In a more subtle way, the practices of certain 
“nationalist” delegations included inf iltration (in the workshops, on the 
platforms) and sometimes hijacking or diverting the discussion. Playing on 
the openness of the Forum, Venezuelans and Saharawi especially took over 
debates that were not necessarily their own. This happened in the case of 
the small Saharawi delegation in Nairobi: during the “Africa Night” grand 
concert, they took advantage of the organizers’ inattention to bring on stage 
Saharawi musicians who were not on the program. In Dakar, Moroccan 
participants, hostile to Saharawi claims that prevailed here and there, 
voiced nationalist arguments in workshops devoted to other topics and 
blatantly ignored the Maghreb Social Forum Charter, which had prohibited 
the presence of national flags in anticipation of such nationalist outbursts.40 
Even more systematically, the Venezuelans were observed unilaterally 
taking the floor or harassing the organizers until they were given permission 
to speak in defense of the Bolivarian revolution and President Chávez.41
Some of these practices were viewed as overstepping acceptable standards 
within the WSF and a rebuke was issued to the organizers who were accused 
of allowing a “Moroccan delegation full of cops” to enter the Forum grounds. 
The accusation, made by a Moroccan participant at the International Council 
meeting, seems to have been shared (as demonstrated by the numerous critical 
reports on violence committed against the Saharawi at the WSF).42 It should 
38 Observations by Nedjib Sidi Moussa (February 6, 2011) and William Herrera (February 7, 2011).
39 ”Les femmes sahraouies exigent une sécurité,” Flamme d’Afrique, no. 3, February 8, 2011.
40 ”Rapport d’observation sur la présence sahraouie au FSM de Dakar,” available at: http://ddata.
over-blog.com/xxxyyy/1/44/13/03/RAPPORT-SUR-LA-PRESENCE-SAHRAOUIE-FSM-2011-1-.
pdf – written by two individuals who introduced themselves as French volunteers at the WSF 
and reread by a person close to the Saharawi cause. 
41  This was the case, for example, with a small Venezuelan delegation in a workshop of the 
“International Residents Coalition.” A Venezuelan speaker, visibly a member of the coalition but 
not introduced among the panelists on stage at the beginning of the workshop, sent multiple 
notes to the workshop coordinator who f inally gave her 3 minutes to speak (which she said was 
much too little time). She then gave an ardent defense of the Bolivarian revolution and the role 
of the government, particularly the president, and her compatriots distributed to the entire 
assembly copies of an extract of the Gaceta off icial, the off icial journal, promulgating a law on 
housing, and a pamphlet entitled “El pueblo legislador” (personal observations, February 8, 2011).
42 The delegation printed a document demanding an apology from the organizing committee 
in the name of “freedom of expression.” Cf. “Rapport d’observation...,” op. cit.
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perhaps be noted that in this case the speaker was a member of the CADTM 
(Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt), an organization highly 
critical of the African Social Forum and of the main IC leaders. It was therefore 
also a question of seizing an argument to oppose these alter-global leadership 
bodies. In reply, another Moroccan speaker minimized the government’s 
presence and recommended that participants “trust the North Africans to 
manage this by themselves.” International space allows nationalist visibility 
but not protests or sanctions, which fall within the national purview.
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I set out to explain how nationalist and occasionally pro-
sovereignty registers and practices, sometimes considered exclusive or 
at least territorialized, are produced in a context that purports, on the 
contrary, to be inclusive and transnational. In addition to revealing the ex-
tremely diverse nationalist repertoire (separatist for the Saharawi, patriotic 
and partisan among the Ivorian participants at the WSF, nostalgic among 
the Congolese, strictly symbolic among the few Palestinian attendees, 
etc.), I have sought to work on two main assumptions of the sociology of 
transnational movements and activist events. First, I have attempted to 
show, along with other researchers (Tarrow, 2005; Wagner, 2007), that the 
material conditions of internationalization and the criteria for recognition 
as a militant or professional are negotiated at least partly in a delimited 
local/national space (e.g. through the “national delegation”). Nationalist 
discourse within the international confines of the WSF will therefore reflect 
the expectations forged by the various participants in their space of national 
identity. Above all – and this is the second hypothesis developed here – I 
have underlined the internationalized process whereby a national register is 
produced. As Anderson demonstrated, the nationalist register emerges and 
is confirmed through contact with others: symbols and slogans are always 
the product of an adaptation to what are believed to be others’ expectations 
or understanding. The resulting nationalist statements are vague enough to 
ensure the support of actors whose intentions and interests may conflict. 
Because of its objective to change the system while in the existing order 
(Teivanen, 2011), forum rules tend to create an open space where differ-
ent causes can come together without forming a unif ied movement. This 
facilitates the working misunderstandings that make the Forum f irst and 
foremost a place to aff irm or reaff irm a shared sense of belonging to an 
internationalized activist world.
3 Mapping a population and its taste in 
tactics
Johanna Siméant, with Ilhame Hajji
Abstract
This chapter intends to study the relation that participants to World Social 
Forums have to protest practices, both on how they have an experience 
of them, and on an evaluative aspect. World Social Forums, compared 
to more local forums, raise important methodological diff iculties to 
carry on such investigations, as the diversity of protest practices and 
traditions of participants is huge. Johanna Siméant explores professed 
forms of political protest and how this latter is linked to a number of 
variables, then follows that with an examination based on a Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA), more consistent with a multifactorial 
conception of commitment than a ceteris paribus model, which would 
be unwieldy in an international militant event. MCA, and its ability to 
condense information, enables a full, visual, and summarized view of 
a population and its diversity, and allows polarities within it to emerge 
rather than to be posited; it is then possible to draw up a hierarchical 
classif ication, which, projected onto a factorial map, makes it easier to 
identify aff inities between modes of action and sub-groups within the 
population participating in this militant event. Here, MCA and Ascending 
Hierarchical Clustering seem particularly adapted to surveying interna-
tionally diverse populations.
3.1 What do we know about how familiar alter-globalization 
activists are with protest practices?
The question of the activist preferences of participants at Social Forums has 
been scarcely studied. What are the “tastes in tactics” of alter-globalization 
protesters (Jasper, 1997)? What can be learned from Tilly’s central demon-
strations (1986, 1995, 2006) about the importance of repertoires in mediat-
ing the possibilities, constraints, and actual practices offered to protesters? 
If repertoires are still tied to national contexts and the hypothesis of a 
third “transnational repertoire” (Cohen and Rai, 2000: 15) must therefore 
be viewed with caution, how can one do a serious study of the relationship 
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between alter-global activists and their protest practices without turning 
a blind eye to the divisions within the population of those same people 
when they come together at global events from nearly all over the world?
Despite the fact that alter-globalization activists are considered a very 
politically active population, their relationship to protest practices, whether 
professed or judged in terms of ethics and eff iciency, is one of the least de-
veloped quantitative aspects that have been studied. For instance, the work 
drawn from most DEMOS surveys conducted in European Social Forums 
(ESFs), particularly those held in Florence and Athens, scarcely examined 
this aspect at all. At most, participation in an alter-globalization-type event 
during the previous year is mentioned. Whether from a quantitative or 
a qualitative angle, this question remains underdeveloped compared to 
the question of the relationship to deliberative practices and democratic 
participation (Della Porta 2009a and 2009b). Although the DEMOS survey 
included a set of questions covering the relationship to these democratic 
practices,1 this aspect appears to have been underexploited in the published 
work drawn from the database resulting from the survey. Even in the 
work focusing more on participation and its determinants (Saunders and 
Andretta 2009), participation seems to be disconnected from its concrete 
manifestations.
There are two exceptions to this general trend, which pertain to events 
held in 2003: an article following a survey conducted during the Evian G8 
summit (Fillieule et al., 2004), and a chapter discussing the data collected 
during the ESF held in Saint-Denis, France (Coulouarn and Jossin, 2005). 
Both the article and the chapter raised a series of questions on the protest 
practices used by the respondents by asking them whether they had ever 
resorted to various types of practices in order to make themselves heard 
and whether they would be prepared to do so. What is interesting in this 
formulation is that it avoids purely abstract judgments on the practices by 
asking the participants if they had actually engaged in them or would be 
willing to use them. The list included 14 items: petitions, demonstrations, 
study groups, product or country boycotts, leaflets, strikes, symbolic ac-
tions, traffic obstruction, occupation, resisting law-enforcement authorities, 
fasting/praying, damage to property, hunger strikes, and physical pressure.
1 “Tried to persuade someone to vote for a political party”, “Worked in a political party”, 
“Signed a petition/public letter”, “Attended a demonstration”, “Handed out leaflets”, “Took part 
in a strike”, “Practiced civil disobedience”, “Took part in non-violent direct actions”, “Boycotted 
products”, “Participated in cultural performances as a form of protest”, “Took part in an occupa-
tion of a public building”, “Took part in an occupation of abandoned homes and/or land”, “Took 
part in a blockade”, “Used violent forms of action against property”, “Other”.
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These two studies (N=2280 at the G8 and N=2198 at the ESF) provided 
a hierarchy of protest practices very closely associated with their overall 
population (even though the G8 population seems somewhat more radical 
and protest-oriented):
– Of the respondents, 90% to 92% stated that they had previously par-
ticipated in a strike or demonstration.
– Between 52% and 74% of the respondents stated that they had previ-
ously taken part in study groups, boycotts, symbolic actions, strikes, 
and leaflet distribution.
– As for traff ic obstruction, occupation of buildings, and resisting law-
enforcement authorities, between 32% and 48% of respondents at the 
G8 and between 26% and 40% of those at the ESF stated they had taken 
part in these.
– Between 2% and 11% of respondents claimed to have participated in 
fasting or group prayer, hunger strikes, physical pressure on a person, 
or damage to property.
The research work done on the demonstrators at the G8 has provided an 
indicator of activists’ protest potential by cumulating their answers to 
the protest items.2 This has made it possible to distinguish four protest-
potential quartiles and to display the associated sociographic properties, 
underscoring the population’s predominantly male character and the 
fact that it is those who have conventional political skills who are most 
inclined and able to express themselves (Fillieule et al., 2004). It is among 
these groups, too, that the greatest number of the movement’s leaders 
are found.
Coulouarn and Jossin, taking up the distinction of action agendas 
proposed by Uehlinger (1988) and Fuchs (1991), posit three types of agenda:
– A demonstrative agenda, “legal and non-violent,” grouping those who 
refuse to engage in “any actions covered by the confrontational and 
political-violence agenda.”
– A confrontational agenda, “illegal and non-violent,” designating “those 
who only refuse to use means of action from the political-violence agenda.”
– The political-violence agenda (illegal and violent): “those who state that 
they have engaged in or are prepared to use at least one of two modes 
of action from the political-violence agenda.” (Coulouarn and Jossin, 
2005: 144)
2 Assigning a value of 2 for effective participation and a value of 1 for potential participation.
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Appropriately, they distinguish judgment on illegal and violent practices, 
and show that a practice does not have to be considered eff icient to be 
practiced. Jossin and Coulouarn then examine the composition of the three 
groups most marked by the use of these practices and by the rejection of such 
practices. Gender appears as a clear differentiating factor in using violent 
and illegal practices. Otherwise, those included in the political-violence 
group are characterized by a slightly lower education level and by a larger 
share of unemployed persons. This group shows a stronger relationship 
to union movements and to extreme left/right-wing positioning. It seems 
more strongly marked by a preference for radical change ideologies. The 
demonstrative group appears closer to the NGO world. Finally, identif ica-
tion with the alter-globalization movement is also a factor in acceptance 
of violent or illegal means of action.
There are two problems in this study, which happens to be one of the very 
few available: on the one hand, there is a prejudicial error where absence of 
response is aggregated with refusal to practice a particular mode of action; 
the other problem is that the three groups were posited a priori instead of 
bringing out the potentially different ways the world of these practices 
is structured, depending on the respondents. What, for instance, is said 
about variations in the attraction to protest practices depending on the 
nationality? Can it be linked, as Cohen and Valencia (2008: 54) think, to 
power distance understood as the extent to which “members of a culture 
expect and accept that power is distributed unequally in society”? It is true, 
for instance, that though a march is considered routine and conventional 
in the sociology of social movements, partly because the history of this 
sociology is influenced by its Western origin, it might be considered far 
more contentious in some African countries. This question, which may be 
of lesser importance in European social forums, becomes particularly acute 
in a world social forum. We will try to show that if nationality counts, it also 
has to do with other classical parameters such as education level and gender.
Those questions are difficult to answer, given the small number of studies 
raising it in situations of multinational and multilinguistic surveys. In fact, 
the only data collected at World Social Forums related to protest practices 
is whether or not respondents had taken part in a demonstration in the 
previous 12 months (Reese et al., 2008): 16.8% of respondents at the 2005 
WSF stated they had not taken part, versus 34% at the 2007 WSF (80.4% of 
attendees in 2007 were f irst-time participants at a social forum).
We thus have either rich, qualif ied work covering a relatively limited 
geographical area in which the national-origin issue is scarcely considered, 
or work covering a more multinational population but which gives little 
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indication of what characterizes potentially very diversified relationships to 
protest practices. Can we even assume that participating in a demonstration 
or a strike has the same meaning in very distant contexts? If not, to what 
does this diversity in protest practices refer and how can it be explored? 
The question is therefore not only to determine the “tastes in tactics” of 
alter-globalization protesters, but also to understand how theses tastes 
related to their social characteristics?
This is the issue that we have chosen to address by raising this question 
on the population surveyed at the WSF, which implies to explain how we 
carried out this survey.
3.2 Familiarity with protest practices among the respondents 
at the Dakar WSF
When developing the questionnaire, we reproduced the questions used 
by Sommier and Agrikoliansky (2005) and Della Porta (2009), themselves 
inspired by the questions used in the World Values Survey3, regarding 
familiarity with a number of protest practices and how they are judged. 
We added four practices that were not included in this analysis:
– participating in a “national day of mobilization,” a form of mobilization 
not always directly related to protest that seemed to us particularly 
supported by activists in the countries of the South, especially in the 
development-aid sector;
– “supporting an organization f inancially”;
– “responsible consumption (local, fair, organic products)”;
– “boycotting elections”.
Along with the four additional items, certain formulations were not re-
produced in exactly the same way: for instance, we distinguished group 
prayer and religious gatherings, on the one hand, and fasting and hunger 
strikes on the other, whereas fasting and hunger strikes were two distinct 
categories in the previous survey. Finally, we added participating “in other 
symbolic actions” to account for other potentially corresponding practices.
Table 3 below gives the outcome of the frequency distribution of partici-
pation in these practices among the surveyed population:
3 The problem of the WVS is however that its exploitation (more than the questionnaire 
itself) often tends to overemphasize the effect of national cultures.
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– As in the ESF and G8 surveys, petitions and demonstrations are at 
the top of the scale at 74%, but exceeded by participation in study or 
discussion groups. The f irst, and foreseeable, observation is the strong 
difference between those answers and the general population of a 
country, as the population surveyed here shows a stronger familiarity 
and positive judgment towards modes of protest.4
– Participation in a national day of mobilization and f inancial support 
to an organization are practices claimed by two-thirds of the sample, 
along with participation in other symbolic actions. Leaflet distribution 
and strikes, as well as other symbolic actions, are claimed by more than 
half of the respondents but in a lesser proportion than in the European 
surveys.
– The three practices that were claimed by 32% to 48% of the G8 respond-
ents and by 26% to 40% of the ESF respondents (traff ic obstruction, 
occupying buildings, and resistance to law-enforcement authorities) 
declined in this sample to 28-29%, with traff ic obstruction at a much 
lower rate.
– On the other hand, use of group prayer and religious gatherings is 
claimed by 34% of the respondents.
– Finally, only f ive practices, down from seven in the preceding surveys, 
are claimed by more than 50% of respondents.
However, 33% of respondents in Dakar indicated they had not participated 
in an alter-globalization event in the previous ten years, which is one 
of the lowest rates ever in these surveys (to be compared with 80% of 
participants at the Nairobi WSF who indicated they had never participated 
in a social forum (Reese et al., 2011). This general result has to be nuanced 
by nationality, however: f irst-time participation is signif icantly related 
to the fact of being African.5 But, again, regarding participation in a 
demonstration in the previous year, respondents indicate a rather high 
level of participation.
4 Despite the differences in formulation, one could compare the very small number of persons 
answering they would refuse to sign a petition (4.6%) or participate in a protest (2.8%) to the 
answers given in the World Values Survey (waves 5 and 6, between 2005 and 2014), with people 
answering that they would never attend peaceful demonstrations (between 26.3% in Mali, 30.5% 
in France and Germany and 47.8 in Nigeria) or sign a petition (between 10.3% in France, 24% in 
Mali, 32% Germany, and 67.8% in Nigeria). Those countries (in Western Europe and Western 
Africa) have been chosen to provide a minimum comparability with the population of the WSF 
in Dakar. Senegal was not surveyed in the WVS.
5 P-value = 1.787441-9.
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Table 3.1  Have you taken part in the following events in the past twelve months? 
(n = 1069) [in %]
YES NO NR
a.  Protests/events in your country against your governments’ 
policy?
58.19 26.29 15.53
b.  Protests, movements against international or regional 
institutions (G20, imF, etc.)
30.31 37.79 31.9
c.  local or regional social forums on continental themes 46.21 31.99 21.8
What can account for the differences in familiarity with protest practices 
and in how they are judged? We have chosen in Table 3 to systematically 
produce cross-tabulations between the results of this table and three vari-
ables: 1) nationality (grouped by continent and concentrating on the three 
continents that showed suff icient numbers to make these calculations), 
2) gender, and 3) education level, grouped into lower than a high school 
diploma and equal to or higher than a high school diploma.
This makes it possible to reflect on the properties of modes of action by 
distinguishing those that seem particularly linked to one or several of the 
three variables. We can therefore distinguish:
– “gendered” modes of action: responsible consumption appears as signifi-
cantly linked to women, and resisting law-enforcement authorities to 
men, as well as petitions, damage to property, physical pressure on a 
person, boycott of products/countries or elections, hunger strike/fasting;
– modes of action related to education level: petitions, responsible con-
sumption, other symbolic actions, strikes, leaflets, boycott of products/
countries, group prayer or religious gatherings, resistance to law-
enforcement authorities, traff ic obstruction, occupation of buildings, 
hunger strikes/fasting, as well as demonstrations, day of mobilization, 
refusing to pay taxes, physical pressure on a person;6
– nationality-related modes of action: petitions, demonstrations, strikes, 
leaflets, boycott of products/countries, group prayer or religious gather-
ings, resistance to law-enforcement authorities, traff ic obstruction, 
occupation of buildings, hunger strikes/fasting, refusing to pay taxes, 
exercising physical pressure on a person, as well as boycott of elec-
tions, are linked to the nationality of the persons using it. However, it 
6 The last case is complex, because graduates tended to say either that they have practiced 
it or that they are opposed to it, whereas those with lower education levels were found more 
often in the no-reply category.
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is important not to have a binary reading of this link among variables. 
In the case of violence against persons, for instance, Europeans are 
overrepresented among those who claim they are opposed to physical 
violence against persons, and Africans are overrepresented in no-reply 
to this question;
– modes of action related to education level AND gender: responsible 
consumption, resistance to law-enforcement authorities, as well as 
petitions, boycott of products, shops, or countries, hunger strike/fasting, 
physical pressure;
– nationality AND gender-related modes of action: not as clear, but boycott 
of elections and damage to property;
– nationality AND education-level-related modes of action: strikes, leaflet 
distribution, group prayer/religious gatherings, traff ic obstruction, 
occupation of buildings, as well as demonstrations, hunger strikes, 
refusing to pay taxes, physical pressure;
– nationality AND education-level AND gender-related modes of action: 
responsible consumption, resistance to law-enforcement authorities, as 
well as petitions, boycott of certain products/shops/countries, hunger 
strikes/fasting, physical pressure.
On the other hand, several modes of action come up as neutral under the vari-
ables used so far: participating in study or discussion groups, participating 
in a national day of mobilization (for women, against AIDS, etc.), supporting 
an organization financially. These are the three modes of action that we had 
added, all of which have a very low confrontational dimension. That these 
modes of action should appear here as scarcely divisive is an interesting 
result in itself for alter-globalization forms of mobilization; they are undoubt-
edly better channels for adapting forms of mobilization to forms of protest. 
We can see here that they can be appropriated as cutting across a variety of 
activist sensitivities in the realm of alter-globalization, and that they also 
refer to practices peculiar to the development-aid sector and to perceived 
traditions from the South (promotion of tontines, in particular): mobilizing 
does not always mean protesting, and this is probably one of the best working 
misunderstandings in World Social Forums – even if it is deplored by some 
radical activists who stigmatize WSFs in Africa as “NGO fairs.”7
Another signif icant aspect has to do with different activist traditions, 
although, again, such observations would need national contextualization: 
7 See for instance “World Social Forum: just another NGO fair?”, Firoze Manji, 2007-01-26, 
Pambazuka news, Issue 288.
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members of trade unions make better judgments on the utility of violence8 
There is also a role of identif ication with the alter-global movement, but 
only in one case, between identifying strongly with the alter-global move-
ment and having a positive appreciation of the eff iciency of responsible 
consumption.
Here we rapidly encounter the limits of bivariate analysis: some variables 
are linked together, but the link takes a different meaning according to 
the nationality of the people surveyed. A good way to control these effects 
and gain access to the real groups of individuals behind the abstraction of 
variables that take different meanings in different contexts is through MCA 
and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering.
3.3 Using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and 
Ascending Hierarchical Clustering to study populations 
“in a situation of militancy”9 in an international event
We would like here to underscore the advantages of using MCA, among 
the various methods of multivariate analysis, for populations engaged in 
an activist practice, particularly in an international context.
We know, as Julie Pagis reminds us in her article on those involved in 
the political events of 1968, that “factorial [analysis] makes it possible to 
avoid pre-establishing asymmetry between variables to be explained and 
(potentially) explanatory variables, and misunderstanding the direction 
of causalities by leaving more room for the interpretation of correlations” 
(Pagis, 2011: 6). This is doubly interesting in the case of surveys on an activist 
event. Indeed, “studying populations in a situation of militancy poses specific 
problems. It is not in fact possible here, as in general population surveys, to 
determine the social factors of political commitment through indicators (…). 
What is being measured through the answers of the politically committed 
refers, in fact, as much to a series of explanatory features of commitment as 
to the possible outcome of secondary, sometimes powerful socialization within 
activist groups” (Fillieule et al., 2005: 16).
This is precisely what might complicate a logistic-regression analysis, 
which conversely makes using MCA so interesting for exploring a popula-
tion surveyed while a collective action is taking place, because we are not 
reasoning ceteris paribus here and are suspending unequivocal reasoning 
8 Chi² <5%.
9 We borrowed this expression from Fillieule et al. 2004: 16.
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on the direction of causality. We also know that MCA, considered one of 
the most powerful tools in survey processing, is inspired from the French 
school of data analysis (Benzecri, 1992), and was the method preferred by 
Pierre Bourdieu (1984) because it makes it possible not only to represent 
complex data sets but also to represent polarities within a social space, and 
in doing so, to map the social space. According to the principle of descriptive 
statistics, one of its advantages is to condense information by making factors 
emerge that summarize the greatest amount of information and provide 
a graphic representation, for instance on two dimensions (the number of 
factors is not always limited to two), of the whole set of variables under 
consideration. We therefore get new variables, combinations of variables 
informing the research theme and summarizing the initial set.
Moreover, the problem of commensurability of the sociographic charac-
teristics of individuals becomes less troublesome if MCA is used on the basis 
of answers to certain questions like those concerning the use of practices, 
and then characteristics related to nationality, education level or others 
are projected onto a factorial map. This makes it possible, thanks to the 
nationality variable, to achieve a better grasp of the meaning of this data 
depending, in particular, on the national context.
MCA is consistent with a relational conception of social practices and 
allows the emergence of families of practices that are more or less associ-
ated. Given the topics we are working with here, the idea will be to identify 
aff inities and oppositions among the surveyed individuals in terms of 
protest practices they say they have used, they reject, or they could resort to.
MCA is an intermediate step of our study to obtain a typology. After 
determining and visualizing the proximities and oppositions between levels 
of the different nominal variables, it is possible to def ine typical prof iles 
(clusters) of activists, who will be identif ied through their sociographic 
characteristics and some of their opinions on the effectiveness of these 
practices. One of the main MCA results, which is to reduce the number of 
dimensions and summarize them on 2 (or 3) dimensions of the graph (facto-
rial axes), will enable us to map the different groups of activists through a 
clustering that will be a function of the factorial axes. The clusters will be 
established on the basis of the Ascending Hierarchical Clustering method.
To study the relationship to protest practices through MCA, we selected 
the following 14 actions:
The set of observations is described by a set of nominal variables. We left out 
two variables that seemed particularly “amorphous” in Table 2: “participating 
maPPinG a POPulatiOn and itS taSte in tac ticS 71
in a national mobilization day” and “supporting an organization financially.” 
Otherwise, practices referring to violence were grouped together. “Participat-
ing in other symbolic actions,” a question that yielded very few results during 
the survey and in fact seemed to have been misunderstood, was also left out.
The “Yes” variable was established by combining “Yes, I have” and “No, 
but I would be prepared to do it.”
The asterisks indicate variables for which we factored in no-replies. 
Indeed, we had the feeling from the start of the survey that we should 
not leave out the NRs, some of which are “very telling” (in particular for 
a number of illegal and violent practices, likely to generate a considerable 
amount of self-censorship).10
The plot of the 14 protest actions studied on the f irst 2 dimensions (Axes 
1 and 2) concentrates a signif icant percentage of inertia (36% of explained 
variance).11
10 We maintained several forms of non-response (NR), in particular for actions that were either 
violent or showed significant chi-square with the 3 variables: gender, education level, and national-
ity. Then, for the purposes of legibility, f inding that in the exploratory MCAs the NRs for responsible 
consumption and hunger strike were very close, we decided to keep only one of the two, and we 
did the same for obstruction and resistance. One of the effects of the fact that we maintained a 
number of NRs was also to maintain the greatest number of individuals for the MCA.
11 In MCA, we often have low percentages of explained variance.
Table 3.3  The 14 MCA variables








Occupation of premises 2
resistance to law-enforcement authorities 3*
Obstruction of traffic 2
leaflet distribution 2
refusal to pay taxes 3*
responsible consumption 3*
use of violence 3*
there are potentially three levels, where “x” is the active variable:  
y_x = yes to x  n_x = no to x noreply_x = non-response to x
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It was decided during the analysis to retain certain actions even if there 
were few replies concerning one of their characteristics (less than 5% of the 
sample). The consequence of this decision is that these actions condition the 
two axes signif icantly because of their low numbers in one of the forms of 
reply, and are very distant from the center of gravity on both axes because 
of their disparity. This latter effect could be designated as a low-numbers 
effect. We shall see that this effect makes it possible to indicate a form 
of scale in protest practices, which we shall itemize when describing the 
axes. This effect will not impair the clustering that will follow MCA, which 
constitutes one of the main objectives of the analysis.
Axis 1, which concentrates more than 27% of the information (a good 
result in MCA), places the respondents who categorically refuse to use 
certain practices, even those considered most moderate or routine, in op-
position to those who explain that they have used (or would be prepared 
to use) protest practices, even those seen as involving the most physical 
violence, illegality (refusing to pay taxes, participating in traff ic obstruc-
tion, occupying premises, etc.), or putting oneself at risk (hunger strikes).
A look at the contributions of each form of reply to the axes shows that the 
respondents are increasingly hostile to:
– strikes














– participating in a 
hunger strike






Conversely, they are increasingly favorable to:
– traff ic-obstruction actions
– resistance to law-enforcement 
authorities
– occupying premises
– participating in a hunger strike
– refusing to pay taxes
– use of violence
For the latter, the contributions are less signif icant. These latter actions 
involve the average respondent, which is why they are close to the center 
of the graph.
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There are two interesting observations at this stage on Axis 1, which we 
could call “Practice of recourse to protest:”
– The exception to this No-Yes polarity is recourse to group prayer and 
religious gatherings. This variable behaves very differently from the 
others, perhaps because it is not perceived of as part of the protest 
range.
12 The squared cosines are used to measure the good quality of the projection. A low squared 
cosine means that the interpretation is not particularly relevant. On the other hand, a high one 
means a good projection of the information, and consequently a relevant interpretation.
Table 3.4  Significant contributions and squared cosines12 in Axis 1
Type of action Significant 
contributions 































8.56* 0.49 y_hunger 
strike
3.04 0.28












n_hunger strike 3.82* 0.28









* contribution greater than relative weight
maPPinG a POPulatiOn and itS taSte in tac ticS 75
– A no-reply to the violence-related questions does not behave like the 
other NRs that were tested. It is remarkably close to favorable recourse 
to violence and is therefore a very telling NR, because it is more indica-
tive of self-censorship than of disapproval or a feeling of incompetence 
(something we could already suppose at the frequency-distribution 
stage, but more intuitively).
– Finally, this close-up makes it easier to visualize proximities among 
certain forms of protest practices: we have a set that is relatively marked 
by closeness among judgments favorable to hunger strikes, traff ic 
obstruction, resistance to law-enforcement authorities, occupation, 
election boycott; and another set that is more marked by judgments 
favorable to product boycott, petitions, strikes, demonstrations, 
responsible consumption, and leaf let distribution. Similarly, in the 
lower right-hand quadrant, a f irst set is marked by proximities among 
judgments favorable to recourse to group prayer and unfavorable to 
recourse to violence, election boycott, hunger strikes, and refusal to 
pay taxes; and a second set marked by judgments hostile to obstruction, 
resistance to law-enforcement authorities, and occupation.
Axis 2, which concentrates 9% of the information, tends to oppose two 
different forms of negative judgment of recourse to forms of protest ac-
tion: one side, above, shows judgment explicitly unfavorable to forms of 
protest that could be considered the most acceptable and most conventional 
(demonstrations, petitions, responsible consumption, strikes), and the other, 
below, shows a set of negative judgments of forms of protest considered 
among the most radical, whether from the point of view of violence or 
illegality (refusal to pay taxes, violence, occupation). (Here, NRs behave in 
a way close to negative judgment, and refer to resistance and refusal to pay 
taxes.) Proposed name for Axis 2: “Legitimacy of protest practices.”
Axis 2 opposes two forms of refusal to engage in the actions under 
consideration. On the one side, the contributions increasingly indicate:
– refusal to participate in 
demonstrations
– refusal to sign petitions
– refusal to practice responsible 
consumption
– (agreement with use of violence)
– refusal to participate in strikes
– refusal to distribute leaflets
– agreement with refusal to pay 
taxes
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On the other side, depending on the contributions, respondents are increas-
ingly hostile to:
– not paying taxes
– using violence
– traff ic-obstruction actions
– resistance to law-enforcement 
authorities
On both axes we have to consider the squared cosines which emphasize the 
good or bad quality of the projection. Axis 1 is better identif ied than Axis 2 
according to the squared cosines. Consequently, we have to moderate our 
conclusions about Axis 2. These last conclusions refer to what we called the 
low-numbers effect in the above graph, and as we thought, it is conditioning 
the MCA.
Although we have reached our objective of providing a two-dimensional 
graphic representation of the 14 dimensions under consideration, this is 
still only one step on our way to establishing a hierarchical clustering that 
will allow groups to emerge that are statistically differentiated by their 
relationship to protest practices, which can then be characterized in terms 
of other variables.
Table 3.5  Significant contributions from forms of reply to Axis 2
Significant 
contributions 














16.92* 0.25 n_refusal to 
pay taxes *
4.24* 0.11



















* contribution greater than relative weight
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To get an idea of affinities among the respondents’ answers and a number 
of properties that characterize the respondents, we retained the following 
illustrative variables:
These illustrative variables, which by def inition are not factors in plotting 
factorial maps, are all of the nominal type. We kept no-replies for each of 
them.
Table 3.6  The 27 illustrative MCA variables
Variables Meaning/translation Levels
adm how the questionnaire was administered 3
lieu_PaSSatiOn Place where it was administered 5
manif_Gouvt demonstration against government policies 3
manif_institutions demonstration against institutions 3
Forum_loc_reg local or regional Forum 3





PcS_8 Professional activity by groups 6
residence residence 5
effbe Perceived effectiveness of boycotting elections 5
effPeti ... of petitions 5
effmaniF ... of demonstrations 5
effdOmm ... of damage to property 5
effPri ... of praying 5
effbOycPdt ... of boycotting products 5
effGrev ... of strikes 5
effGrevF ... of hunger strikes 5
effOccuP ... of occupying premises 5
effreSiSt ... of resisting law-enforcement officers 5
effentr ... of traffic obstruction 5
efftr ... of distributing leaflets 5
effPreSS ... of putting physical pressure on someone 5
effimPO ... of refusing to pay taxes 5
effcOnSe ... of responsible consumption 5
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3.4 Ascending Hierarchical Clustering, composition of groups 
of participants, and “bringing real people back in” through 
paragons
To get the best possible summarization of our study, we decided to accept 
the partition of the sample13 into nine categories, obtained through a pro-
cedure that maximizes variance among groups and minimizes intra-group 
variance.
Table 3.7  Clustering (=partition) of the 587 observations into 9 clusters
Cluster number & name given Number of 
observations
Percentage
1 - deferential Senegalese 31 5.3
2 - african legitimists 30 5.1
3 - villagers who do not put themselves at risk 35 6.0
4 - Senegalese muslims prepared to make their voices heard 41 7.0
5 - Senegalese people active in the public sphere 91 15.5
6 - nr (non-response) on taxes 12 2.0
7 - French, non-violent and believers 92 15.7
8 - alter radicals 125 21.3
9 - (latin american) men favorable to violence 130 22.1
total 587 100.0
The 9 clusters can now be projected on the MCA.
What can we say about these nine emerging clusters? How could they be 
named? National characteristics emerge strongly in this clustering, favored 
by the fact that we could reason by continents, and that the two main 
national groups present at the WSF were French and Senegalese, which 
allows a f iner grain of description. Light can also be shed on each category 
by illustrating it with an individual who is statistically identif ied as its f irst 
paragon, i.e. an individual located at its statistical center of gravity. The 
length of the questionnaire makes this individual portrait possible, using 
variables that, although not used in the construction of the paragon, give 
flesh to it and illustrate what the people characterized by their tastes in 
tactics are socially.
Cluster 1: Deferential Senegalese. Located in the extreme upper right-hand 
quadrant of the factorial map, this is a group of individuals characterized 
13 Proposed by SPAD.
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by their explicit hostility to many protest practices, including, in particular, 
petitions (77.4% versus 5.6% in the sample), strikes (90.3% versus 10%), 
demonstrations (61.3% versus 3.6%), resistance to law-enforcement authori-
ties (90.3% versus 28.5%), police-obstruction actions (90.3% versus 30%), 
occupying buildings (83.9% versus 25.9%), and even boycotting products 
(64.5% versus 17.6%), hunger strikes (90.3% versus 44.3%), and leaflet dis-
tribution (45.2% versus 9.7%). It stands out, unlike the next three groups 
(2, 3, and 4), in its explicit condemnation of violence (96.8% versus 70.9%). 
Sociographically speaking, it includes a majority of Senegalese (67.7% versus 
23.7%), with a low education level (54.8% versus 18.6%), believers (90.3% 
versus 56.6%), and Muslims (58.1% versus 8.6%), most often farmers, mer-
chants, and craftsmen/women and heads of small businesses14 (22.6% versus 
5.1%). As for their opinions on the effectiveness of protest actions, these are 
persons who judge that it is not at all effective to go on strike (61.3% versus 
3.6%), sign petitions (54.8% versus 5.8%), resist law-enforcement authorities 
(71% versus 18%), demonstrate (35.5% versus 3.1%), participate in a traff ic-
obstruction action (67.4% versus 18.4%), occupy buildings (61.3% versus 
15.7%), boycott certain products (45.2% versus 9.7%), participate in a hunger 
strike (58.1% versus 25.4%), boycott elections (74.2% versus 37.8%), refuse 
to pay taxes (58.1% versus 25.4%) (in fact they do not resort to the latter 
three practices), distribute leaflets (29% versus 7.3%), practice responsible 
consumption (19.4% versus 4.7%), exercise physical pressure (77.4% versus 
57.8%). They do, however, judge as altogether effective to participate in group 
prayer or religious gatherings (48.4% versus 21.8%), even though they do not 
indicate that they themselves take part in these actions. In addition, these 
are persons who have not participated in a demonstration/event against 
their government in the previous 12 months (58.1% versus 28.6%).
• Individual 202 [ first paragon of the cluster] answered an administered 
questionnaire in French. She is a 59-year-old Senegalese woman, Mus-
lim, member of the RCPDC (Réseau des radios communautaires pour 
la paix et le développement en Casamance – Network of community 
radios for peace and development in Casamance). She came with her 
organization and was financed by World Education Senegal (WES). She 
had not taken part in any demonstrations in the year prior to the WSF, 
and she participated in many WSF activities, including “women, peace, 
and development” meetings. She is a member of the PDS, the party then 
in power in Senegal. She refuses all protest practices except for group 
prayer, financial support to an organization, responsible consumption, 
14 Which had been grouped into a single category.
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and other symbolic actions – she might possibly distribute leaflets. She 
always votes. As for her occupation, she indicated: “Small farmer, works 
at the radio.” Her husband is a school teacher. She lives in a large village.
Cluster 2: African Legitimists, marked more by their mistrust of responsible 
consumption practices. Located in the upper right-hand quadrant of the 
factorial map but closer to the center, this group is also characterized by its 
hostility to certain protest practices: responsible consumption (93.3% versus 
6.3%), boycotting products (50% versus 17.6%), resistance to law-enforcement 
authorities (53.3% versus 28.5%), and traff ic obstruction (50% versus 30%). 
This category is therefore less hostile in general to all forms of protest, but 
uncomfortable with certain forms of illegality. This group is mostly made up 
of Africans (40% versus 1.6%) whose education level is equal to high school or 
lower (36.7% versus 18.6%), in which the French are underrepresented (3.3% 
versus 25%), and who have no professional activity (30% versus 14.1%). As for 
their opinions on the effectiveness of protest actions, these are persons who 
judge that it is not at all effective to practice responsible consumption (19.4% 
versus 4.3%), participate in a traff ic-obstruction action (40% versus 18.4%), 
boycott certain products (30% versus 11.7%), go on strike (20% versus 6.5%), 
resist law-enforcement authorities (36.7% versus 18.6%). They also consider 
it “not very effective” to occupy buildings (23.3% versus 8%).
• Individual 461 [ first paragon of the cluster] answered an administered 
questionnaire in French. He is a 53-year-old man, Muslim, from Niger, 
member of the NGO Aghir In’Man (“soul shelter” in Tamashek, the Tuareg 
language) in which he volunteers and on behalf of which he came to the 
WSF. He is member of a party, the African Modem, and deputy mayor of 
his town. He indicates he would refuse to boycott elections, cause damage 
to goods, go on hunger strikes or fasts, oppose police forces or use physical 
pressure on someone, practice responsible consumption, or refuse to pay 
taxes. He asked to annotate the questionnaire to explicitly condemn violent 
practices. He has already participated in a national day of mobilization, 
supported an organization financially, distributed leaflets, gone on strike, 
taken part in group prayer and marches, and signed petitions. He had never 
participated in such a gathering against globalization before. He belongs 
to the union of miners in Niger, and his first significant mobilization was 
against the exploitation of uranium in Niger between 2006 and 2008. He 
votes for an opposition party in Niger. He has a diploma marking the com-
pletion of primary school. He is a worker in radioactivity sampling: Niger is 
the place of uranium extraction through the French company Areva, and 
here this man seems to confirm the complex link that some activists can 
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have to powers that are at the same time objects of critique, employers and 
providers (Siméant, 2013a and 2014). His father was a stockbreeder, like his 
grandparents, both of them nomads. He comes from a small town.
Cluster 3: Villagers who do not put themselves at risk. Located in the upper right-
hand quadrant of the factorial map but even closer than the previous two to 
the center and Axis 1, this group is characterized above all by its hostility to 
distributing leaflets (100% versus 9.7%), as well as to occupation and obstruc-
tion actions (48.6% versus 25.9%). Sociographically speaking, this group has 
few emerging characteristics that would allow its characterization, other than 
the fact that individuals living in a capital city are underrepresented in it 
(31.4% versus 50.8%, which might explain their poor familiarity with practices 
such as traffic obstruction and leaflet distribution). These are persons who 
judge that it is not at all effective to distribute leaflets (54.3% versus 7.3%). 
Four practices that they do not resort to seem ineffective to them: boycotting 
elections (57.1% versus 37.8%), refusing to pay taxes (42.9% versus 25.4%), 
signing petitions (31.4% versus 13.8%), and demonstrations (17.1% versus 
5.6%). On the other hand, they judge participating in group prayer to be very 
effective. In addition, these are persons who have not demonstrated against 
their government’s policy in the previous 12 months (48.6% versus 28.6%).
• Individual 8 [ first paragon of the cluster] answered an administered 
questionnaire in French. He is a 42-year-old man, Muslim, from Morocco, 
indicating that he has come on behalf of “Moroccan civil society” although 
he indicates no membership in any group. A doctor in pharmacy, he comes 
from a small town and his parents and grandparents were peasants. He 
indicates he has an elected position in his town and that he is member of 
the “popular movement party” in Morocco (a party that has ministers in 
the government). Although he has already taken part in marches, strikes, 
or occupations and even resisted police forces, which doesn’t exactly match 
the portrait of the class, he is extremely cautious. He votes for the party 
in power, and indicates that in the past year he has not participated in 
any protests against his government (but against globalization). Very 
significantly, this first paragon came from Morocco, a country whose 
activists at the WSF showed very strong self-censorship (when they were 
not harassing the Sahrawi activists demanding independence) – and in 
which power has shown a strong ability to co-opt many forms of protest, 
the development industry therefore becoming a sort of niche for those not 
wishing to pay too heavy a price for dissent.15
15 On this point, see Vairel (2011) and Cheynis (2005).
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Cluster 4: Senegalese Muslims prepared to make their voices heard. Located in 
the lower left-hand quadrant of the factorial map, yet quite close to the center, 
this group, like cluster 1, is made up of believers (92.7% versus 56.6%), Muslims 
(70.7% versus 28.6%), Senegalese (46.3% versus 23.7%), or from another African 
country (36.6% versus 18.6%), with a low education level (39% versus 18.6%). 
Although they are hostile to boycotting products (75.6% versus 17.6%), refusing 
to pay taxes (82.9% versus 45.8%), occupying buildings (56.1% versus 25.9%), 
and to hunger strikes (75.6% versus 44.3%), its members are favorable or have 
resorted to group prayer (82.9% versus 55.9%), resistance to law-enforcement 
authorities (87.8% versus 70.9%), and leaflet distribution (100% versus 90.3%). 
Management-level and higher professions are underrepresented in this group. 
These are persons who seldom express their opinion on the eff iciency of 
protest actions (many NRs); at most, they judge as not at all effective to boycott 
products (29.3% versus 11.7%) or occupy buildings (29.3% versus 15.7%), and 
altogether effective to participate in group prayer or religious gatherings.
• Individual 82 [ first paragon of the cluster] answered an administered 
questionnaire in French during the opening march of the forum. She is 
a 57-year-old woman, Muslim, member of a women’s GIE (Groupement 
d’Intérêt Economique, economic interest group, a typical organization 
in Senegal, on the borderline between activism and community group), on 
behalf of which she came. She describes her family, networks, and friends 
as very committed to activism and members of the socialist party. She has 
a diploma marking the completion of primary school and is a midwife. 
She shows hostility towards boycotting products, violence, refusing to pay 
taxes, and hunger strikes, but indicates a high level of practices with which 
she agrees. She always votes, and declared she had voted for an opposition 
party in the last elections. Her husband is a nursing assistant, her father 
was a worker in Dakar harbor (known for his tradition of protest), her 
grandparents were peasants, with a grandmother who also was a midwife. 
She lives in a large village.
Cluster 5: Senegalese people active in the public sphere. Located in the lower 
right-hand quadrant of the factorial map, this group is characterized by its 
opposition to the protest practices most marked by use of violence or illegality. 
Unlike Cluster 4, it practices responsible consumption, but not resistance to 
law-enforcement authorities. On the other hand, it is a group that practices 
or judges favorably leaflet distribution (100% versus 90.3%), group prayer 
(70.3% versus 55.9%), and responsible consumption (97.8% versus 92%). 
This is a group made up of believers (78% versus 56.6%), mostly Senegalese 
(40.7% versus 23.7%), Muslims (44% versus 28.6%) or Christians (31.9% versus 
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21.6%). They are persons who judge that it is not at all effective to participate 
in a traffic-obstruction action (49.5% versus 18.4%), resist law-enforcement 
authorities (46.2% versus 18.1%), occupy buildings (37.4% versus 15.7%), refuse 
to pay taxes (42.9% versus 25.4%), damage property (70.3% versus 51.4%), 
boycott elections (55% versus 37.8%), participate in a hunger strike (35.2% 
versus 20.4%), or exercise physical pressure (68.1% versus 57.7%). On the other 
hand, they judge altogether effective to sign petitions (40.7% versus 30.3% 
though they do not practice this) and to participate in group prayer or reli-
gious gatherings (35.2% versus 21.8%). As in some of the categories previously 
described (Clusters 1 and 3), these are persons who have not demonstrated 
against their government’s policy in the past 12 months (41.8% versus 28.6%).
• Individual 550 [ first paragon of the cluster] answered an administered 
questionnaire in French. He is a 60-year-old man from Senegal, indicates 
he belongs to the Muslim religion although he wouldn’t define himself as 
a believer. It is not the first time he has participated in such an event. He 
came on behalf of the Confédération des Syndicats autonomes du Sénégal 
and belongs to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). He 
is a member of the Parti Africain pour l’Indépendance et la Démocratie 
(African Party for independence and democracy, a small organization) 
and recalls May 68 in France as the first significant mobilization in which 
he took part. He says he would refuse to boycott elections, cause damage to 
goods, participate in hunger strikes, occupations, and tax boycotts or oppose 
police forces; but he has already taken part in marches, strikes, and group 
prayer, boycotted products, signed petitions, and opposed police forces. He 
always votes and indicates support for an opposition party. He has spent 
one year in the US for his studies, three months in Russia, has graduated 
from the university and speaks more than two international languages. He 
is an engineer, teaches at a university, his wife is a teacher, his father was an 
officer in the French army and his mother a qualified midwife. He is a typical 
representative of the well-trained, urban Senegalese bourgeoisie owing part 
of his knowledge – and critical attitude – to his link to the former colony.
Cluster 6: NR (Non-response) on Taxes. This group is located in the lower 
left-hand quadrant of the factorial map, not far from the center. It comprises 
primarily all the persons who did not reply to the question on refusal to 
pay taxes (100% versus 2%) and who did not indicate their occupation (25% 
versus 5.4%). It follows that these are persons who did not give their opinion 
on the effectiveness of this action (91.7% versus 17.9%).
• Individual 321 [ first paragon of the cluster] answered a self-administered 
questionnaire in French. This 34-year-old woman from France defines 
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herself as an atheist. She works both as a freelance journalist and a trainer 
in an organization for reproductive rights. Her partner is an employee; her 
parents were farmers and her grandparents workers and farmers. She lives 
in Paris and explains she is mostly interested in WSF debates on violence 
against women. Not only did she not answer the question about refusing 
to pay taxes as a form of protest, but she also put a question mark next 
to that question. She says she always votes and voted for an opposition 
party. Her first significant mobilization was in support of undocumented 
migrants in France in 1997. She has been a candidate for the Nouveau Parti 
Anticapitaliste (the New Anticapitalist Party) of which she is still a member.
Cluster 7: French, non-violent, and believers. This group is located in the lower 
right-hand quadrant of the factorial map. It comprises persons who, although 
they are clearly opposed to boycotting elections (100% versus 46.3%) and 
to using violence (100% versus 70.9%), are on the other hand favorable to 
a whole set of protest practices, in particular those most characteristic 
of the non-violent resistance agenda: occupying premises (96.7% versus 
74.1%), traff ic obstruction (93.5% versus 70%), boycotting products (97.8% 
versus 81.1%), resistance to law-enforcement authorities (87% versus 70.9%, 
which should be understood here as non-violent resistance as sometimes 
suggested by annotations), responsible consumption (100% versus 91.9%), 
and hunger strikes (68.5% versus 55.7%), as well as leaflet distribution 
(100% versus 90.3%), strikes (98.9% versus 90%), and petitions (100% versus 
94.4%). Sociographically speaking, this is a group comprising mostly French 
citizens (53.3% versus 25%) with a high education level (72.8% versus 56.7%), 
working at management level or in higher professional positions (55.4% 
versus 43.4%), and who identify with Christianity (30.4% versus 21.6%). The 
Senegalese are underrepresented in this group (7.6% versus 23.7%). Their 
opinions on the effectiveness of protest actions are consistent with the spirit 
of non-violence: they are persons who judge that it is not at all effective 
to boycott elections (64.1% versus 37.8%), damage property (71.7% versus 
51.4%), or exercise physical pressure on a person (73.9% versus 57.7%). On the 
other hand, they judge as quite effective the actions of boycotting products 
(44.6% versus 28.3%), occupying premises (47.8% versus 31.7%), traff ic 
obstruction (42.4% versus 27.4%), distributing leaflets (45.6% versus 30.5%), 
resisting law-enforcement authorities (42.4% versus 28.6%), participating in 
a strike (39.1% versus 26.2%), participating in a demonstration (43.5% versus 
30.3%), participating in group prayer (26.1% versus 15.8%), signing petitions 
(46.7% versus 34.9%), participating in a hunger strike (44.6% versus 34.8%), 
and responsible consumption (31.5% versus 22.8%). [Paragon 987 or 496]
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• Individual 987 [ first paragon of the cluster] answered a self-administered 
questionnaire in French in a workshop on “économie solidaire” (solidarity 
economy). She is a 69-year-old Frenchwoman, from a small town in the 
north of France, a region known for its strong Catholic presence, and a 
member of the CRID. She came with her organization Les Amis de la Vie (the 
association of the friends of the left-wing Catholic weekly La Vie (Life). She 
has a master’s degree and was a trainer for teachers in the civil service be-
fore she retired. She has been a volunteer for the Comité Catholique Contre 
la Faim et Pour le Développement (CCFD, a major Catholic organization 
for development), Ritimo (a French network of information on Third World 
and international solidarity), and Artisans du monde (craftsmen of the 
world), a French fair trade organization. Her husband was the principal of 
a middle school. Her father was a physician. This Catholic woman describes 
herself as a believer who goes to church every week and prays every day. She 
has never been a member of a party but considers the Socialist Party and 
the Greens as the two with views closest to hers. She always votes. She has 
already signed petitions, participated in marches and strikes, responsible 
consumption, and group prayer. She would be prepared to engage in a fast 
or hunger strike. She refuses to boycott elections or products, use violence, 
or, in this case, oppose the authorities or the police. The first mobilizations 
she indicates as important for her were protests in the 1990s in Germany 
against Third World debt (marking the beginning of the Jubilee campaign).
Cluster 8: Alter-radicals. This group is located on the left-hand side of the 
factorial map, just below Axis 1, farther from the center than the previous 
group. Like the previous group, it comprises persons hostile to using violence 
(98.4% versus 70.9%), but its members are favorable to boycotting elections 
(100% versus 53.7%), which is the main characteristic that distinguishes it 
from the previous group. They also share a whole series of protest practices 
reflecting the agenda of non-violent resistance: occupation (96% versus 
74.1%), boycotting products (99.2% versus 89.1%), traffic obstruction (91.2% 
versus 70%), refusal to pay taxes (74.4% versus 52.1%), resistance to law-en-
forcement authorities (88% versus 70.9%), leaflet distribution (100% versus 
90.3%), hunger strikes (73.6% versus 55.7%), and strikes (98.4% versus 90%), 
responsible consumption (99.2% versus 92%), and petitions (100% versus 
94.4%). Its members are non-believers (51.2% versus 38.7%), of the higher so-
cial categories (55.2% versus 43.4%), and with a high education level (65.6% 
versus 56.7%). The Senegalese are underrepresented in this group (11.2% 
versus 27.3%). As for their opinions on the effectiveness of protest actions, 
these are persons who judge many of them to be quite effective: boycotting 
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elections (27.2% versus 14.6%), resisting law-enforcement authorities (40% 
versus 28.6%), occupying premises (43.2% versus 31.7%), refusal to pay taxes 
(36% versus 26.1%), traff ic obstruction (36% versus 27.4%), group prayer 
(although they do not practice them) (22.4% versus 15.8%), hunger strikes 
(42.4% versus 34.2%), boycotting products (36% versus 28.3%). They are 
also persons who in the previous 12 months participated in demonstrations 
against their government (73.6% versus 62.7%), against international or 
regional institutions (45.6% versus 34.6%), and in local or regional social 
forums focused on continental themes (56.8% versus 48.6%).
• Individual 61 [ first paragon of the cluster] answered a self-administered 
questionnaire in French. This 27-year-old Frenchwoman lives in Senegal 
where she works for an NGO defending the rights of handicapped persons, 
after graduating from the university. She defines herself as an atheist. She 
also is a member of Survie (Survival), a French association very critical of 
the French policy in Africa. She sometimes votes. She has never been member 
of a party but feels closest to the Greens and the New Anticapitalist Party. 
Her first significant protest was again the National Front in France in 2002; 
she expresses an affinity with the protest practices described in the cluster 
above. On the 19 actions described she indicates that she has practiced 13 of 
them, would practice 3 of them, and only opposes damage to goods, prayer, 
and violence against persons. She has spent one year in Senegal, one in the 
UK for her studies, and 6 months in Malawi for an internship. Her father 
was a sports teacher, her mother a secretary, her grandparents shopkeepers 
on one side and primary school teachers on the other side. Her partner, 
in Senegal, is a craftsman. She is interested in the issue of access to land, 
particularly for women. She considers her situation satisfying morally but 
not materially. She identifies closely with the alter-global movement.
Cluster 9: (Latin American) men favorable to violence. This group is strongly 
characterized by its use of violence16 (it is the only category favorable to it) 
(99.2% versus 28.3%), as well as the protest practices under consideration 
with the exception of prayer. It is a group of persons who define themselves 
as non-believers (55.4% versus 38.7%) and state no religion (70.8% versus 
49.7%), mostly from the Americas (20.8% versus 13.1%, that is, in our sample, 
from Latin America), and more male than female (65.4% versus 56.4%). 
They judge the following actions as quite or altogether effective: damaging 
property (25.4% versus 8.9%), resisting law-enforcement authorities (41.5% 
16 On the style of “Porto Alegre men,” also mentioned here by Julie Castro, see Eschle and 
Maiguashca (2010: 34).
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versus 23%), exercising physical pressure on a person (16.9% versus 6.3%), 
occupying premises (46.9% versus 29%), and traff ic obstruction (43.8% 
versus 28.8%). Nonetheless, there are also persons among them who judge 
that it is not effective to damage property (21.5% versus 13.6%) or exercise 
physical pressure (20.8% versus 11.4%). They qualify as altogether effective 
strikes (62.3% versus 47.9%), boycotting products (48.5% versus 36.8%), 
refusal to pay taxes (23.8% versus 15.8%), and hunger strikes (25.4% versus 
17.7%). In the previous 12 months, they participated in demonstrations 
against their government’s policy (76.9% versus 62.7%) and/or against 
international or regional institutions (45.4% versus 34.6%).
• Individual 788 [ first paragon of the cluster] answered a self-administered 
questionnaire in Portuguese. This 31-year-old Brazilian man comes from 
São Paulo as a journalist in alternative media (like his partner) and came 
to cover the forum. Defining himself as agnostic, he is a former member 
of the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores), the party of former President Lula 
and then President Roussef. He evokes the mobilization for Lula’s election 
in 2002 as his first significant mobilization. He has spent one year in Bolivia 
and has an undergraduate diploma. His father was an engineer, his mother 
a nurse, one of his grandfathers was a worker and the other an accountant.
3.5 Conclusion
We hope this work has shown that the statistical mode of reasoning specific 
to MCA is perfectly consistent with a sociological type of reasoning that 
is closer to the science of investigation than to modeling (Passeron, 1991). 
Moreover, using Ascending Hierarchical Clustering and knowing the details 
of the paragons makes it possible to go back to real individuals enhanced 
with the characteristics identif ied in the questionnaire, even if those char-
acteristics have not been statistically measured until then. Furthermore, 
MCA, combined with Ascending Hierarchical Clustering, appears as a way 
to control the meaning of sociographic variables, recontextualized through 
the groups emerging from the analysis.
Beyond the inherent interest of using MCA for multinational popula-
tions in a situation of activism, we believe we are in a position to draw the 
following conclusions:
– Participants at world social forums continue to have extremely differ-
entiated relationships to action, notably to practices that include some 
form of violence or confrontation, which are still shunned by a majority 
of participants from the South. The differentiation in relationships to 
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protest practices reflects in particular national origins, which in turn 
are characterized by a set of properties that mean different things in 
different contexts. Indeed, participating in the same event does not 
imply that the same repertoire of collective action goes without saying 
for all the participants – practices that are routine for some may on the 
contrary be experienced as repellent by others.
– On the specif ic question of the feeling of competence and legitimacy 
in using protest practices, especially violent ones, it is essential to pay 
attention to the no-replies in the surveys, as the statistic behavior of 
certain no-replies shows their affinity with a favorable perception of use 
of violence. However this should not be read as a univocal interpretation 
of Non-responses as meaning always a lack of feeling of competence and 
legitimacy: in some cases, this would mean self-censorship and in others, 
it may actuality reveal the problem of dualistic framing of questions and 
activists’ sense of the complexity of political contexts; as activists often 
have a very nuanced understanding of tactics and strategies that are not 
well captured in binary sorts of choices. That is why it opens the question 
of seizing (through statistics regularities for instance) what specific non-
responses could mean concerning specific questions and contexts.
– If we assume that participating in the same event involves very dif-
ferent relationships to legitimate forms of practice, it would explain 
why certain practices owe their success to the fact that they cut across 
several registers of action: these would include, for instance, national 
days of mobilization, responsible consumption, etc. The success of these 
practices is also due to the effects of the development-aid and NGO sec-
tor, which are major actors in f inancing the world of alter-globalization 
and tend to make a distinction between mobilization and protest.
Here again, Charles Tilly’s attention to repertoires of collective action 
helps us understand that not all activists are equally familiar with protest 
practices, what they consist of or what they basically mean.
4 Women’s issues and activists at the 
World Social Forum in Dakar
Julie Castro
Abstract
In this chapter, Julie Castro looks at gender at the WSF in Dakar. Com-
bining a locally grounded approach with the results of the collective 
research, she portrays the whole range of actors of the women’s cause 
(transnational, but also international and local organizations). She then 
analyzes the weight, spaces, tensions, and blind spots of the women’s 
cause in Dakar, and shows that it was shaped by broader trends that 
structure the contemporary Senegalese society, notably the development 
industry and the remoralization of the public sphere.
Women were unquestionably present at the World Social Forum (WSF) in 
Dakar in February 2011 and in large numbers1. Numerous women’s organiza-
tions, dressed in identical T-shirts or outf its made from fabric bearing 
their NGO logo, were visible in the ranks of the Forum opening march. 
The banners and signs they carried were sometimes obviously made for 
events at home: for example, one of them said “APROFES2 Parité homme/
femme. Instrument de défense nationale” (men-women parity, an instru-
ment of national defense), referring to demonstrations prior to the 2010 
law that introduced male-female parity in all partially or totally elective 
institutions; another read “les femmes comptent pour la paix en Casamance” 
(women count for peace in Casamance). There were also broader slogans, 
such as “No to impunity and violence against women and girls,” “Women, 
the backbone of Africa,” “Women, the drivers of development in Africa,” 
“Women, a positive force ignored in Africa,” and “Women, a vector for 
peace in Africa.” The percentage of women attendees remained high in 
the days that followed, as shown by the results of the quantitative survey: 
43% of the survey respondents were women. Among them, the African 
contingent was as large as the European contingent: 41%. Next came the 
1 I wish to thank Emmanuelle Bouilly for her acute reading and constructive critique of the 
f irst drafts of this chapter.
2 APROFES: Association pour la Promotion de la Femme Sénégalaise (Association for the 
Promotion of Senegalese women), based in Kaolack and set up in 1987.
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contingent from the Americas with 14%, whereas the number of women 
from other continents was less than 2%. If we compare the participation of 
African men and women, we observe that the number of African women 
was proportionately smaller than that of their male counterparts, who 
represented 58% of the male respondents. Generally speaking, the WSF in 
Dakar was strongly marked by African attendees, who accounted for half 
the participants, male and female combined.
This massive presence of women was not peculiar to Dakar. Women have 
made up half or more of the participants at World Social Forums from the 
outset (Eschle and Maiguashca, 2010; Masson, 2003). The virtual absence 
of African women was notable at the f irst events, however, reflecting the 
weakness of the WSF’s ties to Africa in general. To remedy that situation, 
the WSF was held in Africa for the f irst time in 2006, initially “on tiptoe” 
because the Forum that year was polycentric, taking place simultaneously 
in Bamako, Karachi, and Caracas, and then on equal footing in 2007 in 
Nairobi. In Bamako as well as Nairobi, African women took part in the 
forums in huge numbers (Latourès, 2007).
In any case, the presence of women, even in massive numbers, in no way 
guarantees that women’s issues will be highlighted at WSFs.3 Leaving aside 
the question of their number to focus on the women’s rights movement 
itself, what do we observe? Activists and academics are unanimous: from 
the beginning, women’s rights have been marginal, if not marginalized, in 
alter-global social forum debates, meetings and assemblies as a whole. Yet 
“from the off icial standpoint, the alter-globalization movement has been 
above reproach: feminism is a stakeholder in the issues it defends and the 
WSF platform makes it a cross-movement topic that must be taken into 
consideration in every area” (Lamoureux, 2004: 171). Gender and diversity 
have appeared as an overarching theme of the WSF since 2002 (Conway, 
2007). Nevertheless, “even if there is no formal hierarchy among the vari-
ous struggles, anticapitalism is largely the core component and the other 
dimensions are often viewed merely as harmful consequences of capitalism” 
(Lamoureux, 2004: 181). The topics discussed thus concern primarily the 
“effects of the processes of economic, political, cultural, and social globaliza-
tion on the living conditions of women evolving in a variety of contexts” 
(Latourès, 2007). According to the dominant view, women are “victims 
of globalization and not (…) actors likely to intervene in it” (Lamoureux, 
2004: 180). In other words, capitalism is considered above all to aggravate 
3 Hereafter, I will use the expression “women’s rights” to refer both to self-identif ied women’s 
movements and those that describe themselves as feminist.
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the dynamics of patriarchy. There is no place for gender understood as a 
category of analysis (Scott, 1986) or for the notion of “intersectionality” 
(Dorlin, 2009): alter-global movements thus appear to “resist linking class, 
gender and race in a structural manner” (Masson, 2003: 102). The f irst texts 
to discuss the importance of women’s issues in the forums were written 
by activists and published starting in 2003 (Karadenizli, Allaert, de la 
Cruz, 2003; Masson, 2003; Salazar, 2004; Bjork, 2004; Duddy, 2004). They 
were followed by academic publications often by researchers who were 
themselves directly involved in women’s issues organizations taking part in 
alter-global forums. In 2004, the journal Recherches Féministes brought out 
a special issue entitled “Féminisme, Mondialisation et Altermondialisation” 
[Feminism, Globalization and Alter-globalization]. Four articles in the issue 
examined the relationship between women’s movements and alter-global 
movements, alternating discussions on the ideological dimensions (the 
compatibility and possible convergences between feminist and alter-global 
analyses) with studies on the dynamics of the marginalization of women’s 
rights observed at alter-global forums (Druelle, 2004). In 2005, an article by 
Catherine Eschle discussed this issue in the journal Signs. It was followed by 
a special issue of Journal of International Women’s Studies. The issue, entitled 
“Introduction to women’s bodies, gender analysis, feminist politics at the 
Forum Social Mundial” (Roskos and Willis, 2007), was devoted entirely to 
analyzing the marginalization of women and feminism in the WSF pro-
cess. In 2008, Lilian Mathieu tackled the issue in the form of a chapter in 
a collective work on the alter-global movement in Europe (Mathieu, 2008). 
The f irst book to deal exclusively with the relationship between feminism 
and alter-globalization was co-authored in 2010 (Eschle and Maiguashca, 
2010). The following year, three texts appeared on this issue: the f irst, in 
France, in an overview of the journal Les cahiers du féminisme (Joanny, 
2011); the second in a book on “others,” i.e. concerning the production of 
certain illustrations of otherness in the discourses emanating from the 
WSFs (Conway, 2012); the third in the form of a chapter of Handbook of 
World Social Forum Activism (Hewitt and Karides, 2011).
In this nascent literature, we can distinguish two trends in the way 
women’s issues are discussed within alter-global forums. The f irst, which 
predominates in the English-speaking works, is in line with the thinking 
on the transnationalization of women’s movements. These articles, which 
account for a growing portion of feminist studies (Naples and Desai, 2002; 
Moghadam, 2005; Basu, 1995), are part of a wider f ield – the study of the 
transnationalization of causes and social movements – which has also been 
expanding rapidly since the early 1990s (Siméant, 2010). They put feminist/
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women’s organizations that participate in social forums and belong to 
the broader group of transnational feminist networks at the heart of their 
analyses (Moghadam, 2005; Basu, 2010). Alter-global forums are viewed as 
“sites to introduce transnational feminism” and considered by some authors, 
incidentally, as the main spaces of protest against neoliberal globalization 
invested by feminist/transnational women’s movements (Desai, 2005: 
349). For others, women’s rights in the WSF represents a specif ic sector of 
“transnational feminism” arising from the intersection of alter-global and 
transnational feminist spheres called “feminist antiglobalization activism” 
(Eschle and Maiguashca, 2010: 4). In all these cases, the sort of transnational 
feminism discussed in these works designates de facto a particular organi-
zational form – NGOs – and a particular level of action – the transnational 
level. Though “this focus of scientif ic literature on the NGO form” indeed 
“corresponds to an effect of real history,” it nevertheless leads to a number 
of biases: it tends to hide “the substratum” of transnational mobilization and 
“generate a kind of blindness with regard to the actors viewed empirically, 
as well as their practices and their social inscriptions” (Siméant, 2010). 
Local women’s/feminist organizations are mostly left aside, despite their 
considerable numerical presence at the various world social forums.
The second trend, this time among French-speakers, seeks to make the 
transnational character an area for questioning rather than a self-evident 
analytical category, and draws attention to the particular historical con-
f igurations that made it possible (Sommier, 2008: 16). Thus they recall the 
historicity of the forms of transnational political action (Tarrow, 2000), 
which preceded the “transnational turn” reached in the sociology of mobili-
zations. Even more, they underscore the fact that “alter-global mobilizations 
(…) continue to be characterized by strong national roots” (Sommier, 2008: 
18). The crucial role played by woman’s organizations at the national level, 
all organizational forms combined, is brought out by Lilian Mathieu (2008) 
in the analysis of the differentiated inclusion of women’s issues in two 
European alter-global forums.
These developments invite us at the very least to widen the spectrum of 
the actors involved and take transnational NGOs, local organizations, and 
other types of organizations into consideration – for example, UN Women at 
the Dakar forum, which played a considerable role. But is it enough to make 
a statement on the marginalization of women’s issues within the WSFs? 
Certainly not, because beyond the question concerning the types of actors 
to take into account in the analysis, a whole set of new questions arises. 
What in fact should be observed in order to assess the importance given 
to women’s rights in an event like the WSF: the workshops and activities 
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organized by women’s/feminist organizations? The role played by women’s 
organizations in the coordinating bodies? The inclusion of gender issues in 
WSF activities that are not labeled “gender” or “women” or, in other words, 
how the WSF is “engendered”? The issue is at f irst methodological, of course, 
as dozens of workshops are held simultaneously at WSFs. But it goes further 
than methodology, because even if a collective survey were tasked with 
exhaustively monitoring all these aspects of the WSF, the question remains 
of how to interpret the various data collected. Disagreement on this issue is 
immediately apparent. Let us consider, for example, the question of physical 
spaces dedicated exclusively to women’s issues within WSFs: are they an 
achievement of women’s issues, which they strengthen, in continuity with 
the praxis of support groups and spaces introduced by the second wave of 
feminist movements? Or do they represent the sidelining or sectorization 
of women’s issues, and hence illustrate their marginalization? Another 
example: the number of workshops that tackle gender issues head-on or 
more laterally. Clearly, this reflects the overall weight given to these issues. 
But it may simply be the effect of weak, depoliticized mainstreaming, which 
has been summed up as “transforming one of the two sexes into a social 
sector in which the living conditions and mode of integration into the 
whole needs to be reformed, while disregarding the fundamentally political 
dimension of the relationship between the sexes” (Hirata and Le Doaré, 
1998: 24). From this point of view, should the dissemination of a certain 
depoliticized discourse on gender be considered a positive achievement of 
women’s rights? The answers to these questions appear to depend on the 
options of the actors present.
The assessment of the importance of women’s rights in the WSF thus 
raises a host of questions that are already caught up in methodological, 
epistemological, and political issues. Indeed, the answers suggest groups 
of different actors, bring into play different conceptions of collective action 
and also reveal different political aims (improving the living conditions 
and status of women versus calling into question the systems that impose 
their subordination and gender hierarchies). While it is impossible to adopt 
an outside position to grasp and assess the importance of women’s issues 
in a WSF (Harding, 2003), it is nevertheless possible to bring out some of 
the stakes, which is the task I have set for myself in this chapter. To do so, 
I will adopt an overview of the forum as a circumscribed space-time, and 
women’s issues as a particular configuration arising from the movements 
and organizations that are present (with or without local ties).
This study will be divided into two parts: the f irst part will be devoted 
to the actors of the women’s movement present at the WSF in Dakar. I 
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will begin by examining the issue of how to identify them – as women’s 
movement activists or as feminist activists – and the issues raised by that 
distinction. I will go on to present the different types of actors: NGO or in-
ternational, transnational or local organizations: all types of actors involved 
in women’s rights in Dakar will be considered. As far as possible, I will evoke 
the trajectories of these different types of actors and, where relevant, supply 
information on the history of their involvement in previous WSFs. Part II 
will propose different perspectives on women’s issues in WSF, looking at the 
issue of physical spaces, the strategies adopted by women’s issues’ activists 
(some seeking to “engender” WSFs, others pursuing different objectives), 
and f inally the tensions and blind spots, i.e. the issues and topics adjacent 
to or part and parcel of women’s issues that were not or only very marginally 
discussed during the event in Dakar. The data that will be mobilized for 
the study comes from several sources: the results of the collective survey 
conducted during the WSF; the observations carried out during the forum; 
an overview of press articles and activist texts pertaining to the WSF in 
Dakar and available online.
4.1 Transnational, but not only: the actors of women’s issues 
in Dakar
Women’s movement or feminism?
In the survey administered during the WSF, two identif ications were pos-
sible: activists could call themselves members of a “women’s association” 
or of a “women’s rights and feminist group”. Identifying with the feminist 
cause is indeed problematic on the African continent (Latourès, 2007; Tripp 
et al., 2008) and more broadly in the Muslim world (Badran, 1994), as well as 
in Asia, in the former Soviet territories, etc. (Basu, 2010). In many societies, 
the “feminist” label is used by its detractors to denounce anti-male and/
or anti-family positions (Antrobus, 2005: 144). And this is not merely a 
common sense view: feminism has also been challenged by women’s issues 
activists and scholars themselves. By the way, West Africa has been the 
source of the most virulent criticism of the categories used by Western 
feminists to describe African realities; these feminists are considered 
exogenous to the realities of the continent and helping to reproduce forms 
of epistemological domination (Cornwall, 2005). From “STIWAnism” (Social 
Transformation Including Women in Africa) proposed by Ogundipe-Leslie 
(1994), to “motherism” opposed by Acholonu (1995) to the “anti-mother, 
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anti-child, anti-nature and anti-culture” stance of feminism, as well as 
Walker’s “womanism” (Walker, 1983) and its rejection of conflictual separa-
tism between men and women, there is a whole current of African literature 
that challenges the categories and presuppositions and ultimate refutes its 
identif ication with “feminism”.
In practice, many women’s issues activists said they belonged simultane-
ously to the two subgroups. More exactly, 73% of the members of women’s 
associations also declared they belonged to a women’s rights/feminist 
group; the opposite was less commonplace, with only 56% of the members 
of a women’s rights/feminist group stating they were also members of a 
women’s association. These survey results suggest it is necessary to soften 
the sometimes rigid distinction between movements that defend strategic 
interests on the one hand, and those that defend practical interests on the 
other (Molyneux, 1985). Indeed, these categories are not mutually exclusive, 
and an organization can simultaneously carry on activities coming under 
both options. Moreover, shifts can occur: a women’s movement may shift 
its discourse towards more radical demands, or the reverse. Finally, we 
should also take into account the possible dissociation between identifying 
with the feminist cause (largely shared by the members of the women’s 
associations surveyed) in an activist context, on the one hand, and speaking 
out as a feminist in a public sphere that tends to delegitimize any discourse 
and any person advocating feminism, on the other.
The activists
Let us now turn to the women’s issues activists who were present in Dakar 
and see what sort of profiles emerge from the survey results. Unsurprisingly, 
women predominated numerically in both groups, with a signif icant link 
between the fact of being a woman and belonging to one of these two groups: 
they represented 63% of the activists in the women’s rights and feminist 
groups and 70% of the activists in women’s associations. A signif icant link 
was also noted between the feeling of having been personally subjected 
to discrimination relating to gender or based on the sexual preferences 
in one’s life and membership in a women’s rights or feminist group. On 
the other hand, there was no signif icant link between the fact of having 
suffered discrimination – of any kind – during one’s life and belonging to 
a women’s association. This gap in relation to discrimination can be linked 
to different ways of presenting and experiencing oneself, which can be 
themselves the product of interventions and policies. For instance, through 
their promotion of testimony, NGOs have imported new technologies of 
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the self (Nguyen, 2002). Moreover, the explicitly feminist current attaches 
great importance to topics linked to discrimination based on gender and 
sexual preference. “Coming out” and victim testimonials are encouraged 
and viewed as militant acts and as steps towards reconstructing self-esteem.
The women’s issues activists had often been or were still engaged in 
other causes, and this tendency was characteristic of the WSF as a whole: 
a very large percentage of the participants in Dakar were “hyper-militants,” 
combining several types of commitment either sequentially or simultane-
ously. In terms of sector of activity, the two most frequently found among 
women’s issues activists reflected the high number of women working in 
general: employment in the public sector ranked f irst (around 27%), fol-
lowed by the associative sector (about 26%).4 The other sectors accounted 
for 15% of the activists. From the standpoint of socio-professional category, 
37% of the activists in women’s associations were in management and the 
liberal professions, 27% in mid-level occupations and the other prof iles 
covered less than 15% of the activists. The percentage of executives and 
liberal professions was even higher among the activists in women’s rights 
and feminist groups, with 45% in management and liberal professions, 
followed by 27% in mid-level occupations.5
Where did the women’s issues activists come from? Among the self-
proclaimed “women’s rights and feminism” group, 55% came from the 
African continent, 22% from Europe, 16% from the Americas (with the other 
continents accounting for less than 5% of the activists). Senegalese activists 
were by far the most numerous at round off to 27 of the members of this 
rights group, followed by French (12%) and Brazilians 5%. Among the activ-
ists in women’s associations, the proportion of Africans was higher still at 
64.5%, followed by the European (16.5%) and American (12%) contingents. 
The most represented nationalities were, in descending order, Senegalese 
(35%), French (8.5%), and Malian (5%).
The women’s issues militants present in Dakar very often came on behalf 
of an organization – 79% representing the members of women’s associa-
tions and 78% representing the members of women’s rights and feminism 
groups – thus, more often than the other militants at the forum (the average 
for the forum as a whole was 69% of survey respondents who declared 
4 From this standpoint, the women’s movement is no different than the other causes, since 
25% of the total number of survey respondents were working in the public sector and 25% in 
the associative sphere.
5 These proportions are virtually identical to those measured for the total survey population: 
43.5% were managers or in liberal professions and 26.5% had mid-level occupations.
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they had come on behalf of an association). Moreover, 40% of the women’s 
issues activists were currently or had been employees of an organization. 
About half of them had their travel expenses to Dakar paid for by their 
organization. This is in line with the overall tendency of the forum, as the 
rate of travel f inancing by organizations, all causes combined, was in the 
vicinity of this f igure.
To sum up, the women’s issues activists were primarily – but not 
exclusively – women, in large part from the African continent and often 
“hyper-militant” (involved in other causes in the past or at present). More 
than half of these women were employed in the public or associative sector 
and more than 60% were engaged in high-level or mid-level occupations. 
Slightly less than 80% of them had come to the forum in Dakar on behalf of 
an organization, and 40% had previously been or were at the time employees 
of an organization.
The women’s issues organizations
The transnational women’s organizations present in Dakar grew out of 
global conferences on women that succeeded each other from 1975 to 1995, 
as well as parallel NGO forums and continental and regional preparatory 
meetings held upstream from these events. Transnational feminist networks 
became involved in large part in the alter-global sphere starting in the early 
2000s. At the time, transnational feminism was in a period of crisis, divided 
by serious tensions between “the supporters of a pragmatic approach and 
those who favored a ‘radical’ approach and critique” (Druelle, 2004). Some 
activists worried that the principle of introducing a new global economic 
order, put forward at the f irst three global conferences on women, was being 
sidelined. Noting the coincidence between the rise of neoliberalism, with 
the implementation of structural adjustment programs starting in 1982 in 
the South and analogous policies in the North, and the abandonment of the 
demand for a new world order at the international conferences on women, 
they denounced the depolitization of the women’s movement and the risk 
of being “hijacked” by the United Nations systems. In this context of crisis 
within the transnational women’s movement, the emergence of the alter-
global movement was perceived by certain feminist organizations as an 
opportunity to re-radicalize and re-politicize women’s issues (Druelle, 2004).
The two most influential transnational women’s organizations in the 
WSF are, according to Valentine Moghadam (2005), the World March of 
Women (WMW), and the Articulación Feminista Marcosur (AFM). Both 
were present in Dakar. In truth, the organization most discussed in the 
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literature is the World March of Women, which the same author claims 
represents “the main expression [of] global feminism,” understood here as 
“women’s discourse and movement aimed at advancing the condition of 
women through improved access to resources, equal measures to achieve 
equality between men and women and the empowerment of women 
within national boundaries using transnational forms of organization and 
mobilization” (Moghadam, 2000: 62). Originating in discussions between 
a northern movement (the Fédération des femmes du Québec) and other 
women’s organizations at the NGO forum organized within the framework 
of the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 (Giraud and Dufour, 
2010), the WMW began taking part in international alter-global forums 
from the very f irst forum in Porto Alegre in 2001 (Lamoureux, 2004). The 
group soon joined the International Council of the WSF (Decarro, 2003), and 
played a very active role in the Assemblies of Social Movements, which take 
place at each forum. The AFM, on the other hand, was the fruit of inter-NGO 
dialogs organized prior to the World Conference on Women in Beijing.6 
WMW activists like those in the AFM belong to the privileged social classes 
and have a very extensive social network, particularly at the international 
level (Eschle and Maiguashca, 2010: 72). Finally, these two organizations 
were largely responsible for setting up the Feminist Dialogues, a high point 
for the discussion of women’s issues at WSFs, which I will come back to later.
Other transnational networks were also present in Dakar. Among them, 
DAWN (Development Alternatives for Women in a New Era) and WIDE 
(Women In Development Europe), both of which came into being in the 
wake of the World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985 (Bereni, 2008), 
have been participants in the alter-global movement since the “Battle of 
Seattle” in 1999 (Moghadam, 2005: 13). The networks of WLUML (Women 
Living Under Muslim Law) and of WILDAF (Women in Law and Develop-
ment in Africa) also took part in the WSF in Dakar.
These are the transnational organizations that showed the greatest 
perseverance in attempting to “engender” the WSF. Thus they quickly joined 
the forum bodies: as I mentioned earlier, the WMW became a member of 
the WSF International Council, followed soon after by DAWN and the AFM. 
In 2003, there were six feminist organizations in the International Council. 
Their active participation at this level widened the scope of demands and 
included in them the reform of the operating mode of WSF coordinating 
bodies. In 2005, the WMW drew up a document aimed at combating the 
6 Cf. www.mujeresdelsur-afm.org.uy/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44
&Itemid=112, consulted on January 19, 2013.
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marginalization of women’s organizations and their concerns, notably 
by promoting a parity policy within the WSF. These requests, which also 
included specif ic proposals pertaining to the WSF organization and the 
operation of “leadership” bodies, were not implemented (Conway, 2012: 121).
In Dakar, the women’s movement also included in its ranks UN Women, 
a new institution that had just launched its activities. As part of the overall 
reform of the United Nations initiated in 2005, this composite entity was 
formed by merging existing UN bodies such as the Division for the Advance-
ment of Women (DAW), the International Institute Research and Training 
Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), the United Nations 
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and the Off ice of the Special 
Advisor on Gender Issues (OSAGI). In Dakar, UN Women attracted attention 
by the size of its tent, its visibility and logistics reflecting its status as an 
international institution (large, colored signs, a special area for viewing 
institutional f ilms), and the variety of gender-related activities held there.
What about African organizations? Some that had arisen from UN 
Conferences on Women were present, such as AAWORD (Association of 
African Women for Research and Development). This organization was 
created in Dakar in 1976 at the f irst African Regional Conference on Women 
(Druelle, 2004) in response to the experiences of participating in the World 
Conference in 1975 and the conference organized in 1976 at Wellesley 
College (which brought together researchers and activists of the women’s 
movement) (Tripp et al., 2008). Subsequently, AAWORD took part in the 
consultative process of “civil society” organized around UN conferences, 
and in the critique of Western feminist imperialism (Druelle, 2004) in 
Copenhagen in 1980. With the stated objective of “decolonizing research 
on African women,” it played a pivotal role in women’s issues in Dakar, as 
I will show later on.
Senegalese NGOs accounted for the largest number of organizations at 
the WSF. It is necessary here to highlight the decisive weight of development 
– understood here as a set of historically situated discourses and practices 
organized in the form of an indirect, private government (Mbembe, 2000) 
notably embodied by NGOs – in the evolution of African women’s move-
ments starting in the 1970s, with the arrival of “gender-related” funding.7 To 
be sure, women’s movements were already in existence on the continent, no-
tably at the grassroots level, including in national struggles for independence 
7 The book by Ester Boserup, which came out in 1970, was the f irst to link women’s issues 
to those of development. It played a considerable role in launching the institutionalization of 
gender in development programs.
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(Tripp et al., 2008). Later on, single-party regimes often attempted to co-opt 
the women’s movements by setting up an institutional network headed by 
African First Ladies. Organizations f inanced by development programs, 
which were sometimes co-opted by the ruling elites, began appearing in 
the 1970s. The situation changed radically in the early 1990s, when Africa 
experienced the combined effects of a wave of political liberalization, an 
influx of funding from international donors to “civil society” rather than to 
national bodies, and the inability of governments to implement essential 
social policies due to drastic budget cuts imposed by structural adjustment 
programs. These shifts led to the rapid growth of national NGOs, many of 
which took up gender issues. Thus, the 1990s saw myriad new organizations 
spring up along with the “NGOization” of already existing ones eager to 
qualify for gender-related financing, such as the FNGPF (National Federal of 
Groups to Promote Women) in Senegal.8 The World Conferences on Women, 
particularly the one held in Beijing in 1995, also encouraged the creation 
of grassroots organizations. Continental events led to similar dynamics: 
for example, the Africa-wide United Nation’s Women’s Conference, held in 
Dakar in 1994, gave rise to new networks introduced on the national scale.9
Behind the effect of institutional formatting – in the form of NGOs – and 
their common dependence on donors, African women’s organizations are 
quite heterogeneous. They focus on different issues, with some concentrat-
ing on economic aspects (micro-credit, income-generating activities, etc.), 
and others on achieving broader inclusion and representation of women, 
in political life for example. Their relationship with the base is often am-
bivalent. The NGOs set up in the 1990s were more expertise-oriented and 
relied largely on educated, urban elites.10 When they came under strong 
criticism within national public spheres, some tried to reconnect with 
grassroots movements and thereby recapture their legitimacy (Pommerolle 
and Siméant, 2008a). Conversely, movements with strong local roots devel-
oped strategies to link up with national and international networks. Let us 
take for example APROFES (Association for the Promotion of Senegalese 
Women). Located in Kaolack, this NGO is characterized by a local base 
and numerous ties to national and transnational networks. It exemplif ies 
a fringe of Senegalese women’s movements that succeeded in avoiding 
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in NGOs. Its participation in the network of Siggil Jigeen, one of the most 
active women’s issues organizations in Senegal, based in Dakar, gave it a 
solid connection to the national level (Sieveking, 2008). APROFES played an 
important role in supporting women’s issues at the WSF in Dakar, where it 
joined with a northern organization called the CADTM (Committee for the 
Abolition of Third World Debt) to organize the forum of African Women’s 
Struggles, held only a few days before the WSF. The f inal declaration of the 
women’s assembly borrowed heavily from the one articulated by this forum.
4.2 Strategies, tensions, and blind spots around women’s 
issues in Dakar
Weight and space
Women’s issues ranked high on the list of causes represented in Dakar. 
More than a quarter of survey respondents had been or were currently 
members of a “women’s rights and feminist” movement, and 20% of a 
“women’s association.” The “women’s rights and feminist” group was 
the fourth most represented, and “women’s associations” the ninth. The 
three most represented causes – in descending order: defense of human 
rights, humanitarian/development aid/international solidarity, and peo-
ple mobilized “against neoliberal globalization,” ref lect the importance 
of certain organizations – in this case, human rights, humanitarian and 
international solidarity – in the genesis of alter-global movements (Fillieule, 
Agrikoliansky, and Sommier, 2010). This ranking of causes also reveals that 
other spheres which played a signif icant role in generating alter-global 
movements had few representatives in Dakar: trade unions, the landless 
movement, and the radical left.
As in previous forums, the large presence of women at the event in Dakar 
contrasted sharply with female representation on stage at the assemblies 
and in the coordinating bodies. Male elites and more broadly modes of 
male interaction in the forum leadership and organization – sometimes 
summarized in the expression “Porto Alegre men” (Eschle and Maiguashca, 
2010, 34) – were still predominant in Dakar. In this regard, the alter-global 
movement is in no way an exception to the rule. As certain authors have 
noted, “Sexism does not end at the door to activist meetings” (Roux, 2005). 
The phenomenon affects all militant movements, even those that are 
critical of the sexual division of labor, including activist labor, and more 
broadly of gender hierarchies (Fillieule and Roux, 2009). Among the thirteen 
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committees in charge of preparing the WSF, one was called “Gender and 
Fairness.” It was tasked with “facilitating the consideration given to gender 
in the WSF, (…) strengthening women’s participation in the scientif ic and 
cultural program of the WSF [and helping] to ensure that gender is taken 
into account in the preparatory process [sic] and in the activities organized 
during the Forum.” The objectives were therefore rather classical, combining 
reinforcement of the role of gender as a theme with increased participation 
of women in the WSF organization and activities.
The central space of the Dakar forum (both geographically, because it 
was situated very close to the epicenter of the site, and metaphorically for 
women’s issues) was definitely the “Women’s Village.” Faced with consider-
able logistical problems that marred the f irst day of the forum – the rooms 
planned for workshops were not available or did not exist, women’s move-
ment activists (especially AAWORD members), supported by the “Gender 
and Fairness Committee,” quickly set up a large red tent called “Women’s 
Village.” Although it was strategically located on the campus and in the 
forum, the tent’s very poor acoustics prevented much of the audience from 
following the discussion. In practice, the tent allowed a large number of 
activities to take place, hence creating a geographical concentration of 
gender-related activities. The UN Women’s tent, mentioned earlier, was 
just a few steps away from “Women’s Village,” thereby strengthening the 
effect of concentration. It contrasted sharply with the surrounding stands 
of Senegalese women’s associations, which were far more makeshift and 
much less well equipped. The structural inequalities between the different 
types of women’s organizations present in Dakar were thus clearly in view.
Of the twelve main topics at the Dakar forum, only three referred explic-
itly to gender issues. The f irst topic discussed the issue of discrimination 
relating to sexual orientation and gender; the sixth was committed to “a 
world freed from capitalism principles and structures, patriarchal oppres-
sion, any form of domination by f inancial authorities, transnational and 
unfair systems of trade, neocolonial domination and domination by debt”; 
the last called for “new forms of subjectivity and epistemology opposed to 
racism, Eurocentrism, patriarchy and anthropocentrism.” Furthermore, 
relatively few sessions or workshops dealt specif ically with gender or 
women during the forum. Of the 470 self-organized activities that took 
place January 7-9, only 33, i.e. 14%, were concerned with “gender,” or more 
exactly, in the overwhelming majority of cases, with “women” (one term or 
the other appeared in the title of the activity). Finally, of the 38 assemblies 
of convergence that took place during the last two days of the forum, two 
were directly linked to women’s issues: the f irst, entitled “Women and 
WOmen’S iSSueS and ac tiviStS at the WOrld SOcial FOrum in daK ar 105
Development,” was organized by French international solidarity associa-
tions, whereas the second – the “Assembly of Women’s Convergence,”11 was 
organized by the heavyweights of transnational feminism and other alter-
global organizations particularly active in women’s issues: respectively 
World March of Women, Articulación Feminista Marcosur, Women’s In-
ternational Democratic Federation, Femnet for the women’s organizations, 
and Vía Campesina and the Committee for the Abolition of Third World 
Debt for allied organizations. Although these f igures conceal the possible 
use of gender as a category of analysis in the other activities and assemblies, 
they nevertheless suggest the continuing prevalence within the forum of 
reluctance to think about how relationships of race, class, and gender are 
intertwined and essentially part of every topic.
What were the highlights for the women’s movement at the WSF in 
Dakar? First, it should be pointed out that at WSFs, semi-autonomous 
events are organized around women’s issues: “the most common practice 
is to hold the women’s forum as a semi-autonomous event during the WSF. 
That is what happened at the Summit of Peoples in Quebec in 2001. It was 
also the case at the third Social Forum in Porto Alegre in 2003 and at the 
European Social Forum in Paris in the autumn of 2003. Usually, the women’s 
forum takes place on the day preceding the off icial opening of the WSF, 
so that women who take part can also participate in other WSF events” 
(Lamoureux, 2004: 179). These semi-autonomous events have been given 
different names over the years, and the WMW and the AFM have been the 
most active in organizing them. The first was planeta FEMEA in Porto Alegre 
in 2002 (Conway, 2012), which originated in the World’s Women’s Planet 
tent set up by the Brazilian delegation for the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 
(Forsyth, 2005: 780). Next there was a European assembly for women’s rights 
at the European Social Forum in 2003, organized by the WMW, which drew 
about 3,500 participants (Conway, 2007). Then, in 2004, the f irst Feminist 
Dialogue of the WSF took place on the initiative of South Asian and Latin 
America women activists at the forum in Mumbai (Roskos and Willis, 
2007: 6). This event has continued to be held at virtually all the subsequent 
forums;12 scheduled a few days before the start of the WSF, it is considered 
a highlight of the women’s rights movement. The AFM plays a crucial role 
in its organization (Conway, 2007). In Dakar, contrary to the previous ver-
sions, the Feminist Dialogue (called Inter-movement Feminist Dialogue) for 
11 Cf. http://fsm2011.org/fr/actualite/programme-des-assemblees-de-convergence-pour-
laction, consulted on January 20, 2013.
12 www.radiofeminista.net/feb07/notas/feminist_charter.htm
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once took place during the forum. But it turned out to be a very marginal 
event: organizational problems had kept it from being held in the originally 
planned space; only a handful of militants were gathered together, sitting 
on the ground in a tent near the building where the session was supposed 
to take place, which looked unoccupied and therefore displayed no sign 
indicating the topic discussed.13 No African women activists attended. At 
the WSF in Bamako in 2006, on the other hand, the Feminist Dialogue was 
a key event for the women’s movement, attracting a crowd of more than 350 
participants (Latourès, 2007). The only semi-autonomous event in Dakar 
devoted to women’s issues was the forum on African Women’s Struggles 
mentioned earlier. It was organized in Kaolack a few days before the WSF 
by APROFES, the Social Forum of Kaolack and the CADTM. With about 600 
participants, according to the organizers, and a plenary session followed by 
five workshops, this forum ended by a declaration using “feminist” language 
and devoting a large part of the discussion to “intersectionality,” entitled 
the “Final Declaration of the Forum on African Women’s Struggles.”14 The 
Women’s Convergence Assembly held at the end of the forum was expected 
to adopt a joint declaration, based on the declaration of the forum of African 
Women’s Struggles and “The Letter of Solidarity with the Struggle of the 
Women of the World” which had been drafted during the WSF and signed by 
some thirty organizations.15 There were no significant divergences between 
the two texts and some organizations were in fact signatories of both. The 
session was nevertheless repeatedly disturbed by Moroccan militants who 
vehemently refused to have the Sahrawi women’s right to self-determination 
mentioned in the f inal declaration. Instead of a common declaration, the 
Women’s Convergence Assembly concluded with a letter made available 
to the organizations for signature, testifying to the relative weakness and 
lack of cohesiveness of the women’s movement in the face of the dissension 
aroused by the Sahrawi question.
Strategies and practices
I will come back only briefly to the various strategies implemented by the 
women’s movement activists to try and “engender” the WSF. First, because 
13 Cf. http://iglhrc.wordpress.com/2011/02/09/overcoming-the-chaos-of-the-world-social-
forum-through-solidarity-and-self-determination/, consulted on January 20, 2013.
14 Cf. http://cadtm.org/Declaration-f inale-du-Forum-des, consulted on May 13, 2013.
15 Cf. w w w.marchemondialedesfemmes.org/al l iances_mondialisat ion/cmicfold-
er.2005-03-02.3713067089/femmes-dakar2011/fr, consulted on April 13, 2013.
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they have been discussed at length in the works cited in introduction; second 
because they were in no way specif ic to the Dakar forum; f inally, and above 
all, because I would like to give more emphasis to the strategies that were not 
part of the women’s movement, in other words, those that were not pursuing 
objectives related to gender equality or women’s status and living conditions, 
but which nevertheless reveal facets of the militant work of women’s issues 
activists. In Dakar, the strategies alternated between a centrifugal tendency 
– strengthening the movement through semi-autonomous events – and a 
centripetal tendency, marked in particular by the intervention of women’s 
issues activists in other WSF spaces (like the intervention of the WMW in 
two other convergence assemblies: the Assembly of Social Movements in 
which it took part at every WSF, and the assembly to unite struggles against 
militarization with those in favor of decolonization).
For African women’s movements, the WSF constituted a space with 
multiple resources, which they tried to seize in several ways. The Senegalese 
women’s organizations, which were massively present in Dakar, stood out 
by the diversif ication of their activities at the forum, often combining the 
sale of products at stands with prospecting organizations seen as potential 
donors, and participating in the activities of the forum itself. The daily 
newspaper Flamme d’Afrique, published throughout the forum, noted that:
We toured the dozens of stands set up on the grounds of Cheikh Anta Diop 
University, on the new campus hosting the tenth World Social Forum, 
to f ind the groups led by women’s organizations. We counted a good 
twenty of them occupied by associations, federations, non-governmental 
organizations, cooperatives and other women’s networks – stands that 
attracted visitors as much by the display of products as by the ideas 
upheld by their occupants. But when one looked closely at these stands, 
one realized that the women’s organizations that occupy them were not 
there solely to engage in commerce. To be sure, the loincloths, shoes, 
chains, necklaces, pottery and other fruits and transformed products 
were the attractions, but they were not the essential part, as several stand 
occupiers gave us to understand.16
In another edition, the same newspaper related the comments of Senegalese 
activists who explained that they took advantage of the forum to identify 
16 Cf. the bulletin of the African Social Forum that appears at each WSF, Flamme d’Afrique, 
no. 4, consulted online on May 11, 2013: http://africansocialforum.org/f lamme/fsm/dakar/
FLAMMEDAFRIQUE04.pdf.
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and seek out new donors: “Beyond the small purchases that participants 
might make, her organization is expecting opportunities for much more 
signif icant business. ‘We already had two contacts with a Belgian and 
a Cameroonian,’ Mrs. Dramé conf ided. The African Network of Women 
Workers emphasizes such contacts because the organization needs to 
be restructured.”17 The WSF thus represented a chance to make contact 
with current or potential donors, which have become critically important 
since available funding declined in the late 2000s when donors went back 
to delivering funds to governmental agencies (Tripp et al., 2008: 73). The 
usual practices of the development world were also on view at the forum, 
e.g. the distribution of per-diems during a workshop on HIV/AIDS. While 
these practices and strategies, so widespread in the sphere of development, 
occurred at most of the earlier WSFs, they were stepped up in Dakar by the 
strong “NGOization” of Senegalese and more broadly African civil society.
Another aspect of action that was invested in Dakar can be read between 
the lines of a report by the Gender and Fairness Committee. Along with the 
traditional aims mentioned above, the committee also wished “to ensure 
that the concerns of ordinary, especially rural, women [are] taken into 
account.”18 Furthermore, the committee should “encourage the appropriation 
of World Social Forum issues by women, women’s organizations and grass-
roots social movements” so that “these women, the women’s organizations 
and the grassroots movements [have] a good understanding of the issues of 
the World Social Forum and [mobilize] to ensure their concerns are taken 
into account.” These words echo the divide already mentioned between 
expertise-oriented national NGOs, led by educated elites, and grassroots 
movements in rural regions, as well as the low level of identif ication of the 
women’s movement activists at Dakar: only 60% of them identif ied them-
selves “very much” with the alter-global cause, 29% “quite a bit,” and 11% 
“a little.” Actually, not only women’s movements tend to avoid alter-global 
discourse: more broadly indeed, “within the WSF, the ‘social movements’ ten-
dency remains (…) largely organized and defended by non-African delegates” 
(Pommerolle and Siméant, 2008a). Facing this situation, the Senegalese 
women’s movement activists involved in the alter-global spheres reacted 
by using the WSF to “raise the awareness” of local women’s movements.
Finally, we might note that the mobilization of African women, massively 
present at the opening march of the forum and consistently in attendance 
17 Cf. Flamme d’Afrique, no. 3, consulted online on May 13, 2013: http://africansocialforum.
org/actual0/images/docs/f lammes/fsm/dakar/FLAMMEDAFRIQUE03.pdf.
18 Cf. http://fsm2011.org/fr/node/559, consulted on January 20, 2013.
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throughout the forum, is reminiscent of an old tradition of using women as 
a “strategic reserve” in national political life. Under single-party regimes, 
African women’s movements were largely co-opted by authorities, which did 
not hesitate to use them for political ends (Sow, 1997; Tripp et al., 2008). The 
forms and repertoires of action available to women’s movements thus remain 
marked by their historical trajectories (Tripp et al., 2008: 59), and these 
large-scale practices definitely left their imprint on the forum as a whole.
Tensions, dissensions, and a blind spot
Finally, I would like to discuss the tensions and dissensions that arose in 
Dakar as well as a topic that was – signif icantly I thought – virtually absent 
from the WSF. The women’s movement has its share of disagreements and 
tensions: between “femocrats” singing the praises of mainstreaming and 
radical feminists calling for a structural transformation of gender relation-
ships; between militants seeking the abolition of female genital mutilation 
and activists denouncing Western imperialism at work in criticizing these 
practices; fault lines run through the WSF just as, more generally, they run 
through the women’s movement as a whole. In my view, there is one point 
worth emphasizing with regard to the forum in Dakar: the failed rendezvous 
with the radical fringe of African feminism represented by the African 
Feminist Forum. This forum, launched in 2006 in Accra and numerically 
dominated by English-speakers, assumes and claims a feminist identity 
and proclaims itself radical in the sense that it seeks a fundamental trans-
formation of relationships between women and men.19 Defining itself as an 
autonomous space dedicated to internal reflection and strengthening the 
movement, “a space in which African women could celebrate their feminist 
identity without recourse to apology, qualif ication or compromise,”20 it 
declares its solidarity with marginalized women (African lesbians, sex 
workers, women with disabilities) and stands ready to counter the rise of 
religious, ethnic, and cultural fundamentalisms.21 One of the objectives 
established at the f irst forum was to join the dynamic of WSFs, which was 
the case in Nairobi with the Feminist Dialogue during which the charter 
of feminist principles for African feminists was off icially launched.22 A few 
19 See the online article consulted on May 13, 2013: www.opendemocracy.net/5050/jessica-horn/
tales-of-lionesses-third-african-feminist-forum.
20 Reclaiming our spaces, Executive summary of the f irst African Feminist Forum, 2006.
21 Cf. www.africanfeministforum.com/background/, consulted on January 20, 2013.
22 Cf. www.wunrn.com/news/2007/02_07/01_29_07/020407_african2.htm, consulted on May 
13, 2013.
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months before the WSF in Dakar, a new edition of this forum took place in 
the same city, to the great regret of certain African feminists such as Amina 
Mama, who said with regard to Dakar: “As a feminist – 30 years I’ve been 
involved with this – it concerns me that there’s still a parallelism going 
on. At times I felt as if I was in a time warp. I think that social movements 
have to take this up more seriously.”23 And although French speakers are 
in the minority within the African Feminist Forum, at least three – all 
Senegalese – participated actively in the WSF in Dakar.
This failed rendezvous illustrates the tensions that arise around the 
possibility of a radical feminist discourse in the Senegalese public sphere 
that I previously mentioned when discussing the auto-identif ication of 
women’s issues organizations as women’s movement or feminists. Other 
elements point to the same dynamic: let us take the example of the Yewwu 
Yewwi movement, which arose in the early 1980s. Calling explicitly for 
the abolition of patriarchy and the radical questioning of gender hierar-
chies, this movement was the crucible of a whole generation of women’s 
organizations, some of which, like the Siggil Jigeen network mentioned 
earlier, are seen today as spearheading the women’s movement in Senegal 
(Kane and Kane, 2012). Yet these “daughter” organizations did not assume 
a feminist identity but instead chose to align themselves with the women’s 
movement. They are constantly forced to deal with the increased risk of 
seeing their discourses disqualif ied for calling into question traditions or 
religion (and hence considered illegitimate by an ever-growing fringe of 
citizens), and the need to give substance to the discourses and programs 
of their donors or partners. And while their discourse might occasionally 
take on radical accents and they even call themselves feminists within 
the space of the WSF, they are more interested in dialog and concerted 
negotiation with the religious or “traditional” authorities at events organ-
ized on the local level (Sieveking, 2008). Thus, it appears that the “local 
associations of women develop their repertoires of action under the impact 
of resources and constraints at various levels, both local and national as 
well as international” (Lacombe et al., 2011). For them, the WSF has certainly 
represented the combination of a series of opportunities (to prospect for 
new donors, generate revenue, create ties at the international level, etc.) 
and constraints (the risk linked to publicly exposing their allegiance to 
discourses that are robbed of legitimacy due to their exogenous, imported 
character, and therefore qualif ied as unsuited to the realities of “Africa” or 
Islam at the national level).
23 www.ips.org/TV/wsf/mixed-reviews-on-space-for-gender/, consulted on January 19, 2013.
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Another difference from Nairobi: the virtual absence of the LGBT move-
ment in Dakar. Of the 1,069 people surveyed, only 57 had been or were 
currently actively committed to the LGBT cause. More than half of them 
stated they were activists for women’s movements (42 for women’s rights 
and feminist groups, 34 for women’s associations). During the forum, the 
only workshop devoted entirely to LGBT issues drew an audience of less 
than a dozen people, seated directly on the ground in a tent without any 
banner or panel to identify the topic discussed. No Senegalese attended and 
the discussions took place in English, the only language shared by all the 
participants in the workshop. In a country that criminalizes homosexuality, 
the question of the visibility of the LGBT cause was especially sensitive. 
And homophobic discourse was indeed not absent from the WSF: in the 
opening march, a popular Senegalese rap group, surrounded by a dense 
crowd of dancing militants from all over the world, slipped homophobic 
words in Wolof in between refrains calling for the abolition of Third World 
debt.24 A scandal had already shaken the public sphere in 2008, when a 
local newspaper had printed photos of a homosexual wedding said to have 
taken place in Dakar. An international conference on HIV/AIDS held in 
the Senegalese capital where homosexual practices in Africa were widely 
discussed triggered a surge of homophobic discourse in the press. This case 
raised once again the question of the hostility provoked by the visibility 
and voice given to homosexuality in a society in which a multitude of forms 
of silent accommodation prevail (Broqua, 2007). In this regard, the WSF in 
Dakar def initely tended to adopt a low profile.
More broadly, the women’s issues in Dakar also highlighted the moral-
izing discourses driving numerous contemporary West African societies, 
fuelled by the intersection between at least two phenomena that expanded 
rapidly at the end of the 1980s: the renewal of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Soares and Otayek, 2007; Saint-Lary and Samson, 2011) on the one hand, 
and the revival of traditionalist discourses (Foucher and Smith, 2011: 30) 
on the other. Rooted in a context marked by a profound, uninterrupted 
economic crisis since the 1970s, the dismantling of the state under the effect 
of structural adjustment programs and massive, unchecked urbanization, 
the support those discourses enjoy within the population is all the greater 
as development has obviously failed. They actually give a privileged posi-
tion to women and their behavior, either by elevating them to the rank of 
24 One of the artists behind the idea for the caravan, Fou Malade, who joined the “Y’en a 
marre” movement (We’re fed up) and is among its leaders, has since taken highly virulent off icial 
positions against homosexuality. I wish to thank Emmanuelle Bouilly for pointing out these facts.
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guardians of “tradition,” or by enjoining them to embody Islamic renewal. 
Recent research has brought out the consequences for women of this moral 
renewal of the public sphere and subtly analyzed the different forms of 
their commitment to these new forms of Islam (Schulz, 2012; Masquelier, 
2009). In Dakar, some debates have been indeed caught in the crossf ire of 
sharp criticism opposing “tradition” or “Islam” to the demands and actions 
in favor of women’s rights. An article in Flamme d’Afrique recounts one of 
these episodes:
Amphitheater I of the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, shortly 
after 10 a.m. On the stage, two ladies and four young men, facing an 
audience that appeared totally disinterested in whatever they were bab-
bling about. Some were busy with their cell phones, whereas others kept 
leaf ing through notebooks and books, revising of course but against a 
background of whispering. We therefore assumed that they were there 
just to take a break between classes. Imagine our surprise when the issue 
came up of early marriage in the Casamance region, based on a project 
under way in Ziguinchor. The project, called “Women have the right,” is 
run by the University of Ziguinchor and implemented by students with 
funding from the Italian NGO COSPE (Cooperation for the Development 
of Emerging Countries). A young girl of 14, required by her father to enter 
a forced marriage with her uncle, had repeatedly run away the day before 
the ceremony was to be celebrated until she was f inally saved by the 
project. The student project leaders raised the father’s awareness about 
the risks to the girl’s immature body, with the added weight of Senegalese 
law, which prohibits marriage for young girls before age 16. Moreover, the 
girl must consent to the marriage and it is prohibited if they are related. 
The statement of these legal arguments from Senegal’s Family Code, 
particularly its sociological aspects (age and kinship) caused an outcry 
from the young people present in the hall. Almost all of them were from 
Casamance or Fouta; we then realized that contrary to what we had sup-
posed, they were not there by chance and they were listening. Abdoulaye 
Sy, a f irst-year student in English, a newcomer from his home community 
of M’Boumba in Fouta, did not understand why one should not marry 
off very young girls since, in any case, they would end up pregnant: “At 
that age, they say we shouldn’t marry them, but we can see that they all 
have boyfriends.” He took this position despite the explanations of Mrs. 
Sarr Géneviève, the law professor supervising the young people in the 
project, who countered with the argument of consent. But Abdoulaye 
had f ixed ideas. Along with him, by the way, several other young people 
WOmen’S iSSueS and ac tiviStS at the WOrld SOcial FOrum in daK ar 113
including Anzoumana Diedhou, a f irst-year student in English, defended 
marriage between relatives. “I am djola (people of Casamance). When you 
give your daughter to someone else, for example to a samba, who is not 
going to respect you, it is better that he be a relative…,” he said, putting 
an end to the argument. What may surprise more than a few in this case 
is the fact that young people are the ones defending these traditions. But 
Abdoulaye Sy from Fouta continued to wonder “if others have the right 
to judge one’s culture.”25
In this chapter, I proposed an analysis of women’s issues as a particular 
configuration deploying itself within a specif ic and circumscribed space-
time. I described its activists, organizations, spaces, tensions, and blind 
spots. As at previous WSF events, the gap between the numerically massive 
participation of women and the limited place reserved for their cause was 
very visible in Dakar. Activists indeed adopted several strategies to coun-
ter this marginalization: participation in WSF organization (Gender and 
Fairness Committee), organization of semi-autonomous events or spaces, 
strategies for speaking at key forum activities (co-organization and speeches 
at the assembly of social movements, for example), etc. Nevertheless, my 
aim here has not been to assess the progress of women’s issues within the 
WSF dynamic. Rather, I tried to highlight the fact that the dynamics that are 
shaping the women’s issues within the WSF exceed, by far, women’s issues 
themselves and require a more grounded approach. In particular, it appears 
that the connection between African women’s movements (the trajectories, 
topics, and strategic options at once highly differentiated and yet all marked 
by development) on the one hand, and the alter-global sphere on the other 
is by no means obvious. To study women’s issues in Dakar required to ques-
tion this link rather than take it for granted and examine how African 
women’s movements seized the forum space to deploy various strategies, 
only some of which related to women’s issues. Indeed, in a context marked 
by strong “NGOization” of civil societies and their extreme dependence on 
donors from the North, continental women’s movements strove not only 
to “engender” the WSF in Dakar, but also to grasp – in multiple ways – a 
new space full of opportunities, while dealing with the moral tensions that 
traverse Senegalese society today, aimed particularly at issues of gender 
and sexuality.
25 Consulted on May 13, 2013 at the following address: http://africansocialforum.org/actual0/
images/docs/f lammes/fsm/dakar/FLAMMEDAFRIQUE03.pdf.
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Abstract
This chapter explores the asymmetries – of power, of access to resources 
and leadership– at work between and amongst transnational social move-
ments. On the one hand, the purpose of this chapter is that of analyzing 
the actual structures of inequality that emerge among the members of 
the alter-globalist movements. On the other, it investigates the explicit 
strategies deployed by the movements themselves in order to deal with, 
and tackle, these inequalities between participants. By looking at the 
2011 WSF of Dakar, the chapter offers an analysis of the “division of 
labor” – i.e. the distribution of social roles – within the alter-globalist 
movement, and of the interactions between activists and organizations 
from the North and the South. In order to achieve this goal, it considers 
the cases of North-South partnerships between European and African 
organizations, as well as cases of South-South cooperation by looking 
at the forms of engagement between Latin American activists and their 
African counterparts.
This chapter is based on a twofold hypothesis: f irst, that the alter-
globalization movement continues to be permeated by unequal access to 
resources and responsibility, and second, that the boundary between North 
and South is one of the main dividing lines within the movement (Smith, 
2002; Pommerolle and Siméant, 2008b; Baillot, 2010). These inequalities are 
clearly revealed in sociological analyses of how North-South networks and 
partnerships between activists actually work and of major international 
activist events aimed precisely at displaying the truly global, representative 
character of the movement.
Slightly less than half of the activists interviewed at the World Social 
Forum in Dakar belong to a transnational network (45%). In all, 37% (380 
respondents) declared they were members of a North-South international 
network and 16% (145 respondents) a South-South network. What does 
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“becoming internationalized” mean for an organization or an activist from 
the North? Does it mean the same thing for a militant from the South? What 
can a sociological analysis of the actors tell us about the way in which forms 
of domination are reconfigured in transnational networks? We f ind these 
questions particularly relevant because this aspect is so frequently eluded 
in the discourse produced by alter-global militants.
In scholarly work, few attempts have been made in this direction, but in 
our view they have not been entirely successful (Smith, 2002; Kwon, Reese 
and Anantram, 2008; Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011). In a recent article, 
Janet Conway (2011) uses the notion of “contact zone” to highlight the influ-
ence of (post-)colonial identities and inequalities at work in international 
social events such as the WSF. The article does not specify, however, how 
the identities and social roles determined by the categories of “North” and 
“South” are actually constructed. Rather than analyze what Conway calls 
the “coloniality of power,” we prefer to study the North-South division of ac-
tivist labor, its resilience and manifestations. This chapter will thus examine 
the categorizations of “North” and “South” and how they were reproduced, 
negotiated and perhaps called into question at the WSF in Dakar.
Our approach here is both qualitative (interviews, workshop observa-
tions) and quantitative (statistics derived from survey questionnaires col-
lected during the event). We will begin by examining how activists present 
themselves and how “partnerships” between organizations of the North 
and South are managed within the alter-global constellation (Sommier, 
Fillieule, and Agrikoliansky, 2008). We will show how the asymmetries and 
inequalities between Forum participants are manifested according to the 
participants’ continent of origin, using the examples of CRID,1 ATTAC,2 and 
CADTM,3 three French organizations and networks that helped to create the 
1 The CRID, or Centre de recherche et d’information pour le développement (Center for 
Development Research and Data), founded in 1976, is a French federation of 53 international 
solidarity associations representing Christian, Third World, alternative media, and post-1968 
anti-imperialist leftist movements including the CIMADE (a French NGO focused on migrants, 
refugees, and asylum seekers), the CCFD (Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Develop-
ment), Secours Catholique (Caritas), and Peuples Solidaires (ActionAID).
2 ATTAC, or Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and for Citizen’s Action, 
created in France in 1998, is now an international network present in 40 countries. Its original 
aim – to introduce a tax on f inancial transactions – f its into a broader perspective of regulating 
and controlling “globalization.”
3 CADTM, or the Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt, founded in Belgium in 
March 1990, is a single-issue association seeking total and unconditional abolition of the debt 
of the countries of the South. Today it is an international network comprising forty member 
organizations. 
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alter-globalization movement.4 We will then analyze South-South interac-
tion, one of the striking features of the 2011 WSF event. We will examine 
the forms of legitimation, the resources, and the methods adopted to build 
these partnerships, which claim to be both alternative and horizontal. Our 
f indings show that hierarchical ranking has also affected so-called South-
South cooperation, which has consequently had trouble establishing itself as 
a more horizontal, egalitarian alternative, particularly for African activists.
5.1 Acting “on behalf of” or acting “with.” Methods of North-
South cooperation at the Forum
In this f irst section, we will reconstruct the approaches to the division 
of labor between activists of the North and South and the dynamics of 
internationalizing the networks and organizations under study here. What 
are the various methods used in North-South cooperation within the alter-
global movement? How can we account for the inequalities between their 
participants?
How do North-South asymmetries manifest themselves in 
international activist networks?
On Sunday evening, February 6th, the CRID organized a welcome party to 
mark the opening of the Forum. The reception, which was planned from 
France, was held in one of the comfortable hotels in the tourist district 
of Ngor, where the French delegation was staying. After an introductory 
speech by the president of the CRID, highlighting the “French” delegation in 
Dakar, the other members were invited to introduce themselves. The French 
associations were the f irst to address the group after the president. When 
it came turn for the partner organizations of the South to speak, time was 
almost up and the CRID’s Director General tried to speed up the pace. One 
after another the “partners” went before the microphone to quickly state 
their organization’s name and country of origin: “Asia... Latin America... go 
ahead.” The African members were the last to go on stage in a room that was 
by then almost empty. Outside, around the pool, the buffet was being served.
The second example testif ies to a more diffuse form of domination. It 
is 5 p.m. on February 10th. Twenty-f ive militants belonging to the ATTAC 
4 The choice of French-speaking organizations is justif ied by the fact the WSF was held in 
Dakar, where the French delegation was the second largest, after the Senegalese.
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International network were meeting under an open tent to discuss the 
events of the WSF. One militant from ATTAC France expressed her pleasure 
at the progress made by the organization: ties between the partners had 
been strengthened along with the group’s visibility by running a common 
stand and demonstrating together during the Forum’s opening march. A 
member of ATTAC Burkina Faso raised a delicate point. There was indeed 
an ATTAC stand that had been manned by numerous Forum participants, 
but the name “ATTAC France” was printed in large characters on the banner 
of their shared tent. Murmurs could be heard throughout the tent. Several 
members of the French branch, clearly embarrassed, apologized: they had 
recycled used material without paying attention to the name. To solve the 
problem, it was suggested that the word “France” be cut out of the banner. 
The logo and the single name ATTAC would symbolize the network’s new 
international character.
These anecdotes may seem trivial but they are symptomatic of the 
problems that arise in transnational activist organizations. The way such 
networks operate is often very different from the image and angelic prin-
ciples of equality, solidarity and common cause associated with them. In 
practice, they are marked by profound inequalities in the information, 
resources and responsibilities given to the participants. What we see emerg-
ing here are elements of an international division of labor between activists 
of the North and the South.5
The actions, words, and experiences of participants in international 
militant networks are permeated by North-South inequalities, which are 
apparent in several revealing mechanisms. In strictly quantitative terms, 
we observed that the “bulk of the troops” representing the three networks 
and organizations at the WSF were from the North. The French part of the 
CRID delegation was twice as large as that of the southern partners: 320 
French members compared with about 150 partners. The CRID thus gave the 
impression it was truly and off icially a “French” delegation, which pleased 
the organization, even though it repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
its foreign partners. The overrepresentation of members from the North was 
not always quite so pronounced: only some 30 of the 150 CADTM delegates 
in attendance at Dakar came from Europe.
From a more qualitative standpoint, the organization and proceedings 
of the workshops tended to reflect and consolidate existing inequalities. 
This was evident in concrete, logistical procedures, which, though seem-
ingly unimportant, actually make up the day-to-day work of militants. For 
5 On the division of activist labor, see Sawicki and Siméant, 2010.
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example, the ATTAC Africa members had drawn up a mailing list called “the 
ATTAC Africa list.” The members of the ATTAC France network distributed 
the same list under the same name because they wanted to focus more on 
African topics. In the eyes of the African activists, the two lists interfered 
with each other and “severely impeded [their] work,”6 which is why several 
of them asked to have the French list eliminated. The ATTAC Africa list also 
created problems from a more symbolic point of view. One of the ATTAC 
Burkina activists explained that, “for communication to take place, we need 
a relationship between ATTAC Europe and ATTAC Africa, not between a 
country and a continent. ATTAC France was the f irst, but we don’t want a 
leader. Today, ATTAC Germany has more members than ATTAC France.” In 
the case of the CRID, the logistical skills of its delegations were highly valued 
amid the widespread disorganization of the Forum; their workshops were 
planned a month before the Forum by one or more French organizations, 
with the CRID overseeing coordination and preparatory meetings. During 
the feedback phase after the return from Dakar, many French participants 
emphasized that they felt like they were taking part in “a forum within the 
forum.” The CRID’s foreign partners were less enthusiastic, however: in the 
“evaluation” forms distributed by the CRID at the end of the Forum, they 
criticized the highly centralized preservation of an exclusive inner circle 
of Franco-centric activists.
Observations of the workshops also revealed a North-South division 
of discourse. The Western members adopted an academic, “scientif ic,” 
or expert form of discourse, even though the content was often political. 
The participants from the South talked about specif ic examples, usu-
ally derived from their home country or even their personal experience. 
This occurred in the workshop on the volatility of commodity prices, 
co-organized by the association Les Amis du journal “la Vie”7 in which 
several, mostly older CRID members sporting badges on their T-shirts took 
part. The workshop, organized in French, resembled a summer university 
seminar with its standardized discourse and diligent note taking. The 
non-French-speaking partners of the organizing associations remained on 
the sidelines; the Senegalese activists took the f loor to provide concrete 
examples. The audience was enthusiastic and responded with hearty 
applause.
The division of activist labor into “expertise” and “testimonials” is a 
pattern in the North-South asymmetries within militant movements. 
6 Observation at the WSF of the meeting of ATTAC groups on February 10th at 5 p.m.
7 La Vie is a left-of-center Catholic weekly founded in France in 1945.
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Does it stem from the participants’ prof iles? A sociological analysis 
shows that even when participants from southern countries possess 
considerable social capital (compared with the population of their home 
countries), they are still at a disadvantage compared with their counter-
parts from northern countries, which may explain why they have fewer 
responsibilities in the network in general and in forum organization in 
particular.
Table 5.1  Profile of the actors from the West (North American, Europe) and 
the South (Latin Americans, Africans, Asians) present at the Forum 
according to their membership in a North-South transnational network
Members from 
the North who 
belong to a 
North-South 
network 
(N = 156) 
%
Members from 
the North who 
do not belong to 
a North-South 
network 
(N = 206) 
%
Members from 
the South who 
belong to a 
North-South 
network 
(N = 202) 
%
University-level studies
master’s or doctoral degrees 75 60 42
Occupations
tradesmen, shopkeepers or 
small employers
4 1 4




White-collar workers 3 4 3
blue-collar workers 4 3 4
agricultural workers 2 1 1
Students 4 14 8
Social background (according to the father’s occupation)
tradesmen, shopkeepers or 
small employers
11 13 12




Working classes 31 25 54
Fluency in a foreign language 71 69 53
experience abroad 63 60 52
read as follow: 75% of the respondents from the north belonging to a north-South network 
declared they had received a graduate degree, compared with 60% of the respondents from the 
north that do not belong to a north-South network and 42% of the respondents from the South 
belonging to a north-South network. 
Source: WSF Survey, Paris1-ucad-uGb, 2011.
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Activists from the North belonging to a North-South network form an elite 
within the Forum: 89% of them have studied at the university level and have 
a college diploma. They are better educated than Western respondents that 
do not belong to a North-South network. From an occupational standpoint, 
managers and liberal professions appear to be overrepresented in this group 
compared with those who do not belong to a North-South network (58% 
versus 46%). Access to a World Social Forum through membership in a 
North-South network is not reserved for the aff luent classes: 31% of the 
respondents come from the working classes.8 The Western members of 
North-South networks, like the rest of the northern participants, show 
a strong tendency towards internationalization, demonstrated by their 
linguistic capital and experiences abroad. Nearly two-thirds have already 
lived in a foreign country, most of them for over a year.
We f ind the same characteristics, but to a lesser extent, among the 
militants of the South that belong to a North-South network. Among 
this population, the managers and liberal professions make up 46% of 
the activists, and mid-level occupations 31%. Furthermore, 71% have 
studied at university and 42% have a graduate degree. They also tend to 
be internationalized: 53% speak at least one foreign language, two-thirds 
speak two or more. Half of them have had the experience of living abroad. 
These survey respondents therefore also have substantial educational, eco-
nomic, and linguistic capital. They nevertheless differ from their northern 
counterparts in several ways. First of all, fewer of them continued their 
studies beyond the undergraduate level (42% compared with 75% of the 
northerners). Second, fewer southern activists work as managers or in the 
liberal professions than the northern participants in North-South networks 
(46% versus 58%). Finally, whereas the majority of activists from the North 
come from middle or upper class backgrounds (58%), those from the South 
generally come from working class backgrounds (54%): more specif ically, 
21% declare their fathers are farmers, 18% white-collar workers and 15% 
blue-collar workers.
Though the sociological prof ile of activists from the North and South is 
an important aspect, it is not enough to explain the continuing division of 
labor between network members, with the least attractive tasks assigned 
to those from the South. To f ind a fresh perspective and new insight to 
help us understand North-South asymmetries within the alter-global 
8 10% did not reply. We included white-collar, blue-collar and agricultural workers in the 
working class category. We did not include the mother’s occupation in the analysis due to the 
very high percentage of no-replies (40-60%).
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movement, we will step back for a moment and examine the causes and 
logic of internationalizing activist organization.
Understanding North-South modes of cooperation. A look at the 
internationalization strategies of the networks and organizations
The North-South division has been a characteristic of, and challenge for, the 
WSF and the transnational activist movement in general. “While the WSF is 
in general seen and projected as a ‘project of the South’ (primarily since its 
formal founders were a group of eight Brazilian organizations and its f irst 
meetings were held there),” Jai Sen, an activist and writer of Indian origin, 
reminds us that “we also need to recognize all its roots, some of which lie in 
the internationalist North, and not politically romanticize it as exclusively 
being ‘an arrow from the South’” (Sen, 2013). Like international organizations 
or businesses, transnational social change groups “work within institutional 
structures and cultural frameworks that inhibit efforts to fundamentally 
alter structural power relations,” and the North-South divide has been a 
major obstacle to the movement’s transnational organization (Smith, 2002: 
506 and 508).
Sharing values and a common cause is a core principle of many interna-
tional solidarity organizations. Yet the phenomenon of NGOs’ and associa-
tion’s internationalization must also be seen from the angle of political 
economy, i.e. as one effect among others of competition and changing 
sources of funding (Siméant, 2005). Internationalization is one of the strate-
gies available to associations to remain viable in the face of competitors or 
even to get ahead of others by operating on a transnational scale. This is the 
case for certain actors in the French world of anti-establishment organiza-
tions such as the CRID or the CCFD: following the internal repositioning 
of French associations in the f ield of development during the 1990s, these 
groups decided to invest their time and energy at the international level in 
the struggle “for an alternative world” (Agrikoliansky, 2005).
The transnational strategies of NGOS and international solidarity organi-
zations were also prompted by f inancing needs. Since the 1990s, European 
and multilateral institutions have become increasingly substantial donors to 
NGOs to help them promote “international civil society”9. At the same time, 
the organizations are more and more systematically required to demonstrate 
partnerships with actors in the South to obtain public funding. For example, 
half of CADTM f inancing in 2009 came from subsidies provided by the 
9 On the impact of funding structures and opportunities on NGOs’ strategies, see Lang 2013.
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Belgian Directorate-General of Development Cooperation (DGDC), which 
reports directly to the country’s Ministry of Development Cooperation 
since 1998. The DGDC focuses on four types of action: funding partners in 
low-income countries; raising the awareness of the Belgian population about 
development problems; offering services to support organization work or 
local partners; and personnel cooperation (providing development workers, 
scholarships, internships). Hence, having partners established in the South 
has become an indispensable ingredient in the development strategies of 
certain Belgian organizations. One f ifth of CADTM funding received from 
the DGDC is allocated exclusively to “strengthening the network.” The CRID 
delegation, whose participation at the WSF was f inanced in large part by 
the French Development Agency (AFD), has had to meet similar conditions 
in terms of its composition and representation. Thus, the number and role 
of partners at the WSF was repeatedly underscored at internal meetings in 
France because they were key factors in presenting the organization and 
becoming eligible for funding: the phrase “the CRID derives its legitimacy 
from its partners...” became a leitmotiv.
For many organizations of the South, setting up partnerships with 
northern NGOs is the only way of obtaining f inancing, in the absence of 
subsidies from their own governments.10 Of the African respondents belong-
ing to a North-South network,11 68% declared that all or part of their travel 
expenses had been funded. For 47%, f inancing is an essential dimension of 
North-South collaboration. Opportunities for training, travel, and attending 
meetings are eagerly sought after. According to the African respondents, 
the main activities of the network are: the exchange of information (79%), 
travel (69%), training (67%), and awareness campaigns (70%). Slightly more 
than half the southern participants declared they had come to the Forum 
to make contacts (53%).12
North-South partnerships should not be viewed solely in terms of the 
dispossession or dependence of southern actors. Indeed, even when such 
partnerships are unequal, they still afford African participants considerable 
opportunities and resources, which can be reinvested in the activist f ield at 
home, as Jean-François Bayart’s notion of “extraversion” (1999) emphasizes. 
10 Smith (2012: 512) has also shown that the scarcity of resources, knowledge base, and social 
capital in the global South is an important aspect of the North-South divide within transnational 
social movement organizations. 
11 They represent 47% of the members of a North-South network and 33% of the African survey 
population (N=177).
12 Compared with 42% of the African respondents that do not belong to a North-South network. 
Chi-Square Test signif icant at a threshold of 5%.
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Partnerships also appear to be a route to emancipation, f irst by overcoming 
national or continental boundaries (funding from “parent” organizations 
is mainly intended to pay for airfare to attend international meetings). For 
example, the airline tickets of the CRID delegates from the South and most 
CADTM delegates to the Forum in Dakar were largely f inanced by the AFD 
and the Belgian DGDC, respectively. The example of Samir, a young student 
activist in ATTAC Togo, demonstrates the multiple opportunities that open 
up for individuals who “go into” international activism: participation in a 
militant event offers a chance to meet others, make contacts and thereby 
generate new opportunities for funding, travel, and further encounters. Dur-
ing the year 2009, Samir attended the ATTAC-Europe meeting in France, a 
European Union conference in Brussels, the Conference on Climate Change 
in Bangkok, and the Conference of African Environment Ministers in Addis 
Ababa, as well as meetings in Montreal, Mexico, and Dakar to prepare the 
2011 WSF. Without a doubt, Samir is now a member of the “jet set” of the 
global justice movement (Sulmont, 2004). Indeed, he f its the bill perfectly: 
he has solid university training, speaks fluent French, and demonstrates 
consummate skill in militant rhetoric. This example is a reminder that 
making connections at the international level requires certain faculties, 
whether f inancial, social, or cultural, which are not available in equal 
measure to everyone in the transnational activist world. Participating in 
the WSF hence appears as a learning process (Sen, 2013), especially for those 
who have the skills to learn.
This trend is confirmed by a comparison between the African survey 
respondents belonging to a North-South network and the other African 
militants that took part in the Dakar Forum. The percentage of managers 
(or liberal professions) and mid-level occupations (41% and 32%) in the 
f irst group is higher than in the second group of activists (31% and 21% 
respectively).13 Among the Africans belonging to a North-South network, 
68% have at least a college degree, 59% speak one or more of their coun-
try’s languages, including an international language (Spanish, English, 
Portuguese, Arabic, French, or Chinese) and 53% have already lived abroad.
Furthermore, playing a dual role (Agrikoliansky et al. 2004; Agrikoliansky 
and Sommier, 2005), which is quite common among transnational militants, 
is essential for the southern partners and carries more than f inancial ben-
ef its. By belonging to several organizations, they can “shop around” among 
northern “parent” organizations for the best offer, i.e. the one that will give 
them the most advantages. For example, at the ATTAC debrief ing after 
13 Chi-Square Test signif icant at a threshold of 1%.
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the Forum, the problem of the group’s relationship with the CADTM came 
up. A member of ATTAC Germany expressed a desire to see ATTAC Africa 
members become more involved in the activities and marches organized 
by the ATTAC network. An activist from ATTAC Burkina Faso explained: 
“You’re wondering why ATTAC Africa members were not with you? It’s because 
they were with the CADTM, because they have a very well organized network. 
They even stay at the same hotel.” Indeed, for the opening march, a large 
majority of ATTAC Africa members from partner organizations in Togo, 
Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, and Morocco had joined up with the members of 
the CADTM, an organization to which they also belong. About 150 of them 
were gathered together at the end of the march, galvanized by hip-hop songs 
from the album Globalisons les résistances and chanting slogans shouted 
out by a member of ATTAC Burkina. The ranks of the CADTM had thus 
swollen during the opening march, at the expense of the ATTAC network.
Many northern militants are conscious of the asymmetry existing within 
North-South networks and they are counting on the situation to evolve: a 
transnational network can only be built over the long term. This is the view 
shared by the members of CADTM Belgium, who have adopted a pro-active 
approach, through their international secretariat, to encourage training for 
members from the South.
Not all the organizations manifest the same degree of lucidity about the 
tendencies towards inequality that threaten to undermine them. The survey 
shows that the steps taken by members of North-South networks have 
yielded mixed results: 43% of the militants of the South think the North-
South network to which they belong does not operate in an egalitarian 
fashion. Among them, 38% go as far as to say there is a major contradiction 
between the principle of equality invoked by the organization and the way 
it functions in practice.
5.2 South-South interactions at the WSF: another kind of 
cooperation?
So-called South-South cooperation was one of the salient themes of the WSF 
organized in Dakar.14 In 2009, the CACIM (India Institute for Critical Action: 
Centre in Movement) hoped that Dakar would be “a New Bandung of the 
14 The role of global South-based regionalisms in counter-hegemonic initiatives and the global 
justice movement more broadly has been highlighted by Smith and Wiest, 2012, chap. 3, pp. 73-4, 
85, 92.
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People.”15 In an interview with Femmes d’Afrique in Dakar, Demba Moussa 
Dembelé (Reality of Aid), a member of the Senegalese organizing commit-
tee of the WSF, supported South-South cooperation insofar as “it calls into 
question the traditional type of cooperation, which is merely an instrument 
of domination by the Western powers” (Bach, 2011). Did the WSF in Dakar 
signal the burgeoning of a “different kind of cooperation,” an alternative that 
could overcome the limits of North-South cooperation? Or, on the contrary, 
did it reproduce the same pitfalls, f irst and foremost the asymmetry between 
participants according to their region of origin? Our analysis is based on a 
sample of 145 respondents belonging to a South-South network.16
South-South networks: more inclusive, more participative?
Membership in an international network, whether North-South or South-
South, appears to be socially selective. The middle and upper classes are 
overrepresented in these networks in relation to the total African survey 
population: they make up two-thirds of the African members of inter-
national networks compared with half of the rest of African population 
interviewed at the Forum.17
The sociological profile of the African members of South-South networks 
appears to rank higher on the social scale than that of their counterparts in 
North-South networks. In terms of social background, the activists whose 
fathers are managers or exercise a liberal profession are more numerous 
in the South-South networks (27% versus 18% of the African members of 
North-South networks, most of whom come from the working class). They 
are also better educated than those belonging to North-South networks: 
53% of those in South-South networks have graduate degrees compared 
with 40% of those in North-South networks. 56% of them are engaged in 
management or a liberal profession versus only 41% of those in North-South 
networks, whereas the latter are found more frequently in mid-level occupa-
tions (31% versus 23%).18 Similarly, the African members of South-South 
networks have a privileged situation in their organizations, since at the 
time of the survey they were more frequently salaried employees of an 
organization (49%) than their counterparts in North-South networks (37%).
15 Rabia Abdelkrim Chikh, “WSF 2011 in Senegal,” CACIM, May 2009: www.cacim.net/twiki/
tiki-index.php?page=MultilogueWSF2011Note, consulted on January 10, 2013.
16 76% (N=110) came from Africa, 21% (N=31) from Latin America, and 2% from Asia and the 
Middle East (N=4).
17 Chi-Square Test signif icant at a threshold of 1% in both cases.
18 Chi-Square Test signif icant at a level of 1% in both cases. 
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The South-South networks therefore appear to be more selective, less 
inclusive and less accessible to African militants. This has not kept the 
members of South-South networks from participating more actively in 
the WSF: with higher qualif ications, they are perhaps more at ease in 
public speaking, argumentation, and debate at an international event. For 
example, at a workshop on ties between social movements and political 
parties, organized by the Secours Catholique but moderated by African 
and Latin American “partners,” members of Senegalese far left parties, the 
Maghreb Social Forum, and the Frantz Fanon Circle demonstrated their 
erudition in references to literary and militant texts. Due to the topic, 
the workshop attracted left-wing and far left intellectuals from North 
Table 5.2  Profile of the African respondents according to their membership in a 
North-South or South-South transnational network
Militants belonging to a 
North-South network 
(N = 214) 
%
Militants belonging to a 
South-South network 
(N = 110) 
%
University-level studies
master’s or doctoral degree 40 53
Occupations
agricultural workers 2 1
tradesmen, shopkeepers, small 
employers
4 4
managers and liberal professions 32 56
mid-level occupations, technicians 
and foremen 
31 23
White-collar workers 3 4
blue-collar workers 6 1
Students 11 11
 – employed by an nGO 
(currently or in the past)
37 49
Social background (according to the father’s occupation)
tradesmen, shopkeepers, small 
employers
13 9
managers and liberal professions 18 27
mid-level occupations, technicians 
and foremen
16 16
Working classes 52 48
read as follows: 40% of the african respondents belonging to a north-South network declared 
they had received a graduate degree compared with 53% of the african members of a South-
South network. 
Source: WSF Survey, Paris1-ucad-uGb, 2011.
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and sub-Saharan Africa engaged in political and trade union struggles. 
This politicization generated complicity between the African and Latin 
American participants.19 It enabled the African participants to do more 
than merely offer testimonials as victims or project beneficiaries (which 
they tend to do in North-South workshops) and assume a more militant 
role, expressing broader, more universal aims (i.e. not rooted exclusively 
in their daily reality and environment).
The specif icity of South-South interactions also hinges on the resources 
mobilized by certain southern militants that have helped to create the 
image of a South united in solidarity opposite the “North.”
A South united in solidarity? Shared identity as a method of legitimation
Some southern activists attempted to assert a shared identity. The topic of 
Afro-descendants was widely exploited by several Latin American delega-
tions, which gave them a connection to a forum in Africa. The historical and 
cultural link between the two continents served as a slogan for Colombian, 
Venezuelan, and Brazilians in the workshops.
It was February 7, 2011, in a workshop entitled “Migration is a Human Right,” 
co-organized by the CCFD. A Colombian activist said he was very happy to 
be there, to share with Africa, and added: “We Latinos, we have the privilege 
of having an African culture in our countries. It is the result of a crime against 
humanity and slavery that brought over twenty million people, but it is also a 
source of great cultural richness.” In several activities, the Latin Americans 
addressed the African public as “hermanos, hermanas” (“dear brothers and 
sisters”), and referred to Africa as “mama Africa.” A sort of brotherhood was 
professed and exalted. All the Latin American participants we interviewed 
said it was their f irst trip to Africa. An Afro-Venezuelan participant claimed 
to have had a mystical experience when he visited Gorée20 with his delegation 
prior to the start of the Forum.21 Similarly, cultural heritage was used to 
build a common identity in mobilizing festivities and emotions. Venezuelan, 
Brazilian, and Senegalese percussionists gave performances on the f irst and 
last days of the WSF: it was a genuine process of “festive diplomacy” that 
attracted an audience that extended beyond Forum participants.22
19 On this topic, see the chapter by Bergamaschi, Navarro, and Nez in this book.
20 An island off the coast of Dakar and symbol of the deportation of African slaves to the Americas.
21 Conversations with a Venezuelan militant. With Héloïse Nez.
22 On the role of emotions and “affective reactions that predispose those who experience them 
to become involved or support a particular cause,” we might mention the work of Christophe 
Traïni on “devices for raising awareness” (Traïni, 2009:13).
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When the Latin Americans were not claiming a common identity, they 
sought to generate complicity with the African public by highlighting shared 
experiences: migration, racism, racial discrimination, and the injustices 
suffered by black populations outside Africa. In the workshop on migration 
organized by the CCFD and led by its Latin American partners, a Brazil-
ian anthropology professor in jeans and a black shirt with African print 
introduced himself as a “son of the diaspora” and went on to give a lengthy 
description of the situation of the sixty million blacks in Brazil and the 
“chromatic division” of wealth in the country. In some of the North-South 
workshops mentioned earlier, the role of bearing witness was often reserved 
for African speakers and audience members to inform or raise the aware-
ness of the Europeans in attendance. In the CCFD workshop, however, the 
testimonial role was embraced by a Latin American speaker and directed to 
a predominantly West African audience (Malian and Burkinabe) to create a 
feeling of kinship. In his speech, he relied much more on his own experience 
of discrimination and poverty than on scientif ic or statistical expertise, 
an approach he claimed was necessary in view of the opposition between 
the developed world (in this case France) and developing countries. By 
addressing the audience in French, he transformed what would normally 
have been an obstacle (his mediocre ability to speak French) into an asset: 
“I don’t speak the language of Molière but I am happy to use the language of 
the street, because my French is not academic and I can speak with everybody, 
taxi drivers and others.”
The interaction observed during this workshop was interesting in several 
respects. The Africans who were present were a “captive” audience: they 
were partners mobilized by the CCFD, each one wearing a little blue scarf 
draped over the shoulder bearing the emblem of the host organization. The 
initial atmosphere – scholarly and studious – gradually loosened up and 
the audience expressed their approval of the speakers in a variety of ways 
(laughing, nodding, throat-clearing, applauding, and expressing thanks 
at the end); they took notes constantly and asked a lot of questions about 
various aspects of political, economic, and social life in Latin America.
A great deal of South-South interaction was also driven by issues con-
cerning the South as a mirror of the North, the uniqueness of the South in 
relation to the North (Europe, United States) and criticism of the North. 
Such discussions ended up producing a uniform image of the South charac-
terized by weak institutions, informality, lack of coordination of initiatives, 
etc. During the workshop on the link between political parties and social 
movements, a Colombian militant asserted that activism today must look 
to Latin America and Africa for critical mass and innovative capacity 
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because “in Europe, people have become conservative. Their struggle consists 
in protecting the welfare state and entitlements acquired in the past.” At the 
end of the workshop on ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas),23 
representatives of various southern countries identif ied with the topic of 
Western anti-imperialism. Several Venezuelan workshop organizers talked 
about the attempts fomented by the US government to destabilize the 
Chávez regime. The workshop ended with a long pro-government speech 
by an Ivorian participant who drew an implicit analogy between French 
neocolonial interventionism in Ivory Coast and American imperialism in 
Latin America. The mobilizing effect of his words was in direct proportion 
to the superf icial nature of the analogy: the audience improvised and 
chanted a slogan: “Solidaridad con la Costa de Marfil!” (“Solidarity with 
Ivory Coast!”). All the same, the need to respect the specif icity of national 
struggles and trajectories (i.e. political experiences in Latin America and 
the “Arab Spring”) and avoid imposing models of activism was asserted 
several times during the workshops and discussions between southern 
activists.
On other occasions, cooperation between governments and social move-
ments of the South was perceived and promoted as a source of alternatives 
to the North-South system. During the workshop on ALBA, a Senegalese 
militant called for greater cooperation between Casamance and Venezuela 
– “close to each other in blood and skin” – at the governmental and social 
movement levels. He recommended, for example, the creation in Dakar of 
an “organization to defend the left-wing South” in which “ambassadors of 
the South (Brazil, Cuba, India, Russia) would come together (…) against the 
IMF and the World Bank.”
Nevertheless, despite calls for unity and common cause, our observa-
tion of the WSF in Dakar reveals that the fragmentation of the South also 
engendered a hierarchical order among participants.
A fragmented South: controversies and hierarchical effects
The expression “South-South cooperation” should not obscure the fact that 
the South is increasingly fragmented. Determining who belongs to the 
South and who is or is not authorized to speak on its behalf was an issue in 
discussions held in Dakar.
23 ALBA, launched in April 2005 by Cuba and Venezuela, was conceived as a regional alternative 
to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) promoted by Washington. 
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Between heads of state: some of the remarks made by Lula, the former 
president of Brazil, at a meeting on February 7th held in the Place du Sou-
venir, irritated the Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade (a long-standing 
opponent of the Socialist party), who refused to be lectured by “emerging” 
Brazil.24 Between militants: the possibilities for stepping up exchanges 
between movements and countries in the South aroused debate because 
some were suspected of being exploitative relationships. In Dakar, Demba 
Moussa Dembelé, a member of the Senegalese WSF Organizing Committee, 
and Ndiakhate Fall, secretary of the Union of Peasant Groups of Méckhé 
(UGPM), expressed their concern and issued a warning about the seizure of 
land accompanying Chinese intervention in sub-Saharan Africa (Bach, 2011). 
Similarly, in several workshops, Senegalese participants sharply criticized 
the attempts to import an agricultural system based on Brazilian latifundios 
in northern Senegal. The criticism then took on an anti-imperialist tone 
(calling the system an imposed model, poorly adapted to African realities), 
similar to the tone used in condemning the practices of the countries and 
multinational companies of the North, and the Senegalese government was 
also blamed for its weakness in the face of such practices.
The fact that certain countries are considered to be “emerging” in global 
economic and institutional arenas has had echoes and repercussions in the 
world of transnational activism. According to Fatima Mello, the transforma-
tion of Brazil from a country receiving aid into a donor country has led to 
changes (and greater fragmentation) within national social movements 
(Mello, 2011: 2). In addition, due to their country’s new international status, 
some Indian activists feel they have been invested with special mission 
within the alter-global movement “to influence economic policies in favor 
of promoting alternatives that would serve the interests of peoples.”25
Other participants acquire a feeling of superiority. Rabia Abdelkrim 
Chikh (ENDA)26 thinks the World Social Forum in Mumbai in 2004 was 
“the best organized of all” and members of the Indian organization CACIM 
have called into question the ability of Africans to mobilize and organize. 
For example, they accused Kenya, the host of the WSF in 2007, of lacking a 
“culture of mobilization,” expressed doubts about the suitability of the Afri-
can continent for organizing WSFs and expressed “various concerns” when 
the international committee announced that Senegal had been chosen to 
24 Le Quotidien, February 8, 2011, p. 12.
25 Cf. the CACIM website, particularly: Rabia Abdelkrim Chikh, “WSF 2011 in Senegal,” op. cit.
26 The Environment and Development of Developing Countries is an NGO founded in 1972 
and based in Dakar, Senegal.
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host the WSF in 2011.27 By doing so, they reproduced towards Africans the 
lack of trust in Indian capacities that South American organizers expressed 
when it was announced that the 2004 WSF would be hosted by India (Sen, 
2013). In Dakar, the Venezuelan delegation’s youth movement representative 
declared that if “it was hard in Caracas because it rained a lot,” “it’s worse 
here,” not due to the weather but to lack of organization; at the end of the 
Forum, incidentally, his delegation called for “stronger, better organization 
of the event” in the future.
In the same vein, during more informal discussions at the Dakar WSF, 
South American participants were rather pessimistic about the social 
movement in Africa: a Colombian participant and the LGBT representa-
tive from the Venezuelan delegation said they were shocked by the lack 
of civil society mobilization, the ignorance, the “manipulation of minds,” 
and the “mental colonization” prevalent in Senegal. On the sidelines at the 
workshop entitled “Facing the Challenges of the Present and the Future: 
How Well is the World Social Forum Doing?” held on the last day of the 
Forum, a South African activist attributed the poor organization of the 
2011 Forum to the apathy of Senegalese civil society, in contrast to the 
involvement of the Kenyan organizers in Nairobi in 2007. His comments 
bring out the cleavages between countries and civil societies on the African 
continent along two main dividing lines already observed at the 2007 WSF 
in Nairobi (Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011): the f irst contrasts South Africa, 
the regional economic and political giant, also known for its dynamic social 
movements and ability to mobilize its trade unions, with the economically 
“least advanced” African countries that are dependent upon international 
aid and in a situation of extraversion, such as Senegal. The second distin-
guishes between English- and French-speaking countries and movements, 
which promote different conceptions and practices of collective action and 
establishes a hierarchy between them.
More egalitarian networks? Division of labor and feeling of equality in 
South-South networks
South-South activities and networks are f inding it hard to challenge the 
division of activist labor and overcome the stumbling blocks traditionally 
associated with North-South interaction. In certain concrete “cooperation” 
situations they reveal an inability to eliminate entirely the (real or sup-
posed) inequalities between their material conditions and those of African 
27 Rabia Abdelkrim Chikh, “WSF 2011 in Senegal,” op. cit.
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participants. This was the case, for example, with a professor of Spanish at 
Cheikh Anta Diop University, who gave valuable support to the Venezuelan 
ambassador to Senegal, but whose role at the Forum was confined to logistics 
(preparing, running, and tidying up the stand) and translating from Spanish 
to French at workshops. At the press conference organized by the Venezuelan 
delegation on the last day of the Forum, two Senegalese and a Cape Verdean 
expressed their desire to see the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) provide more funding and called for greater collaboration and 
“strengthening of capabilities.” Such appeals to Latin America reflect the 
fact that South Americans continue to be perceived much the same way as 
northern organizations and activists – namely, as potential donors. They also 
indicate the prevalence of old reflexes and the assimilation of the distribu-
tion of roles and ways of being and interacting acquired in North-South 
cooperation, particularly in the sub-Saharan context. In some workshops, 
by the way, African militants referred to Latin America as part of the North 
and, in the course of a conversation with a Mexican member of the survey 
team, southern activists told her they consider her as being from the West.
These observations appear to be confirmed by the analysis of the replies 
to quantitative survey questions concerning the feeling of equality in 
network operation. Among African members of North-South networks, 
60% declared the network functioned in an egalitarian manner, 26% 
thought that it tried to do so but sometimes failed, and 14% stated there 
were major contradictions between the organization’s principles and its 
actual practices. The percentage of Africans that felt their South-South 
network operated in an egalitarian way was slightly lower (55%) than for 
the North-South networks: 30% thought the South-South network tried to 
work in an egalitarian manner but did not always succeed perfectly, and 
15% that its modus operandi was clearly non-egalitarian. African activists 
are thus more inclined to point out inequalities in the workings of South-
South networks. In any case, the survey results do not indicate that the 
African members experience South-South networks as operating in a more 
egalitarian fashion.
A separate study would be required to interpret these results in depth. 
There are, however, a few hypotheses that might explain this result. It is 
possible that African activists interiorize their domination, which would 
lead them to view the asymmetries between northern and southern mili-
tants in activist networks as normal; or they may be reluctant to criticize 
partnerships that provide resources (see paragraph below). It is also possible 
that the inequalities in South-South networks are felt more strongly than 
in North-South networks because the South-South networks create higher 
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expectations regarding equality, and/or that the organizations of the North 
are more concerned about euphemizing the asymmetries between partici-
pants through various devices and procedures intended for that purpose.
Table 5.3  Perceived feeling of equality in transnational network operation by the 






The network tries, 
not always success-
fully, to operate in 
an egalitarian way 
%
There are strong 
contradictions between 
the principles of equality 
and the actual operation 
of the network 
%
Perception of a North-South network
activists of the north 47 46 7
activists of the South 57 30 13
- African activists 60 26 14
Perception of a South-South network
- African activists* 55 30 15
*We would note the low number of respondents in these categories and/or the high rates of no 
reply. consequently, these results should be interpreted with caution. 
Source: WSF Survey, Paris1-ucad-uGb, 2011.
South-South partnerships do have a specif ic feature, however. Indeed, the 
possibilities open to African activists through participation in a North-
South or South-South network are not identical: in this case, membership 
in a North-South network appears to offer greater professional and financial 
opportunities (training, travel and meetings, funding). Thus, South-South 
cooperation between social movements may in fact be different and more 
balanced for the participants – because it is less rooted in donations and 
the f inancing dimension – but at the same time paradoxically seem less 
attractive and advantageous to sub-Saharan African movements with few 
other sources of funding.
Based on the experience of the Dakar WSF, this chapter has presented 
a picture of the many ways in which the asymmetries within the alter-
global movement are expressed according to the origins of the activists. An 
international division of labor between northern and southern participants 
is emerging in transnational activist networks and generating criticism of 
European organizations. This process becomes clearer (which does not 
mean legitimated) when we take into account the logistical issues that have 
prompted the actors to adopt internationalization strategies.
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In our study, we have pinpointed certain specific features of South-South 
interaction, particularly in their legitimizing discourse, the way they pre-
sent themselves, and the mechanisms of participation. Although so-called 
South-South partnerships claim to be more representative and better able 
to speak for the South, they are more selective with regard to African activ-
ists and they are seen by their African members to be egalitarian in their 
operations than North-South networks. Northern organizations often plan 
the activities to stage encounters between movements and participants of 
the South. In addition, hierarchies and asymmetries exist between several 
“Souths:” between the aid-dependent South and the “emerging” South; 
between Latin America and Asia, on the one hand, and Africa on the other, 
as well as between activists on the African continent. Thus, there does not 
appear to be any evidence that South-South networks operate in a more 
inclusive, horizontal way than North-South networks.
All these elements recall the extent to which the distinction between 
“North” and “South” is central to the functioning and structuring of the 
alter-global movement and that these categories and their operating modes 
are now being reconfigured. They are an invitation to pursue the analysis 
of this long-neglected aspect of activist movements in greater depth.

6 Making waste (in)visible at the Dakar 
World Social Forum
A Goffmanian perspective on a transnational alter-global 
gathering
William Herrera, Alice Judell and Clément Paule
Abstract
In this contribution, we look at waste management techniques at the 
Dakar 2011 World Social Forum and the different tactics deployed to 
preserve the façade of a clean, environmentally conscious, and organized 
transnational alter-global gathering. By using a theatrical metaphor, we 
take into account the way in which organizers of the Dakar WSF have 
attempted to present this international alter-global event to activists, 
media and other participants, the ways in which they have tried to 
guide and control the impression formed on the event, and the types of 
activities and techniques employed to sustain their performance before 
participants.
“Prepare yourself for chaos,” said a seventy-year-old German activist when 
he learned that, like most activities planned for the day, the classroom 
where he was supposed to attend a workshop on the “Jasmine revolution” 
was occupied by Senegalese f irst-year university students who were in 
the middle of their f irst-semester law examination.1 The unavailability 
of classrooms and the absence of updated information on campus at the 
Université Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD) of Dakar for the activities of the f irst 
1 This type of comment (or other kinds of remarks, such as “It is a very irresponsible attitude 
by the organizers, the trip to come here was very expensive!” – Herrera’s f ield notes on February 6, 
2011), were quite common from the early hours of the Dakar World Social Forum as tensions arose 
days before between the UCAD Board of Education and the WSF Local Organizing Committee 
preventing access to over 100 rooms throughout the campus for workshops. These remarks 
were later on reinstated by the Working Group in charge of the evaluation of the Dakar Forum 
Event: “Dakar was a disaster for the individuals that participated; they spent a lot of resources 
to get there and were lost most of the time. The forum failed for those thousands of individuals. 
Networks fared much better, because of word of mouth or self-organization.” At the same time, 
the participants’ improvised self-organizing abilities were praised, particularly in this chaotic 
context. WSF International Council, Evaluation Dakar Forum Event, in: http://openfsm.net/
projects/ic-methodology/wsf11-evaluation-synthesis.
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day of the 2011 World Social Forum (WSF) created feelings of confusion and 
discomfort among participants. These feelings would worsen on the second 
day, as most classrooms were still unavailable for WSF activities. By the third 
and fourth day, it was the arrival of dozens of Senegalese street vendors on 
the campus main arteries that caught the attention of participants. Wooden 
statues, T-shirts and other local items contributed to a colorful, Senegalese-
impregnated décor. By the f ifth day, the forum was reaching its climax; the 
Assembly of Social Movements gathered together most of the participants 
and representatives of local and international organizations, where they 
tried to plan the next stages of their respective transnational mobilizations. 
Parallel to this fervent activist activity, disposal piles grew near the borders 
of the UCAD campus, far away from the main stages of the WSF.
While some authors consider the World Social Forum and its regional 
manifestations as a laboratory to explore transnational activism (Smith et 
al., 2007; Agrikoliansky and Sommier, 2005), we can also view the WSF as a 
material and symbolic universe in itself with its own practices and representa-
tions of social and militant activity. In line with this perspective, in this 
contribution we will be looking at waste management techniques at the Dakar 
2011 World Social Forum and the different tactics deployed to preserve the 
façade of a clean, environmentally conscious, and organized transnational 
alter-global gathering. Using Erving Goffman’s theatrical metaphor (Goff-
man, 1959), we will take into account how the organizers of the Dakar WSF 
attempted to present this international alter-global event to activists, media, 
and other participants, the ways in which they tried to guide and control 
the impression formed at and of the event, and the types of activities and 
techniques employed to sustain their performance before participants.
Few insights can be extracted on the way the specif ic issue of waste 
disposal was handled, actually used and sometimes criticized by multiple 
actors intervening as spectators, performers, or directors of what could 
be considered the World Social Forum as a “public stage”2 of the alter-
2 For a general presentation of the WSF as a public stage of the Global Justice Movement or 
alter-global movement, see Rucht (2011: 19). “Major gatherings such as congresses, jamborees, 
and mass protests, whether contentious or not, help to create and sustain social movements. In 
such gatherings, the adherents of a social movement physically meet with two aims: They first 
send a message to the outer world, making it aware of their existence, worldviews, demands and 
activities. To this end, slogans are formulated, keynote-speakers selected, journalists invited, and 
media-oriented events staged to demonstrate the strength and vitality of movement. Gatherings 
thus serve primarily as public stages. Less obviously, these gatherings also aim at strengthening 
internal bonds by permitting activists to talk to one another, exchange experiences, bridge cleav-
ages, and express solidarity.”
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global movement. In this case, to analyze waste management practices in 
an activist space, we need to consider the local material conditions that 
play a role in the development of this transnational contentious gathering 
(Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011). Also, we strongly believe that the lack of 
attention and research on waste, in other words its invisibility, should be 
taken into account. As Honor Fagan puts it: “[waste] is usually invisible 
(mostly hidden), deemed unproductive and certainly not well researched” 
(Fagan, 2002: 5).
Nevertheless, studying waste management practices may allow us to 
unveil some hidden aspects of the WSF. The sociology of social movements 
should also have alternative entry points to their object of study.3 Indeed, 
bins, waste dumps, and waste-related objects are not noble per se, but in 
contrast to the off icial and overconstructed face of activist activities, they 
are still especially invested by activism at large. Observing waste enables us 
to shed light on these dichotomies. We should also keep in mind the hard 
challenge posed by waste management in a context where the resources are 
scarce and also unequally distributed between the heterogeneous landscape 
of organizations participating in the event. Thus, the diff iculties encoun-
tered by the organizers will not be considered here as failures or f laws, but 
rather as revealing some asymmetries, which contribute to shape the WSF4.
6.1 Waste management as stage-setting for a transnational 
alter-global event
First, one should look at the way the façade of the WSF was designed through 
the example of waste management conceived as a specif ic scene of the 
global staging of the alter-global movement. Therefore our analysis will 
focus on three main points: after a brief overview of what seems to be 
a public issue in Dakar, we will try to describe how the waste problem 
was conceived and integrated into the staging of the WSF. Finally, we will 
illustrate how waste management was actually set up within the UCAD 
campus according to our observations during the investigation.5 Mean-
3 “Sociology treats ‘waste’ as if it was literally immaterial, as if it existed in a world apart from 
the one we inhabit in our daily, routine lives” (O’Brien, 1999).
4 Our sincere thanks to Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle and Johanna Siméant for their 
insightful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
5 For this contribution, we rely on some tools of the ethnographic approach as a way to 
examine international activists and local organizers in action and to explore the dispositions, 
incentives, and skills these groups of actors attach to waste management practices, which is a 
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while, several lines of research regarding the global and local dimensions 
of the event’s organization will be discussed.
Waste management remains a recurrent problem not only in UCAD, but 
also in the city of Dakar as a whole. In the f irst decade of the 21st century, 
several actors shared this policy sector, among them two departments of the 
central state – the Ministry of Environment (Ministère de l’Environnement) 
and the Ministry of Culture, Gender and Quality of Life (Ministère de la 
Culture, du Genre et du Cadre de vie) –, private companies, and local au-
thorities. A multi-million-dollar project f inanced by the World Bank and 
implemented by an Italian company started in 2005 to improve the situation 
in the Senegalese capital but was abruptly ended by the government in 2007. 
Recent attempts to reform its governance led to the foundation of a new 
public-driven organization created in 2006: the APROSEN (Agence Nationale 
pour la Propreté au Sénégal). Then, a consultation process led to the creation 
of a public-driven company in the summer of 2011, the SOPROSEN (Société 
pour la Propreté du Sénégal), which was empowered with responsibility for 
waste management throughout the country. But this structure coexists with 
regional-level agencies, like the Entente Cadak-Car, which was operating 
across the entire provincial territory.
This institutional turmoil was punctuated by recurrent struggles such 
as the conflict between local authorities and the state over the devolution 
of powers in this specif ic policy area. We should also mention the 2010 
controversy over the contract binding the French f irm Veolia and the Dakar 
town hall, denounced as unfair by 19 Senegalese companies. The waste 
management market in Dakar was valued at 10 billion CFA (about 15 million 
euros) in 2010. But one should also note the mobilizations of waste workers, 
especially during the WSF where they complained about their wages and 
status within the reform. Furthermore, the FUTN union (Front Unitaire 
des Travailleurs du Nettoiement) threatened to strike if the authorities 
ignored their claims. Thus, the organizing committees of the upcoming 
WSF in Dakar faced a complex situation with fickle support from the central 
authorities. This set of constraints has to be kept in mind to understand the 
local context in which WSF organizers had been working during the months 
of preparation for the event. But we should point out that this issue may 
particular aspect of activist life in a World Social Forum. In this way we try to address the “double 
absence: of politics in ethnographic literature and of ethnography in studies of politics” pointed 
out by Javier Auyero (2006: 258). For this kind of approach in the study of social mobilization, 
see also Wolford, 2006. For a discussion on the ethnographical approach in the study of social 
mobilization, see Combes et al., 2011.
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also have been a critical one for local authorities, since it was an element at 
the core of the university’s reputation and by extension the renown of the 
entire capital city and even the country. In fact, a large part of the Senegalese 
economy relies on tourism, which is why the image of Dakar – along with 
other priorities like security – had to be preserved.6 Thus, it should be seen 
not only as a matter of staging the event – conceived as a purely autonomous 
scene produced by and dedicated to foreign activists – but also as a way to 
enclose it in the country.
Organizing a WSF is a complex, multi-leveled process in which various 
actors at the international, regional, and local levels have to cope with a 
number of logistical aspects in keeping with the internationally agreed 
organization standards issued by the World Social Forum International 
Council (IC) and the local resources available. In order to handle the 
multiplication and diversif ication of “social forums” around the globe, the 
IC adopted in 2008 the Guiding Principles for Organizing a World Social 
Forum Event7 as a means to set standard rules for designing and organ-
izing this particular kind of activist performance. Among these jointly-
defined principles, which include those of “participation” and “equality of 
access,” there are specif ic criteria for the choice of “the venue”, as special 
consideration needs to be given to “transportation to and from the venue, 
environmental conditions – plastic bags and bottles, overuse and misuse of 
paper, use of recyclable materials and so on, and levels of cleanliness and 
hygiene. It would be highly desirable to make the space for the duration of 
the event into a ‘common’, to which not just the organizing committee but 
all the participating organizations have a responsibility in manner of use, 
maintenance, and upkeep.”8
For organizers, particularly at the international level, the tangible aspects 
of setting up a World Social Forum are critical in order to show consistency 
in activist conduct between proclaimed principles and actual practices. For 
instance, throughout the preparation and evaluation of the two previous 
WSF editions in Nairobi and Belem, there were debates on how to set up the 
6 Touristic, economic, and commercial dimensions were also a part of the f irst World Social 
Forum organized in the African territory. In Nairobi in 2007, the organization of the World 
Social Forum was seen as an “economic opportunity” to promote local tourism for authorities, 
entrepreneurs – represented by Kenyan and transnational f irms which partly f inanced the 
alter-global event – and local craftsmen (Pommerolle and Haeringer, 2012).
7 Adopted in a plenary session of the IC on September 24, 2008 in Copenhagen. These Princi-
ples are constantly being adapted in accordance with changing WSF organizational practices.
8 Guiding Principles for Holding WSF Events, available at: www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/
noticias_textos.php?cd_news=720.
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forum’s physical space and what this symbolizes in terms of the “alter-global 
ethos” (Audrain et al., 2008: 151). In Nairobi in 2007, scholars have pointed 
out that one of the main controversies throughout the event concerned the 
“commercialization” of the WSF, which in the eyes of international and local 
activists was perceived as a deviation from the “true nature” of World Social 
Forum space (Pommerolle and Haeringer, 2007). Furthermore, in 2009, 
the issue of the impact of this kind of event on the local environment was 
central in the discussions on how to preserve the façade of the event: “To 
avoid the contradiction of not respecting the environment in the Amazonia 
and be free of media criticism, the Organizing Committee and the IC should 
insert in the discussion of Methodology the impact of holding a WSF in Belem 
(airline travel, local pollution generated by transportation, trash produced 
by participants, impact on climate, reduce the usage of plastic and paper, 
and other environmental issues).”9 These concerns were followed up during 
the evaluation of the Belem WSF: “It’s important to ensure the coherence 
between theory and practice concerning ‘sustainability’. Issues related to 
waste disposal and recycling, resources conservation, transportation, terri-
tory planning, and others should be considered more seriously.”10
References to these “principles” were very common during the prepara-
tory stages of the 2011 WSF, for which a subcommittee dedicated to waste 
was specif ically constituted within the logistics committee. Reports of 
the preparatory meetings and seminars show that organizers were quite 
aware of the waste situation in UCAD and Dakar: “an ongoing effort to raise 
awareness regarding waste during the Forum is expected, to avoid its forma-
tion and to plan its sorting and disposal. The SOC [Senegalese Organization 
Committee] has been integrating garbage collectors and recyclers in the 
logistics committee in order to develop alternative options.”11 In this sense, 
the infrastructure and hygienic aspects of the organization were a key part 
9 Report on WSF International Council Meeting, “Commissions reports and decisions – 
Methodology”. Abuja – Nigeria, March 31 – April 3, 2008.
10 Report on WSF International Council Meeting, “WSF 2009 Evaluation”, Belem – Brazil, 
February 2-3, 2009.
11 Report of the 2nd Preparatory seminar of the 2011 WSF Dakar, “Food, Water, Prices and 
Waste”, Dakar – Senegal, July 27-29, 2010. See:
http://africansocialforum.org/doc/COUNCIL/Dakar_juillet_2010/reports/Report_Seminar_Da-
kar_ July_2010.pdf. This meeting, held at the end of July 2010, gathered 75 people of the WSF 
International Council (IC) but also representatives of the Council of the African Social Forum 
and of the Local Organizing Committee (LOC). It is a clear example of the interactions between 
the international, regional, and local levels of the alter-global arena.
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during the meetings held between the Local Organization Committee (LOC) 
and the Dakar authorities.12
Waste management at the Dakar WSF had visible aspects (and other less 
visible as we shall see in the last section of this chapter) throughout the 
UCAD campus. During our f ieldwork, we immediately encountered the 
“green garbage bins” which had been put up by the organizers in several 
areas of the campus. Here, let us take a walk through the main scenes of the 
event to describe briefly the impression given by the official waste system 
during the 2011 WSF. After entering the campus, the bins did not actually 
appear until we arrived in the surroundings of UCAD 2, the area of the 
university campus where most tents and villages of organizations and the 
press were concentrated. Then there were bins scattered in the alleys, which 
led to the roundabout between the Grand Podium and the Library, which 
was partially transformed into a Press Center. A few bins had also been 
set up in the surroundings of Brazil’s pavilion, which had its own system 
of waste disposal with black bins though without recycling instructions, 
and between the FST (Faculté des Sciences et Techniques) and the FSJP 
(Faculté des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques). But they had become few and 
far between compared with UCAD 2 near-military checkering and did not 
last the entire event. Furthermore, there was also a difference between 
UCAD 2, where bins were often paired with sorting instructions, and other 
areas, where they were put up as a single unit. Workshops and activities 
were most often organized in those areas, although the cancelations and 
disorganization could lead the participants to wander around other places 
less “prepared”. We also noticed that forum bins were not very visible during 
the opening day, and then their number grew quickly on the second and 
third days of the event to stabilize until the end of WSF.
Such observations led us to suggest that the concept of a sensitizing 
device proposed by Christophe Traïni (Traïni, 2010) might be useful to 
underline the role of material things and the layout of objects in the staging 
of the event. One should highlight the distribution of green garbage bins 
mostly in the UCAD 2 area, where the majority of organizations had set 
up their tents during the WSF. We will deal with this issue later (see last 
section of this chapter), but at this point we should nonetheless draw 
attention to several points. First, let us take a look at the color of the objects: 
these bins were similar to several others we had encountered in the city, 
12 “Note de rencontre avec la Mairie de Dakar,” August 31, 2010. A few informal interviews with 
Senegalese students and waste collectors revealed that the big alleys and the space dedicated 
to the tents had been cleaned up two months before the event.
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but it seems they had been painted green for the occasion. Then, the pres-
ence of paper sheets indicated which objects should be recycled or not: 
on one hand, non-plastic items, and on the other, those made of plastic or 
aluminium. The standardization of these objects shows how organizers 
had been trying to convey techniques to sensitize the audiences regarding 
waste management.
Illustration 6.1  Bins as stage props in the neat alley of UCAD 2, February 7, 2011
Photo by clément Paule
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Finally, certain organizations and their stands played an important 
part in reinforcing this environmentally friendly impression of the WSF 
stage, like the Dakar-based ENDA (Environnement et Développement du 
Tiers-Monde), one of the leading organizations concerned with waste man-
agement. It soon became clear as the forum unraveled that the Dakar WSF 
was to be a major space of dissemination for ENDA’s network. The leader of 
ENDA Maghreb, Tawfik Ben Abdallah, was one of the key members of the 
organizing committee, and will continue to be so, as the next WSF was in 
Tunis, home of ENDA Maghreb. ENDA, through an impressive web of dif-
ferent centers of activism, was thus at the core of organizing the forum. The 
headquarters of most of ENDA’s branches are in Dakar, and this organization 
has increasingly played a significant role in African alter-global movements. 
ENDA’s presence was visible throughout the forum, from the opening march 
with hundreds of banners to UCAD, with tents and material resources 
displayed across campus. Topics such as sustainable development, access 
to land, and waste management are at the core of ENDA activism.
ENDA Ecopole, one of the major branches of the regional NGO, is specif i-
cally concerned with waste and recycling practices, and has been involved 
with the Dakar dump for decades. During the Dakar WSF, ENDA Ecopole 
highlighted the concern given to waste management during the preparation 
phase. Its stand was one of the most visible ones upon entering the formal 
grounds of the WSF. Not only was the stand very colorful, but also clean 
and well equipped. The inside of the tent was covered with educational 
posters on electronic waste and the Mbeubeuss dump of Dakar; they had 
publications (free and for sale), and at least one member of the organization 
was present at all times. Thus, this organization could not be ignored as 
a part of the staging at the core of this paper. Indeed, ENDA Ecopole had 
planned to organize two workshops on waste management. However, only 
one entitled Electronic Solidarity and Waste Platform (Plateforme Solidarité 
Numérique et Déchets) occurred on Wednesday, February 8th. It took place at 
the local UCAD Internet cafe, where all modern technologies and comfort 
were available (computers, sound system, projectors, seats and tables for 
all participants, air-conditioning, etc.). Many different speakers (from 
Senegal, France, and Colombia) were scheduled, including representatives 
from the Senegalese government, UCAD, NGOs, and waste-pickers. As the 
workshop was focusing on electronic waste and reducing the digital gap, 
there was a strong normative conflict among the various speakers. On the 
one hand, there were the representatives of formal institutions, such as 
the government and UCAD, who advocated the formal establishment of 
the Mbeubeuss dump, waste disposal, and recycling practices, the f ight 
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against illegal import of waste and the reduction and better management 
of waste. On the other hand, there were the representatives of the pickers, 
and waste-related NGOs such as ENDA Ecopole, who advocated maintaining 
the status quo, i.e. protecting the waste-picker profession and empowering 
local actors in waste management processes. However, what was striking 
was the common stage face they all shared. As performers, they tacitly 
agreed to hold a common ground on the idea that they were all working 
together. The mise-en-scène of the representative of the Mbeubeuss Pickers’ 
Union, with a very emotionally and politically driven speech, added to the 
construction of a common ideology of waste. One of UCAD representatives 
mentioned the case of the campus, and the problems encountered in waste 
management and treatment, but this was the only link that was made in a 
four-hour workshop between waste in general and waste at the WSF.
The next morning, ENDA Ecopole organized a visit of the Mbeubeuss 
dump for partner NGO members, journalists (BBC Africa and Croatian 
television), and two researchers (including one of the authors of this 
contribution). The visit or more precisely tour of the dump was very well 
orchestrated. Not only did the participants have to follow unquestioningly 
all instructions (such as the prohibition of photographs or video recording 
and the strict requirement to stay on the path planned for the tour), but 
the discourses of both the Pickers’ Union representative and the members 
of ENDA Ecopole were identical to those of the workshop and previous 
journalistic visits of the dump.13 The analysis of both the workshop and 
the Mbeubeuss tour demonstrates a strong inclination on the part of NGOs 
and their partners to set forth and transpose a particular discourse on 
waste. This discourse is not, however, linked to any practical organizational 
matters, such as the management of waste at the forum. There is a gap 
between the staged discourses on waste and the actual presence of its 
performers within an activist forum, where waste also matters. This gap 
reflects one of the broader debates within the transnational environmental-
ist movement(s). For many years, deep ecologists have tried to prove that 
nature and the environment should be at the top of all political agendas. 
Development advocates, on the other hand, have argued that some forms of 
environmentalism harm the poorer of the world (Wenz, 2007). Thus social 
justice movements and environmentalism have clashed over issues such 
as waste management, with the former arguing against the dispossession 
of waste-pickers and the latter arguing for the formalization of dumps. 
13 Video dated from 2008 from the Canadian International Development Research Centre, 
accessible on web.idrc.ca/fr/ev-133936-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html.
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This gap often represents the overwhelmingly present divide between the 
North and South discourses of transnational environmentalism: it involves 
not only the question of historical responsibility for pollution, but also the 
present cases of “individual lifestyles of activists being at variance with 
ecological principles” (Kothari, 1996: 159). Furthermore, as these seem-
ingly contrary ideologies of social and environmental justice on the one 
hand, and deep ecology on the other, reach a common ground, the issue of 
the place of ecology in social movements has become primordial. Indeed, 
environmental issues in a broader sense were at the center of most debates 
during the Dakar WSF. However, as justly pointed out by Kothari more than 
a decade ago, there is still a disconnect between transnational ecological 
discourse and practice (Kothari, 1996).
6.2 Audiences
This second section will look at the actual settings and audiences of the WSF 
regarding waste uses and management. Here we use the terms “settings” 
and “audiences” as Goffman def ines them, i.e. the public and the place 
where human action takes place (Goffman, 1959: 22). However, the forum 
form also implies that the actors/performers and the public are part of the 
same group, the audience in general terms. Also, as we will explain further 
in the next section, the formal setting or stage where the interactions take 
place is well def ined and exclusive. The allocated space for the forum, the 
visible and legitimate stage for interaction, is itself divided into def ined 
stages and audience terrains.
With regard to these basic assumptions about waste in the forum, 
garbage-related objects, whether bins, disposal piles, and handicrafts made 
of recycled waste or stray waste can be considered as props: they are part of 
the décor, the setting. Within the material culture of protest, these objects 
are used to enact and convey diverse social meanings (O’Brien, 1999). The 
particular use of special World Social Forum bins, made of half barrels 
and painted green with black writing, illustrates this argument. In a sense, 
the participants at a forum will adapt their actions regarding waste, and 
especially waste disposal, to the setting they are in. On stage, they tend to 
follow the rules of the land, that is, to use the bin-props that are available. 
Backstage they are more likely to follow and use other rules and props 
when it comes to waste. The idea here is not to generalize about behavior or 
modes of action, because of the immense diversity of participants and stages 
within the forum setting, but rather to shed light on some patterns detected 
148 William herrera, alice Judell and clément Paule 
while observing relationships to waste. As soon as the “off icial” WSF bins 
appeared on the forum as well as paper signs indicating the “proper” fates 
of different types of waste – also known as recycling –, it was observed that 
participants tended to follow (without question) the instructions. Whether 
or not the waste was to be “properly” disposed of and recycled was not a 
preoccupation; the concern was rather to follow the rules of waste disposal.
Normatively, bins are used to dispose of waste and garbage, and these 
were the appropriate/legitimate purposes planned for these objects. In this 
sense, bins were mostly found at strategic places such as food outlets, resting 
spots (stairs, building entrances, grassy areas, etc.), or next to major stands 
or alleyways. What was not planned was the possibility for alternative or, 
in other words, inappropriate/illegitimate, uses of these green metallic 
containers. Here, bins are not only part of the décor, but can be considered as 
props, tools to carry out human interactions. In this particular case, several 
alternative uses were observed. The f irst, and quite frequent one, was the 
use of bins as seats during workshops or performances. The immense lack of 
material resources and organization at the forum led to a scramble for any 
piece of furniture (or, as in the case here, non-furniture) by the participants 
and organizations present. One of the representatives of the small French 
NGO Solidarité had to stay permanently at her stand during the f irst two 
days in order to secure her one and only chair and some planks of wood.14
Another alternative use of bins was as blocking material. During the 
second and third days of the forum, the local student movement of ‘non-
oriented’ alumni grew in both visibility and importance. They were protest-
ing against the lack of student positions at the university where the forum 
took place.15 Their arguments were therefore outside of the forum sphere but 
better heard within it. While marching, they used the bins and waste that 
were available to blockade the main alleys leading to the library. The use of 
these bin-props, objects branded WSF, was a very material demonstration 
of improvised and unforeseen protest at this “activist theater” (Audrain 
and Pommerolle, 2008: 180). Not only did these young protesters integrate 
14 Informal chat between Alice Judell and Maëlle Bouvier from Solidarité.
15 Cf. Herrera and Paule’s f ield notes on February 8, 2011. The f irst student protest during the 
WSF took place around 2 p.m. while we were looking for the site of a conference that we never 
found. We were asking for directions from students or lost fellow activists when we heard some 
sort of crowd roaring inside the campus. A few minutes later, we were able to locate about 30-40 
students who were demonstrating in the big alley in front of the library and heading to the 
University Rectorate. Followed by a European journalist with a video camera, the group was 
asking for “orientation” and described itself as a group of alumni prevented by the university 
administration from registering as proper students.
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the forum’s stage to further their message, but they also used the available 
props, its material symbols.
Another use of the bins was as a souvenir. During the forum, all forum-
branded objects, such as T-shirts, bags, banners, and bins, were very much 
sought after by mostly local but also international participants at the forum. 
On the third day of the forum, one of the authors was able to purchase a WSF 
bag at a recently opened, informal stand behind UCAD 2. The vendor had 
many WSF-branded objects and was turning a large profit. The sale of bins 
was not witnessed, but during the days immediately following the forum, 
some participants and locals took bins, whether to use them as flowerpots 
or f ire barrels or simply as souvenirs.16 Later on, after the forum, the bins 
were piled up in corners of the campus, but also reused as garbage cans for 
other events within the university. Indeed a Google conference took place 
several days later and the bins were reused for that event.
Illustration 6.2  Bins piled up after the WSF
Photo by abigaïl Sartorio-boucheix
Other spaces in the forum setting were allocated to exhibitions and the sale 
of handicrafts made from or inspired by waste-related objects, reinforcing 
a material culture of protest specif ic to the African alter-global movement, 
which was manifest at the Dakar WSF. Let us note here that the use of 
16 Post-WSF observations by the authors.
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recycled plastic containers to make African-style masks illustrated two 
processes that were present at this forum. The f irst relates to the social 
and material construction of African identity and unity at the forum using 
symbols of “Africa” as it is perceived in the rest of the world – such as the 
“voodoo” myth of the African mask. The second is related to waste and to 
the f ight for the preservation of an informal economy based on garbage 
as it takes place in most African dump sites today (see section 1 on the 
Mbeubeuss dump). Also the presence of artifacts made of recycled objects 
demonstrates the importance of informal economies in tourism-related 
trade. Indeed, handicrafts made from informally recycled waste have 
become a souvenir trade throughout most of the African continent. This 
denotes the intention of organizers and participants to place the importance 
of informal and solidarity-based economies dependent on recycling and 
waste at the center of the forum (both geographically and thematically).
While the audience itself – in other words, the participants – at the 
WSF was highly diverse and prompted by varied motives, the state of the 
global environment represented a recurring feature of interest. Indeed, 
in relation to the environmental issue, the statistical data collected 
throughout the forum for this project indicates that almost one quarter 
of all participants questioned declared that they were or had been an 
active or passive member of an environmental group or organization.17 
However, when asked which debate or topic they considered the most 
compelling so far at the WSF, only 35 interviewees out of 1,070 mentioned 
the environment.18 More surprisingly, only one participant mentioned 
waste management as an issue in a comment on electric and electronic 
waste management.19 Thus, although the state of the environment seemed 
to be an important preoccupation during the staging of the WSF, pollution 
and environmental degradation appeared to be treated as a secondary 
matter at the individual level for the participants responding to the survey. 
Moreover, the total absence of comments on waste management at the 
forum in the questionnaires collected could indicate that the fate of waste 
immediately after consumption was taken for granted (the act of disposing 
17 Out of 1,070 participants questioned, 150 declared they were active members of an environ-
mental organization, 58 passive members, and 38 declared having been members in the past.
18 The broader environmental issues were mentioned as “climate change(s)”, “sustainable 
development”, “ecology”, “environment”, “environmental justice”, “pollution”, “desertif ication”, 
“biodiversity”, “climate”, “CO2”, “Rio +20”, “climate justice” and “waste.”
19 It should be noted that this participant f illed out the questionnaire during the aforemen-
tioned workshop by ENDA, and declared himself as working for the Institute for Environmental 
Sciences of Dakar.
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waste in a bin and/or separating waste into different bins) as an on-stage 
rule, but the ultimate destiny of waste produced by the WSF after it left 
the stage did not seem to be of interest. In other words, even if the analysis 
of the statistical data collected does not allow us to go further on this 
matter, we submit the hypothesis that waste management can be viewed 
as a “suppressed activity” in the Dakar WSF activist space, as opposed to 
Illustration 6.3  African masks made from recycled waste on display at the center 
of UCAD 2 main roundabout
Photo by alice Judell
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other “manifest activities” such as the eagerly-awaited Assembly of Social 
Movements. This management of activities – whether they are manifest 
or suppressed – allows us to go through the looking glass by questioning 
the invisible backstage of the forum related to the visible on-stage activist 
space.
6.3 Backstage tactics and the boundaries of an 
institutionalized activist space
Alongside the fervent activist activity during the six days of the WSF, 
disposal piles grew on the edges of the UCAD campus, particularly in 
three areas that went unnoticed by most participants: near UCAD 2 where 
most of the organization tents were set up, between students’ residences 
behind the Faculté de Lettres et Sciences Humaines (around the Hallway 
of Death – le Couloir de la mort20) and behind the Faculté de Sciences et 
Techniques. However, the main areas seemed relatively clean in spite of 
the mass presence of activists, street vendors, and UCAD students. Waste 
management techniques during the WSF worked in such a way that most 
of the trash collected from garbage bins was later piled up essentially in 
these “invisible” places where individual garbage collectors would select 
certain items before burning the disposal piles.
We mentioned earlier that by arranging green garbage bins along specific 
areas of the UCAD campus and stressing recycling practices, organizers 
sought to establish the initial ideal setting for this type of transnational gath-
ering in order to raise awareness about waste disposal21 as a routine during 
the event. Nevertheless, at the Dakar 2011 World Social Forum, some aspects 
of militant activity were accentuated, such as workshops, assemblies, and 
protest marches, while others were “suppressed,” such as drinking beer or 
20 This expression refers to one of the places where bloody clashes took place between police 
and students during various strikes, notably in May 1968 but also during the 1980s. Boly Bah, 
“Couloir de la Mort de l’Université Cheikh Anta Diop. Mythes et réalité”, Senegal Tribune, August 
18, 2009, available on the website: www.senegaltribune.com/articles/2813/1/COULOIR-DE-LA-
MORT-DE-LUNIVERSITE-CHEIKH-ANTA-DIOP-Mythe-et-realite/Page1.html. On the student 
protests in Senegal, see Bathily (1992) and Nkinyangi (1991).
21 Goffman mentions the importance of the “initial def inition of the situation” projected by 
an individual, which tends to provide a “plan for the cooperative activity that follows.” In this 
case, the cooperative activity relied on the use by WSF participants of green bins to throw away 
garbage and even to sort garbage into specif ic bins for plastic or non-plastic objects. In the end, 
even if the recycling practices were not always respected, the content of the bins would be mixed 
up later on “backstage” as plastic and non-plastic waste were a part of the same disposal piles.
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waste management techniques.22 Broadly speaking, the spatial dimension 
of the WSF offered us a few examples of this division, as some places were 
actually excluded from the physical stage, such as the so-called “refugee 
camp,” which gathered various caravans of participants coming from nearby 
African countries. This appellation was used by the travelers themselves 
to denounce the harsh conditions – extreme exposure to the sun, lack of 
latrines and sanitation, etc. – they were experiencing in the football f ield 
belonging to the Ecole Supérieure Polytechnique (ex-ENSUT) where many 
of the tents were set up. Thus, while some caravanners and fellow activists 
criticized the lack of preparation and poor organization of the WSF, some 
of them denounced this relegation as politically motivated. Furthermore, 
they stigmatized northern NGOs for renting expensive hotel rooms, holding 
private events and excluding de facto less endowed participants. In stark 
contrast to the caravanners, another example of backstage tactics drew 
our attention: the majority of Brazilian participants had been gathering in 
22 It was rare to see participants drinking beer on the main stages of the WSF, even though it 
was a common “activity” which took place in the less visible refreshment areas.
Illustration 6.4  Waste management results at Dakar WSF
Photo by William herrera
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Dakar’s Goethe Institute where they organized their workshops and other 
activities. Thus they did not experience the same level of chaos and disori-
entation that shaped the first few days for most WSF participants. Moreover, 
they remained quite secluded during most of the week, as the Institute 
was located outside the campus area. Both of these examples highlight the 
different uses of the backstage and how it shaped the boundaries of WSF. 
On the one hand, the “refugee camp” was relegated to the southern end of 
the campus as the only option offered to the travelers by the organizing 
committee, generating exclusion and resentment towards what appeared to 
be the showcase of the event. On the other hand, some participants chose to 
organize themselves in havens, far from the widespread chaos on the main 
stage. Thus, backstage tactics should be seen not only as a covert means of 
exclusion, but also as a technique used by participants with a larger set of 
resources who could afford to leave the scene.
The map below shows the distribution of the areas where manifest 
and suppressed activities took place during the Dakar WSF. The white 
rectangles and grey circles represent the visible areas: the former indicate 
the main stages for activist performance, while the latter designate leisure 
areas where participants ate local dishes or enjoyed a traditional Toubá 
coffee. The black dotted lines mark the back region or backstage areas of 
this transnational gathering where suppressed aspects of WSF activity were 
concentrated.23 In this scenario, hiding waste in backstage areas served 
as a tactic to control the impression the participants receive of the WSF, 
among other stage management techniques during activist performances 
(workshops, assemblies and any other kind of activist encounter).
These aspects were concealed to most participants as a technique 
employed by the Local Organizing Committee to guide and control the 
façade of a clean, well-organized space. In other words, waste was hidden 
so that the audience would not be able to see the treatment of this aspect of 
WSF activity in comparison with the treatment one would expect from the 
organizers of a World Social Forum, especially in view of the aforementioned 
Guiding Principles for Organizing WSF Events. Indeed, to render the waste 
management techniques visible would have given an inconsistent impres-
sion of what a WSF should be.24 By making waste invisible, organizers set 
23 According to Goffman (1959: 114), the back region is the “place, relative to a given perfor-
mance, where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter 
of course.”
24 The Guiding Principles, along with the WSF Charter of Principles from 2001, are one of the 
texts often invoked to remind organizers of the specif icity of a social forum and to maintain, in 
Goffman’s terms, “regional behavior” at an activist alter-global transnational gathering. Political 
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the stage for a type of information game by concealing elements of the 
transnational activist event such as waste and disposal piles and revealing 
legitimate elements of décor like garbage bins and leaving free areas for 
participants’ artistic expression out of waste and recycled material such 
as sculptures.
By stocking trash at the ends of the places where the activist performance 
was presented, waste management practices formed the boundaries of the 
activist space. However, our focus here was not to analyze the indigenous 
scientist Lilian Matthieu (2012: 89) emphasizes that invoking a set of texts is a practice that 
marks out the boundary of “social movement space” – in this case alter-globalization space.
Illustration 6.5  Map of Dakar’s WSF backstage locations
illustration by the authors
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debate on the WSF as being an “open space” in the sense of allowing differ-
ent kinds of organizations to join the alter-global organizational dynamic. 
In this chapter, we have seen the WSF from two angles: f irst as a space 
that physically constrains the participants to elaborate their performance 
and second, as an institutionalized activist space with a set of practices, 
roles, and representations that are continuously transmitted, reproduced, 
and improvised in the alter-global transnational arena, from social forum 
to social forum, as a result of interactions mostly between the WSF IC 
and Local Organizing Committees. By examining the concrete aspects of 
waste management at the Dakar World Social Forum, we see how in the 
end local material conditions and activists’ practices are used to mark out 
the “material space of mobilization” (Combes et al., 2011: 21), confining and 
authorizing activists’ actions and their representations of those actions, 
which are at the core of sustaining and perpetuating the alter-global ethos.
7 Latin Americans at the World Social 
Forum in Dakar
The relationship between the alter-global movement and 
the institutional sphere
Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro Rodríguez and Héloïse Nez
Abstract
This chapter aims at examining the discussion about transnational social 
movement’s relationships to politics during the World Social Forum 
(WSF) held in Dakar, Senegal, in 2011. We make the assumption that 
Latin American participants pushed towards the movement’s increased 
politicization, by reason of their considerable connection to conventional 
politics. This chapter is based on research that involved different empiri-
cal materials: a f ield observation (workshops, presidential declarations, 
assemblies and social events) during the WSF in Dakar and quantitative 
data of Latin American participants’ careers.
The relationship between the alter-global movement and politics has been 
a constant topic of debate within the movement since it f irst emerged at 
the end of the 1990s.1 In scholarly works, the issue has been examined 
mainly from the standpoint of the forms of organization used to coordinate 
heterogeneous actors at social forums (Sommier, 2003; Della Porta, 2004: 
49-77; Aguiton and Cardon, 2005; Agrikoliansky, 2007: 33-54). At the heart 
of these reflections lie the opposing notions of the “forum as an open space” 
and the “forum as a movement,” which arose in discussions among militants 
concerning Article 6 of the Charter of Principles of the World Social Move-
ment (WSF): “The meetings of the World Social Forum do not deliberate 
on behalf of the World Social Forum as a body. No one, therefore, will be 
authorized, on behalf of any of the editions of the Forum, to express positions 
claiming to be those of all its participants. The participants in the Forum 
shall not be called on to take decisions as a body, whether by vote or acclama-
tion, on declarations or proposals for action that would commit all, or the 
1 We would like to thank Julie Pagis, Johanna Siméant, and Isabelle Sommier for their extremely 
helpful comments on an early version of this text. Our discussions with Nicolas Haeringer, a 
member of the International Council of the WSF, have also nourished and stimulated our thinking.
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majority, of them and that propose to be taken as establishing positions of 
the Forum as a body.” By rejecting a centralized body and enshrining the 
prohibition against any attempt to speak on behalf of social forums, the 
network thus became the accepted form. Since then, however, competing 
organizations have gradually entered into a power struggle to define the 
relationship between social movements and institutional politics: “Once it 
became a space to discuss and develop proposals, the social forum ratif ied 
a specif ic type of division in the relationship between civil society and 
national political spaces, in which the preferred instrument was to engage 
in effective lobbying to make political parties officially support the demands 
and proposals produced in forum debates” (Aguiton and Cardon, 2005: 19). 
Our aim here is to explore this issue by analyzing the recurrent debates and 
tensions within the alter-global movement over developing ties with political 
parties and “friendly” governments, allowing heads of state to attend social 
forums or endorsing an ideology and concrete alternatives to capitalism.
At the 2011 WSF in Dakar, these topics were mainly promoted by the 
Latin American participants who raised the issue of the relationship with 
political institutions, i.e. political parties and governments, in clear-cut 
terms. We therefore chose to study this group in particular, in the same way 
that researchers studied African participants at the 2007 WSF in Nairobi 
(Siméant and Pommerolle, 2008). It may seem rather strange a priori to take 
Latin Americans as our focal point when this WSF was organized in Dakar 
and thus rooted in Africa, especially in view of the fact that the “revolution” 
in Tunisia was the dominant news story in February 2011. Moreover, Latin 
Americans are by no means a homogeneous group nor do they present them-
selves as a “bloc” within the WSF. Studying this subgroup nevertheless offers 
the advantage of raising questions about the relationship between social 
forums and politics. First, it allows us to examine the ties between social 
movements and institutional politics, since some left-wing Latin American 
governments – with signif icant national variants – claim to support alter-
global, anti-imperialist, and anti-liberal values and projects (Hugo Chávez’ 
Venezuela) or are offshoots of the social and labor movement (Evo Morales 
in Bolivia and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, known as “Lula,” in Brazil). It also 
highlights the question as to whether current government authorities should 
take part in the alter-global movement, since the Latin Americans were the 
only group in Dakar with heads of state participating in the forum (Morales 
and Lula) and several Latin American delegations were partly f inanced by 
political and/or government organizations. Finally, by concentrating on 
the Latin American actors, we can analyze the evolution of international 
alter-globalization in the debates over the leadership and orientations of the 
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movement, with the Brazilian participants claiming paternity and leader-
ship of the world social forums born in Porto Alegre in 2001. Our article 
therefore aims to analyze the discussions held at the 2011 WSF in Dakar 
concerning the alter-global movement’s relationship with politics in order 
to test the hypothesis that the Latin American participants are seeking to 
establish ties between the world social forums and the sphere of institutional 
politics. We draw upon the assumption that the ways through which these 
activists create and maintain ties are related to their understanding of the 
state as well as their position in the public space (national or international).
Our method is based on observing participants and processing statistical 
data. For six days at the WSF, we observed several workshops organized 
by Latin American actors as well as large WSF assemblies (such as the 
Assembly of Social Movements) and broader debates on changes in the alter-
global movement. In particular, we monitored the activities of the Brazilian 
and Venezuelan delegations in planned workshops listed in the off icial 
forum program and festive events or improvised initiatives like the press 
conference held by the Venezuelans after the Declaration of the Assembly 
of Social Movements.2 We continued our observations after the forum at 
the meeting of the International Council of the World Social Forum on 
February 13th in Dakar and the feedback session organized by ATTAC France 
and the CRID (a group of French international solidarity associations) on 
February 27th in Paris. In addition to these observations, we analyzed the 
questionnaires administered within the framework of the forum, combin-
ing levels of analysis in order to study a regional population: we compared 
the three main continental “blocs” (Africans, Europeans, and Americans); 
we analyzed the Latin Americans as a subgroup within the American bloc 
and compared them with the total survey population (85 Latin Americans 
out of a total of 1,069 interviewees); we studied the differences within the 
Latin American subgroup, particularly the Brazilians who were the most 
heavily represented (47 interviewees). While the quantitative study has its 
limits, due to the reduced size of our sample, its chief purpose is to test the 
hypotheses developed from our observations and support them with data.
We will begin this chapter by showing the specif ic position of the Latin 
American participants at the Dakar WSF on the issue of the relationship 
of the alter-global movement to politics using our observations in the f ield 
and then propose factors to explain this Latin American specif icity by 
combining our forum observations with a study of the questionnaires.
2 The testimonials of Latin American participants given in Spanish and Portuguese during 
these activities or short interviews were translated into French by the authors.
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7.1 The singularity of the Latin Americans’ relationship to 
politics
The Latin American participants adopted a specif ic position at the Dakar 
WSF on the ties they maintained or wanted to develop with political parties 
and governments in power in certain Latin American countries as well as 
on the participation of two heads of state in or on the sidelines of the social 
forum. Both positions generated considerable debate, notably within the 
Forum Organizing Committee. During the workshops, the issue of ideology 
was also discussed more directly by the Latin American participants than 
by the actors from other continents.
Ties to political parties and “friendly” governments
The Charter of Principles of the WSF stipulates: “neither party representa-
tions nor military organizations shall participate in the forum” (Article 9). 
Yet certain political parties played a major role in the emergence of the f irst 
forum in Porto Alegre in 2001, starting with the Workers’ Party (PT). The PT 
was not off icially among the organizers but its militants often wore several 
different hats both within the party and among the social organizations in 
the Brazilian Organizing Committee, i.e. small organizations with influence 
in Brazilian civil society such as the United Workers’ Central (CUT) and 
the Rural Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) (Aguiton and Cardon 2005). 
Since then, governments have openly f inanced the event or their national 
delegations, e.g. the Brazilian government through its state-owned company 
Petrobras, which had a stand at the Dakar WSF and paid for the travel 
expenses of several participants. The issue of relationships with political 
parties has become more acute since the arrival of leaders in Latin America 
who are “friendly” or ideologically close to the movement – mainly Chávez, 
president of Venezuela from 1999 to 2013; Lula, president of Brazil from 
2002 to 2010 (succeeded by Dilma Rousseff, also from the PT); Morales, 
president of Bolivia since 2005; Rafael Correa, president of Ecuador since 
2006. As one Ecuadorian participant put it at a workshop on the Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA),3 “Latin American activists 
are the only participants at the WSF who are proud of their governments 
3 ALBA, launched in 2005 by the signing of a “commercial treaty of peoples” between Cuba 
and Venezuela, was presented as an initiative in favor of socialist regional integration and an 
alternative to other regional alliances based on free circulation and free trade agreements with 
the United States (notably FTAA, the Free Trade Area of the Americas). 
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and their heads of state.” This remark shows how much these militants 
wanted to be viewed as representatives of the entire continent, excluding 
Latin Americans led by presidents and regimes further removed from the 
alter-global movement. In the workshops, some activists recommended 
maintaining a critical distance from these governments, asserting that 
social forums should remain spaces strictly reserved for civil society, while 
others insisted on the need to support them in order to build bridges with 
the social movement.
This debate arose on several occasions in Dakar, for example in a work-
shop on “The Present and the Future of the World Social Forum” organized 
by the CACIM (India Institute for Critical Action: Centre in Movement) 
on February 7th. Though the topic of discussion was progress and changes 
within the alter-global movement, a Chilean participant raised the issue 
of developing ties between social forums and the institutional sphere, 
pointing to the importance of “progressive” governments in Latin America 
“from Lula to Evo Morales.” In general, the activists in Dakar who defended 
a rapprochement with institutional politics systematically referred to Latin 
American experiments, distinguishing the more radical path (Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Ecuador) from the reform path (Brazil). In this workshop, a North 
American activist, citing the f igures on poverty reduction in Brazil and 
Venezuela, regretted the refusal to establish strong links with electoral 
politics: “We must work with political parties. It’s true that the US social 
forum is a success, but the process that has been the most successful in the 
United States today is still the conservative process.” A German participant 
retorted that a network organization allowed for “different levels of ex-
pectations” regarding such ties, whereas if the forum worked closely with 
institutional organizations, it might exclude “people coming for the f irst 
time” and less politicized partners such as NGOs. The American sociologist 
Immanuel Wallerstein maintained: “We cannot achieve social transforma-
tion through electoral politics,” whereas the Bolivian president, invited to 
address the participants at the end of the WSF opening march, defended 
a diametrically opposed position: “Our experiment in Bolivia has been on 
how to move from these social, trade union, community, and intellectual 
struggles to an electoral struggle to take back political power, and now it is 
we – the poor and the marginalized – who govern.” In his speech, Morales 
insisted on the far-reaching effects of this shift “from resistance to the 
conquest of power,” underlining the structural transformations achieved, 
for example, by electing a constituent assembly, including water as an 
inalienable human right in the Constitution and the “nationalization of 
hydrocarbons.”
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At the WSF in Dakar, the workshops organized and/or led by Latin 
Americans dealt with more political topics, such as the one-day workshop 
featuring Latin American and African partners of the Secours Catholique (a 
French international solidarity NGO), member of Caritas who discussed the 
“relationship between social movements and political parties.”4 The debate 
focused on the weakness of political parties in Africa in contrast to their 
importance in effecting social change in the experience of Latin Americans. 
A speaker from Cameroon provided a broad overview of African political 
evolution from “confiscated independence” to political “party fragmentation” 
brought about by democratization, which has kept “social projects” from 
emerging. She went on to talk about the “Latin American model” and how 
it might be a source of inspiration for others. That idea was taken up by 
a Moroccan activist who asserted that, although “revolutions cannot be 
exported” and “each movement must create its own path,” Latin America 
represents “a school, an incubator for the social movement.” A far-left activ-
ist lamented the prevalence of associations over political movements in 
Senegal, which he explained by the fact that such movements have to appear 
apolitical in order to be recognized. A Colombian militant, a member of Polo 
Democrático Alternativo (a far-left coalition), declared “structural change 
is only possible if the parties survive.” The Brazilian speaker, who claimed 
to belong to the eco-socialism movement, emphasized the urgent need to 
turn to parties and governments to “formulate public policies of sovereignty, 
local authority, regional autonomy, and a new orientation of ownership.” 
He reminded the audience that Cuba was “the only revolution” and that 
“the other progressive governments came to power through elections.” 
The Colombian moderator concluded the workshop by asserting “the need 
for a body to centralize the struggle” and a “meeting of social movements 
and political parties” because “Internet and symbolic declarations are not 
enough; concrete action is necessary.” Our observation of this workshop 
clearly shows the different positions within the social movement regarding 
institutional politics in various contexts in Africa and Latin America, with 
certain Latin American countries viewed by African activists as “models” for 
the political outcome of the social movement. During the morning session 
of this workshop, which mainly attracted Europeans and Latin Americans, 
some Latin American participants nevertheless adopted a critical attitude 
4 Another topic raised by the Latin Americans at the WSF concerned Afro-descendants. 
This was an area of action for the “revolutionary” governments (the Venezuelan delegation, for 
example, included a representative of organizations of Afro-descendants) and represented a 
privileged way of integrating Latin American activists in a forum organized in Africa.
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towards their own country’s political experiments. The difference in the 
social movement activist’s receptiveness of institutional politics, from differ-
ent or same countries, reveals how the relationship to politics is an individual 
process related to the history of states’ construction as well as individuals’ 
experiences concerning institutional politics.
Debates over the presence of heads of state at the WSF
Since the early years of the alter-global movement, heads of state have 
sometimes attended or expressed their views at the WSF, under varying 
circumstances and in different ways (see box). Some members of the move-
ment, particularly the 2011 WSF working and evaluation groups organized 
after Dakar, saw the participation of political leaders as an intrusion in 
contradiction with the WSF Charter.5 In Dakar, the refusal to allow Sen-
egalese President Abdoulaye Wade to inaugurate the event was believed 
to be one of the reasons for the organizational problems that plagued the 
2011 edition (the withdrawal of promised funding and the lack of available 
university classrooms to hold activities) (Scerri, 2012: 4). But apart from 
possible tensions with the authorities of the organizing host country, the 
Latin Americans were distinguished by the presence of two heads of state, 
thus reactivating the controversy surrounding the participation of govern-
ment authorities in the WSF. The presence of Lula did not generate as much 
debate among forum participants as that of Morales, because the former 
president of Brazil spoke outside the WSF grounds, whereas the current 
president of Bolivia gave the f inal speech at the opening march of the social 
movements, which carried strong symbolic signif icance.
Presence of Heads of State at World Social Forums
2003 (Porto alegre): hugo chávez (President of venezuela); luis inácio lula da 
Silva, known as “lula” (President of brazil, elected but not yet officially sworn in)
2005 (Porto alegre): chávez; lula (for an informal meeting with some movements)
2006 (caracas): chávez
2009 (belem): chávez, lula, Fernando lugo (President of Paraguay), evo morales 
(President of bolivia) and rafael correa (President of ecuador)
2011 (dakar): morales (closing address of the march on the first day of the Fo-
rum), debate between lula and abdoulaye Wade (President of Senegal), organ-
ized outside the WSF site
5 OpenFSM, Methodology Commission and Working Group, “WSF 2011 evaluation,” http://
openfsm.net/projects/ic-methodology/wsf11-evaluation-synthesis/, consulted January 10, 2013.
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Though Morales, a former Bolivian trade union leader, introduced himself 
in his speech as “a student of these forums, which are a major social move-
ment event in the world,” since he was “still, symbolically, a trade union 
leader,” his presence was not appreciated by everyone. “A head of state 
should not have been allowed to speak at the beginning of the Social Fo-
rum,” declared Gus Massiah, a member of the WSF International Council, 
at the evaluation meeting organized by ATTAC France and the CRID in 
Paris following the return from Dakar. At the International Council meet-
ing on February 13th, Massiah, a leading f igure in the French alter-global 
movement, asked to have the WSF Charter include a stipulation that no 
heads of state shall be allowed to participate in the WSF in the future. 
The problems of translating certain parts of Morales’ speech – “I would 
like more presidents to emerge from the ranks of alter-global/social move-
ments” was translated as “I would like more presidents to come/take part in 
the forums” – also testif ies to the tensions among WSF organizers. Morales’ 
translator was Christophe Aguiton, a militant from ATTAC France, who 
declared later on at the CRID evaluation session organized in Paris on 
February 23rd, that he was f irmly opposed to having the Bolivian president 
come to the WSF.
Ideology and the reference to “revolutions” in Latin America
In addition to the presence of heads of state, references to political leaders 
and to their institutional achievements were rejected on the whole in the 
WSF events in Dakar. At the workshop on “The Present and the Future of 
the World Social Forum,” held on the last day, the use of the word “socialism” 
and mention of the experiments carried out in Venezuela and Bolivia – 
described by a Colombian speaker as “authoritarian” experiments – made 
the participants uneasy. Initially, the declaration of the “World Water As-
sembly” held on February 10th was to contain a direct reference to the role 
of Morales in the “water war” in Bolivia, which ended with the 2003 victory 
of demonstrators in Cochabamba and El Alto over the public authorities 
engaged in privatizing the public utility for the benefit of multinational 
corporations. In the end, however, Morales’ name was removed from the 
text following protests by several participants against mentioning a political 
leader by name.
Furthermore, the Venezuelan delegation expressed regret that the Decla-
ration of the Assembly of Social Movements did not refer more widely to the 
processes of change under way in Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Brazil, 
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which had been initiated and developed alongside the social forums.6 At a 
press conference organized on the last day of the WSF, one of the delegates 
openly criticized the lack of concrete proposals resulting from the social 
forum: “It is not enough to criticize capitalism, it is necessary to construct 
alternatives, which we are doing in these Latin American countries; it is 
necessary to support this movement.” The f irst version of the delegation’s 
press release was entitled “Venezuela’s position on the Declaration of the 
Assembly of Social Movements at the World Social Forum, Dakar, 2011.” A 
few paper copies of the release, distributed to the audience just before the 
press conference, stated:
The World Social Forum was born in Porto Alegre (…). South America 
is not a small event in the history of the World Social Forum. It is the 
center of an agenda of political resistance to global capitalism (…). South 
America feels that the World Social Forum has made an enormous mistake 
in neglecting these processes under way and that this strategic mistake 
is almost a betrayal. The basic problem is conceptual: the groups that 
converge upon the World Social Forum are farther and farther removed 
from concrete politics (…) We cannot forget that in South America paths 
have been opened up for the concrete construction of a better world.7
This radical position did not enjoy a consensus among the Venezuelan 
delegates and it set off a lively debate just before the press conference. It was 
not reported to the Organizing Committee either in Dakar or afterwards, 
nor was it included in the f inal press release published by the Venezuelan 
delegation in their press at home, where the statement read: “The different 
organizations that made up the Venezuelan delegation (…) subscribe to the 
f inal declaration of the 2011 Dakar World Social Forum and express to the 
whole world their commitment to build a more just society.”8 All this would 
suggest that the loud message was not directed to a particular audience in 
Dakar (the International Council or other civil society organizations) but 
rather to the power circles of Caracas and that it was primarily intended 
6 The Declaration of the Social Movements Assembly contains two references to Latin 
American political and social experiments, which emphasize their diversity without naming 
any country in particular and recall that they are part of much broader progress achieved over 
the last ten years.
7 Emphasis added.
8 ”Declaración de la delegación venezolana en el Foro Social Mundial Dakar 2011,” Alba TV: 
comunicación de los pueblos, March 11, 2011. Available at: www.albatv.org/Venezuela-presente.
html, consulted January 10, 2013. 
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to show the Venezuelan government that the colors of the revolution were 
being flown abroad.9 A careful look at the delegation’s f inal press release 
tends to support this hypothesis. The content reiterates the values, aims, 
and heroes of the “Bolivarian” revolution, which were not widely shared 
by the WSF participants either as a whole or in their diversity. It states 
that the WSF brings together “the sons and daughters of the fatherland of 
Simón Bolivar” and that “the person and the government of Hugo Chávez 
are a vector and a reference on our continent and in the rest of the world 
in search of a new model of civilization”10 – a position that was far from 
generating consensus in Dakar or within the alter-global movement or the 
International Council of the WSF.
But the criticism expressed was intended f irst and foremost at pointing 
out the limitations of the Declaration of the Assembly of Social Move-
ments, which invites the “social movements around the world” to “defeat 
the capitalist system” without def ining an alternative to the dominant 
production model. During the WSF, the issue of concrete alternatives and 
the ideologies that could support them was raised above all by the Latin 
American participants. Representatives of the indigenous movement in 
Latin America showed it was necessary to construct an alternative develop-
ment paradigm to replace productivism, based on “buen vivir” (good living)11. 
This concept, presented as an outgrowth of the worldview of indigenous 
communities, is promoted by the current governments of Ecuador and 
Bolivia as a new development model, characterized by the search for a more 
equitable balance among people and in their relationship with “mother 
earth” (“tierra mama,” “madre tierra”).12 While there may be connections 
between this notion and the idea of “décroissance” (de-growth), which 
has developed more in France and Europe, the Dakar WSF was not really 
conducive to in-depth study of concrete alternatives in that direction. In 
the workshops and assemblies, there was also talk of “female socialism” 
(socialismo femenino), “eco-socialism,” and “reinvented socialism.” These 
9 This hypothesis coincides with the theory put forth by Fabrice Andreani regarding the 
position adopted by Chávez and Morales in the international climate negotiations (Andreani, 
2012: 63).
10 ”Declaración de la delegación venezolana en el Foro Social Mundial Dakar 2011,” op. cit.
11 On this vision of development claiming to draw on indigenous cosmology, see, on the 
Bolivian experience: Ranta-Owusu, 2008.
12 These values may seem to be in contradiction with the oil revenues that serve as the main 
mode of f inancing the revolution and socialist development to which the Venezuelan and 
Bolivian governments are committed. On the limits and ambiguities of the involvement of 
these governments in the f ight against global warming, see Andreani, 2012: 69.
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direct references to a new conception of socialism, promoted mainly by 
the Venezuelan militants, were usually rejected by the WSF participants, 
particularly the members of the International Council, who did not trust 
the personality of Chávez (unlike Morales, he did not start out in the labor 
movement but in the army). Their rejection did not stem, by the way, from 
a serious analysis of the process of transformation under way in Venezuela, 
even from a critical perspective. A Latin American activist summed up the 
situation at the meeting of the International Council following the WSF: 
“One topic did arise: ideology. It is something that has to be discussed; it is 
a fundamental issue, because for ten years people have been saying another 
world is possible, but what kind of world? Anything’s possible!” The call to 
organize “a day of global action against capitalism on October 12th, where 
in every possible way we will reject the system that destroys everything in 
its way,” launched in the Declaration of the Assembly of Social Movements, 
does not really answer this question.
7.2 Explaining Latin American singularity: a specific militant 
profile
Why did the Latin American participants adopt their singular position 
in favor of a closer partnership between social forums and the sphere of 
institutional politics? We will explore two main hypotheses here: the f irst 
directly concerns their relationship with institutional politics, which would 
appear to be closer as a result of their militant and political practices (past 
and/or present aff iliation with a political party, position as elected off icial, 
voting) than that of participants from other continents; the second pertains 
to their sociological prof ile, which is marked by a high socio-cultural level 
and internationalization – characteristics they shared with participants 
from other continents but with added experience in organizing World 
Social Forums. The Latin American participants seem not only to be highly 
politicized activists in their home countries but to have long-standing 
experience in international activism, which prompted them to advocate 
a more political view of WSFs in the Brazilian tradition – especially as 
Brazilians were heavily represented among the Latin Americans present in 
Dakar. To test these hypotheses, we will look at the replies to the question-
naires, combining three levels of analysis. First, we will distinguish three 
main continental blocs, analyzing the replies of American, European, and 
African participants (respectively 131, 338, and 531 interviewees) (cf. Table 
1). Then we will examine the subgroup of Latin Americans (85 interviewees) 
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within the American bloc,13 comparing their replies with those of the North 
Americans (46 interviewees) and above all with the total survey population 
(1,069 interviewees). Finally, we will show that a further analysis can be 
carried out within the Latin American group, but only for the Brazilians 
(47 interviewees), as the number of the other nationalities was too low to 
be treated statistically (cf. Table 2). After Brazil, the countries with the most 
attendees were Argentina (10), Venezuela (7), and Colombia (6). While in all 
there were participants from 14 Latin American countries at the WSF in 
Dakar, the presence of other nationalities was not very signif icant: together 
they represented only 18% (15) of the Latin American interviewees. South 
America, especially Brazil, was therefore overrepresented among the Latin 
American participants at the WSF in Dakar, which had an impact on their 
relationship to politics.
More politicized than the average activist
To analyze the participants’ relationship with institutional politics, we 
selected three variables for comparison: involvement in a political party, 
experience as an elected off icial, and voting. When our sample is divided 
into three continental blocs, we observe that the Americans stand out by 
their experience with partisan activism: 54% declare they are or have been 
members of a political party, which is the case for only 33% of the Europeans 
and 44% of the Africans. A closer look reveals that more Americans and 
Africans (30%) continued to be involved in partisan activity at the time 
of the WSF in Dakar, compared with only 16% of Europeans. Within the 
American group, the specif icity of the Latin Americans is unquestionable: 
59% (48 interviewees) declared they are or have been members of a political 
party, compared with only 44% of the North Americans (20 interviewees) 
and 41.5% of the total American survey population. Among the participants 
actively involved in political parties at the time of the WSF, 27 were Latin 
Americans, a percentage (33%) well above the survey population as a whole 
(24%). In the case of the Brazilians, this partisan commitment concerns 
more than half of the sub-sample (24 interviewees in 47), mainly in the 
Workers’ Party (16). These f igures show a stronger relationship between 
social movements and political parties in Latin America, but they may also 
13 To construct the sample of Latin Americans, we have given priority to nationality rather than 
to selecting questionnaires f illed out in Spanish and Portuguese, because the criterion of language 
did not allow us to single out Latin Americans – the questionnaires of our sample were, by the way, 
f illed out in several languages (40 in Spanish, 39 in Portuguese, 4 in French, and 2 in English).
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reveal a selection process: as traveling to a forum in Africa was costly for 
activists from Latin America, in all likelihood the expense was assumed 
by a political party that favored its own members.
The differentiation of American participants, notably Latin Ameri-
cans, based on their experience of partisan activism is confirmed when 
we observe the trends by bloc and subgroup among those that declared 
they had never had any involvement with a political party. Among the 
Europeans, 67% of the interviewees stated they never had any partisan 
experience, whereas among the group of Africans and Americans, the trend 
was respectively 56% and 46%. More precisely, 56% of the North Americans 
declared they had never been members of a political party, which was the 
case for only 41% of the Latin Americans. Involvement in a political party 
on the part of the subgroup of Latin Americans was almost exclusively on 
the left of the political spectrum. When they were not members of a party, 
the Latin Americans nevertheless declared they felt ideologically close 
to a left-wing party. With regard to their protest practices, these active 
militants expressed less reluctance to engage in violence and claimed to 
have taken part in a broader repertoire of actions (except for group prayer) 
to demonstrate against government policies or regional and international 
institutions.14














Although they are closely tied to political parties by partisan aff iliation or 
ideological proximity, only 7% of the Latin Americans declared they had 
14 Cf. the contribution of Johanna Siméant and Ilhame Hajji in this book, chapter 3.
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run for elective office or assumed a political function. From this standpoint, 
they resemble the overall survey population: 75 Latin American interview-
ees (93%) were not currently holding or had never held an elective off ice, 
compared with an average of 88.5% for the total sample. The percentage 
of American participants (95%) that were not currently or had never been 
elected off icials was even slightly higher than those from Europe (84%) or 
Africa (89%). There were proportionately more Africans in elected off ice 
at the time of their participation at the WSF in Dakar (7%), compared with 
Americans (2%) and Europeans (3%). However, the percentage of Europeans 
who had run for off ice but were not elected was higher (8%) than that 
of Americans (1%) and Africans (2%). Experience as an elected off icial 
can nevertheless be linked to the age of the participants: Europeans were 
overrepresented among attendees aged 60 or above, accounting for 23% 
compared with 7% for the Americans and 5% for the Africans.
Thus, what distinguishes the Latin Americans present at Dakar is not 
holding an elected off ice, but rather their involvement in a political party 
and the practice of voting. The same percentage of Americans and Europe-
ans (88%) declared they had voted in the last elections, compared with 75% 
of Africans. This trend is confirmed when we look at the participants who 
declared they always vote, whether in national/federal or local elections 
(72% of the Americans and Europeans, 63% of the Africans). However, 
when we focus on the subgroup of Latin Americans, the specif icity of their 
voting practice stands out more clearly: virtually all the Latin Americans 
declared they voted in the last elections (76 interviewees, i.e. 92% of the 
sample), which is a higher percentage than in the North American subgroup 
(82%) and in the overall survey population (81%). This particular trait is 
reinforced when we look at those who stated they always vote in elec-
tions (85% of Latin Americans compared with 50% of North Americans 
and 67% of the total survey population). The nearly universal practice of 
voting among Latin American participants can be explained by the high 
proportion of Brazilians in the sample, for whom voting is mandatory: 42 
Brazilians in 47 declared they had voted in the last elections and 43 stated 
they always vote.
The tendency of Latin American participants to vote for the party 
in power (34 interviewees) or for an opposition party (45) depends in 
large part on the national context. The ties between WSF participants 
and parties in power were particularly close in the cases of Brazil and 
Venezuela: 16 of the Brazilian interviewees belonging to a political party 
were members of the Workers’ Party (PT) currently in power and 5 Ven-
ezuelans were members of Chávez’ United Socialist Party of Venezuela 
172 iSaline berGamaSchi, tania navarrO rOdríGuez and hélOïSe nez 
(PSUV). We also observed in the f ield a close relationship between Brazil-
ian and Venezuelan activists and their governments and the parties in 
power, which determined how their delegations were funded, presented, 
and organized. The Brazilians were partly f inanced by the state-owned 
company Petrobras. When the WSF ran into organizational problems on 
the campus, the Brazilian delegation held its workshops at the Goethe 
Institute, away from the rest of the forum, in order to comply with one 
of the conditions laid down by their sponsor. The Venezuelan delega-
tion arrived at and departed from the Forum like a sports team at an 
international competition, dressed in jogging outf its in their country’s 
colors (violet, red, and yellow), identical to the one worn by Chávez in 
television appearances or at events abroad.
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Trained, highly internationalized activists
From a sociological standpoint, the Latin American activists appear 
to be endowed with a considerable amount of educational capital and 
they stand out in particular by their high level of internationalization, 
which partly explains their visibility and their specif ic positioning at 
the forum. When the survey population is analyzed by continent, the 
Americans often occupy an intermediate position between the Africans 
and the Europeans. That is the case, for example, for those belonging 
to an organization they represented at the WSF (72% of the Americans 
– midway between 65% of the Europeans and 80% of the Africans); in 
their professions – the Americans tended to occupy a position between 
the Africans, who were overrepresented in handicrafts and commerce or 
among those without an occupation, and the Europeans, overrepresented 
among executives and scientif ic professions; and for their education level: 
87% of the American respondents to the questionnaires had a college or 
university background, between the Africans (67%) and the Europeans 
(90%).
When we examine more specif ically the subgroup of Latin Americans, 
they appear to be highly educated, on a par with the Europeans: 91% 
went to college or university (53 interviewees at the most advanced 
level of higher education and 21 at a lower level), compared with 81% 
of the North Americans and 77% of the total survey population. This 
was especially the case with the Brazilians within the Latin American 
sample: 42 interviewees in 47 went on to higher education, including 28 
at the most advanced level. A high percentage of the Latin Americans 
who went to Dakar were college or university graduates. Two-thirds (50 
interviewees, i.e. 77%) speak two or more languages, proportionately less 
than the North Americans (32 interviewees, i.e. 84%), but more than the 
survey population as a whole (44%). These polyglot militants with their 
college and university degrees have qualif ied jobs: university professors (15 
interviewees), mid-level professionals in healthcare and social work (13), 
professions in the media, the arts and entertainment (9), elementary and 
secondary schoolteachers (8), and liberal professions (7). By the way, more 
than half the Latin Americans (59%, i.e. 50 interviewees) declared that 
their current occupation corresponded to their expectations, a percentage 
that is still below that of the Europeans (72%) but far superior to that of 
the Africans (49%).
While the Americans are often positioned midway between Europe-
ans and Africans, they nevertheless stand out for their participation in 
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international activist events. It is true that the WSF in Dakar was the f irst 
international activist experience for 43% of them, a higher percentage than 
among the African participants (37%) and especially the Europeans (24%). 
But among those who had participated in more than ten alter-global rallies 
or antiglobalization demonstrations during the ten years prior to the WSF 
in Dakar, more than half were Americans (53%), a higher percentage than 
among the Africans (28%) or Europeans (19%). This difference becomes 
especially obvious when we observe the trends within the subgroups of the 
American continent: the WSF in Dakar was the f irst experience of this kind 
for 11% of the Latin Americans (9 interviewees) compared with 26% of the 
North Americans (12 interviewees) and 33% of the total survey population. 
Among the Latin Americans with experience in alter-global events during 
the ten years prior to the Dakar WSF, 33 took part as event organizers, 
40 as speakers and 35 as ordinary participants. Compared with the total 
survey population, the Latin Americans had distinctly more experience as 
speakers and organizers of this type of mobilization, which may explain 
their visibility at the WSF in Dakar and their professional approach to social 
forum organization.
Indeed, the percentage of Latin Americans with experience at inter-
national activist events stems in particular from the high proportion of 
Brazilians in the sample. Their presence in large numbers explains the 
advocacy of a more politicized conception of the WSF, closer to the f irst 
forums organized in Porto Alegre than to the world of NGOs and donors 
at the African events.
Behind the debates concerning the Forum’s relationship with politics lay 
a conflict over who should lead the alter-global movement. The prevalence 
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of the Brazilians was challenged by the participants from other continents 
– notably Africans –, which could be explained by the ambivalent posi-
tion of a major emerging power like Brazil claiming to speak on behalf 
of the South. The huge Petrobras stand set up on the WSF grounds, a 
material embodiment of the pervasive Brazilian presence and the close 
ties of the Brazilian delegation to their country’s government (cf. photo), 
revealed the Brazilians’ superiority to local actors and organizations and 
offended the sensitivities of environmental organizations. Later on, the 
working group in charge of evaluating the 2011 WSF concluded that the 
presence of Petrobras had “a negative impact on outside perceptions of 
the Forum.”15 At the International Council meeting on February 13th, the 
Brazilians proposed to organize the next WSF at Porto Alegre, pointing 
to the disorganization of the event in an African context and arguing that 
they already benef ited from the approval of all the elected off icials in the 
municipal council as well as their experience. At the sub-continental level, 
a widening gap could be observed between the member countries of ALBA 
and the others; and competition between the Brazilian and Venezuelan 
delegations manifested itself in the Assembly of the Social Movements. 
These conflicts over the leadership of the alter-global movement are a 
reminder that the Latin American group was not a bloc within the WSF 
in Dakar, even though similarities can be noted in their relationship to 
politics.
15 OpenFSM, Methodology Commission and Working Group, “WSF 2011 evalution,” op. cit.
Chart 7.7  Interviewees who declared they had participated more than 10 times as 
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Photo 7.1  The Petrobras stand at the WSF in Dakar, a symbol of the leadership 
claimed by the Brazilians
7.3 Conclusion
This study of the Latin American groups at the Dakar WSF shows that the 
relationship of the alter-global movement to politics is still being debated 
within the social forums. As recalled by Jai Sen, an Indian activist and writer 
ref lecting on the history and evolution of the global justice movement, 
the WSF has periodically and increasingly been criticized for being “a talk 
shop (…) removed from the real world, that has diverted people who are 
concerned and looking for ways to resist, from more militant and radical 
politics.” Because its organizers have put the focus on “deliberation rather 
than on action or (…) prefigurative politics,” they have lived out “the change 
and social relations that you want to see taking shape in society” (Sen, 2013: 
484).
Whereas the organizers of this international event in Africa held a num-
ber of workshops and discussions on the topic of development and NGO 
actions, the Latin Americans championed a different conception of social 
forums by openly asserting the need to establish a close relationship with 
political parties and governments with a similar ideology. In the activities 
they organized or in which they participated, the Latin Americans often 
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freed themselves from the thinking and structuring characteristic of devel-
opment projects – the dominant and sometimes inescapable form of action 
(notably in sub-Saharan Africa) – and instead centered their contributions 
on the topic and specif ic examples of social and political mobilization.16 
While they promoted a strategy of forging stronger relationships with the 
institutional political sphere in order to have a direct impact on national 
public policies, the position adopted by the Latin Americans nevertheless 
remained a minority view in the Dakar debates, which calls into ques-
tion a broader rapprochement between the alter-global movement and 
institutional politics, except for a few, specif ic national configurations.
Our analysis of the Latin American group at the WSF in Dakar also 
shows the connection between the position of participants who favor 
closer ties between social forums and the institutional political sphere 
and their individual sociological and activist prof iles. The Latin Ameri-
cans who were able to make the journey to Africa are highly politicized 
militants, who maintain strong ties (through voting or activism) with 
left-wing political parties and governments in power. The position they 
advocate concerning cooperation with the institutional political f ield is 
directly related to this activist experience. Furthermore, they are strongly 
internationalized militants with solid experience at international activist 
events and a signif icant amount of cultural and educational capital. These 
militants, Brazilians for the most part, promote a conception of social 
forums closely linked to political organizations, as they were during the 
early years of alter-global movement organization in Porto Alegre. Thus 
the specif ic relationship with politics advocated by Latin Americans in 
Dakar raises the issue not only of close cooperation between social forums 
and institutional politics, but also of continuing Brazilian leadership of 
the alter-globalization movement.
16 In its f inal release, disseminated to the national media, the Venezuelan delegation con-
demned, for example, “the inf iltration of right-wing organizations that seek to diminish the 
revolutionary and anti-establishment nature of the Forum; in particular, the non-governmental 
organizations whose reputation has been tarnished by advocating neoliberal politics and 
ambiguous political positions,” in “Declaración de la delegación venezolana en el Foro Social 
Mundial Dakar 2011,” op. cit.

8 Groups and organizations at the WSF
Polarities, intermediaries, and hierarchies in the alter-
global arena
Johanna Siméant, with Ilhame Hajji
Abstract
How do groups and organizations matter in a WSF? This chapter ex-
amines the cleavages and polarities of participating groups, and then 
shows how the central organizations in Dakar were characterized by 
a strong connectivity of northern organizations, mostly represented 
beyond Africa, whereas participants were rather “troops and grassroots 
providers,” without benefiting from such a connectivity. If this chapter 
does not lead to an iron law of Western domination in global forums, it 
does show how, in WSFs, organizations with very different attraction 
capacities interact, therefore contributing to explain the polarities of 
global activism.
What does a small Senegalese association like Jang Jup Teki (in Wolof: “Learn 
and succeed in rectitude”), have in common with Caritas, a huge interna-
tional Catholic solidarity organization, and the Confédération Générale du 
Travail (CGT), France’s main trade union? These organizations share few if 
any similarities in terms of size, f inancing, activity, international reach, or 
number of employees. Yet all three of them, as well as myriad others, sent 
members to represent them at the World Social Forum (WSF) in Dakar.
One of enduring legacies of resource mobilization theory has been its 
insistence on the central role of organizations in mobilizing people. Looking 
at the groups to which mobilized actors belong gives us a better understand-
ing of the underlying organization of mobilizations – how “organizations 
matter” (Fisher et al., 2005), how they lay the foundations for mobilizations 
through the resources they pour into them and how they influence the types 
of action in which the participants engage (Saunders and Andretta, 2009). 
The part played by organization employees and their ability to f inance 
activists’ travel expenses is a core aspect of activist gatherings. It increases 
signif icantly when the mobilizations, such as WSFs, are international in 
scope. Dana Fisher shows that this role becomes even more crucial when 
the mobilizations take place in distant locations, where different languages 
and practices require interpreters, intermediaries, and brokers.
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This material dimension is just as important as ideology. Studying these 
organizations means, of course, examining their ideological differences, 
their differentiating or even opposing activist traditions. These ideologi-
cal divergences may in fact be partly related to differences in wealth and 
type of organization. For example, the tension between organizations that 
identify with social movements on the one hand and NGOs on the other, is 
well-known. They adopt different organizational tones and criticize each 
other. One side accuses the other of moderating their actions in order to 
keep their jobs and in deference to international donors, or on the contrary 
of engaging in radical protest that is unlikely to improve the situation of 
the disadvantaged.
In short, understanding the role of organizations presupposes studying 
the relationships between them. This implies f irst of all a theoretical space 
that allows us to grasp the aff inities and competition between organiza-
tions, based in particular on the notion of a multi-organizational f ield 
(Curtis and Zurcher, 1973). Here we have drawn in particular on the survey 
conducted by Olivier Fillieule and his co-authors (Fillieule et al., 2004), 
which examined the membership groups of participants surveyed at the 
G8 summit in Evian and revealed the divisions within this organizational 
space.
Such an approach also implies gaining a better understanding of the 
more or less central role of organizations and families of organizations – 
and the factors that contribute to this position: is it due to the intersecting 
nature of the ideological topics they manipulate? The amount of resources 
they have amassed? The extent of their international presence? Here 
again the international dimension, a core feature of WSFs, complicates 
the issue: does the reconstructed space of relationships between organiza-
tions express international hierarchies (in which northern organizations 
dominate?) or is it merely a distorted version combined with national 
hierarchies? How is this space connected to – or disconnected from – 
national activist spaces?
This chapter aims to take a close look at these questions. We will begin 
by examining the importance of organizations at the WSF in Dakar and 
revealing their role in the mobilization. As in Chapter 3, using Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and Ascending Hierarchical Cluster-
ing, we will demonstrate the national and socio-demographic polarities 
that run through this world of organizations. Next, through a logistic 
regression, we will test the relationships among organizations, showing 
how the organizational core in Dakar was characterized by the strong 
central position and connectivity of the organizations mainly represented 
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in the North, whereas the organizations most frequently represented on 
the African side provided sizable activist troops without benef iting from 
similar connectivity. While one cannot automatically deduce Western 
domination of the alter-global movement from this demonstration, it does 
show how organizations with very different capacities to attract members 
interact and coexist, pointing to opposing tendencies within international 
alter-globalization.
8.1 Between material support of mobilization and ideological 
indicators: a forum portrait through organizations
In Dakar, belonging to an organization was a good indicator of whether or 
not people could get their bearings amid the chaos. The program of WSF 
events was not very reliable and planned workshop locations often had to 
be changed at the last minute. The individuals most able to f ind their way 
through the masses of people and activities were not only those with cell 
phones, sometimes equipped with a local SIM card: they were also par-
ticipants backed by wealthy and/or organized groups. Whether they were 
Malian women seated on the university steps waiting for their “manager” 
to come back and tell them where to go next or participants at workshops 
run by a German foundation that withdrew to comfortable, air-conditioned 
off ices, far from the tumult on campus, the ability to navigate without 
wasting a considerable amount of time and energy depended directly on 
organizational support.
When asked the question “Did you come on behalf of an organization?” 
69.5% of survey respondents answered in the aff irmative. And they did not 
come to the WSF alone: 56% said they had come with their organization 
(compared with 14% who came on their own and 17% with colleagues). In 
contrast, a minority of respondents (18.9%) claimed not to belong to any 
organization (when all survey questions providing some indication on this 
point were combined).1 This latter population tended to be made up of 
somewhat younger, Senegalese women, with slightly less education than 
the general population of survey respondents. In our survey, individuals 
declared on average that they currently belonged to four organizations (one 
as a passive member, three as active members) – and had previously been 
1 Respondents might well say that they did not “belong” to an organization or forget to check 
the box and at the same time say they were employed by or volunteers for an organization.
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members of another organization.2 In addition, 38% of the respondents 
stated they were currently working as volunteers in an organization and 
25.7% had previously done so.
As Dana Fisher (Fisher et al., 2005) has shown, organizations play an 
especially important role in paying for the travel expenses of international 
activists: 60.6% of survey respondents who stated they had come on behalf 
of an organization indicated that the organization had f inanced their trips 
(we should keep in mind that 23% said they were from Dakar and therefore 
had fewer problems f inding funding).3 But the role of organizations was 
not limited to supporting international activists who traveled from afar. 
It also mobilized people who came to Dakar without feeling they were 
“representing” an organization when, in fact, an organization had f inanced 
their journeys (in the case of 9.3% of respondents)! This point reveals the role 
of organizations in the development world, which tend to mobilize “bases” 
that are sometimes quite remote from the causes they advocate. Similarly, 
of the 162 participants residing in Dakar and its suburbs, 66% also came on 
behalf of an organization, 50% “with” an organization, and 25% with travel 
expenses paid by their organization. The material role of organizations is 
thus expressed not only in the “sociology of the plane ticket” but also in the 
“sociology of the bus ticket.” It is this same sociology of the bus ticket that 
explains how participants were able to come from other regions of Senegal 
and from neighboring countries on buses such as the Malian caravan that 
arrived during the night of February 5-6, 2011.
Who are the organizations to which WSF participants belong, the ones on 
behalf of which they say they came? Among the names indicated by the 726 
people who provided this information, the following stand out (they were 
mentioned at least three times) from the multitude of small organizations: 
they offer a glimpse of the organizational and ideological world of this WSF, 
clearly marked by its twofold French-Senegalese dimension and by the 
influence of Catholic organizations.
But what does it mean to come on behalf of an association? What degree 
of involvement or even professional activism does it indicate? Two ques-
tions – one regarding volunteer participation in organizations and the other 
2 These averages should be taken with caution, however, especially in the case of organizations 
operating on the African continent that adapt to international funding opportunities by switch-
ing from a “women’s rights” agenda to a “post-conflict” or “education and development” program. 
In talking with African survey respondents to whom we administered this questionnaire, we 
noted that some of them checked 3 or 4 boxes for an organization of this type.
3 The travel expenses to the forum of 44% of survey respondents were paid in full by an 
organization.
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on the contrary concerning employee status in the organization – help to 
answer that question.
Among the 6.8% of respondents indicating they were (38.1%) or had 
previously been (25.7%) volunteers in an organization, 542 people specif ied 
the name(s) of these organizations. Here are the most frequently men-
tioned names, which indicate the organizations that rely most heavily on 
volunteers.4
This cloud gives a good idea of the dominant lexicon in the text corpus 
of organization names (we have used the language in which the names of 
organizations were indicated):
4 It should be kept in mind that these are the most salient organizations and that many of 
the organization names mentioned once or twice refer to small national or local organizations 
(e.g. Fédération sénégalaise des associations de personnes handicapées, Association pour le 
bien-être des populations de Fass, etc.).
Table 8.1  Names of organizations on behalf of which respondents attended the 
WSF in Dakar, mentioned 3 or more times (n = 726)
Name of organization Times mentioned
caritas/Secours catholique* 22 (3%)






congad, Peuples solidaires 7
alliance internationale des habitants, cntS 6
cGt, Solidaires, association des femmes de la médina (aFeme), amis 
de la vie, maaya, ymca
5
uSOFOral, unSaS 4
réseau interact, amnesty international, artisans du monde, collectif 
equitess, cSa Sénégal, confédération Française du travail (cFdt), 
association culturelle d’autopromotion éducative et sociale (acaPeS), 
via campesina, uSdS, ritimo, Siggil Jigeen, Punto rosso, no vox, 
mouvement de la paix, Justice et paix, Gewerkschaft erziehung und 
Wissenschaft (GEW), crid
3
* indicates that it may be the local chapter of an international organization or that it was the only 
name of the organization mentioned: e.g. “attac” or “attac togo”
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Figure 8.1  Respective weight in the lexicon of organization names5
A counterpoint to this volunteer work is salaried membership in organiza-
tions – a phenomenon found more frequently among Europeans.6 Slightly 
more than 20% of the respondents are currently employed by organiza-
tions (nearly 13% were in the past), which means that one third of our 
sample has at some point worked in the associative world (furthermore, 
5 Word cloud produced using WordItOut software.
6 There is a signif icant link between the fact of being employed by an organization and being 
European (p-value = 0.002780455).
Table 8.2  Names of organizations mentioned more than 2 times by the 
respondents who were or had previously been volunteers
Name of organization Times mentioned
attac 22
amnesty international 14
ccFd – terre solidaire 13
babels, caritas – Secours catholique, croix rouge 8
Peuples solidaires, cadtm 7
enda, Scouts 6
Survie 5
mouvement de la paix, cimade, association culturelle 
d’autopromotion éducative et sociale (acaPeS), artisans du monde
4
action aid, collectif des organisations de la société civile pour la 
lutte contre la pauvreté au Sénégal (cOluPaS), dal, Forum civil, 
Greenpeace, OXFam, Solidaires
3
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we know that 30% of the workforce at the WSF were salaried staff in the 
associative sphere). Of the 157 names of organizations that respondents 
declared as their employers, the following were mentioned more than 
once:
– The Christian and/or Third World branch of alter-globalism: Secours 
Catholique – Caritas France (10), Justice et paix (3), ATD Quart Monde 
(2), Worldvision (2), CRID (2), Emmaus (2).
– Large NGOs of the South such as ENDA (5), based in Senegal, which 
was one of the mainstays of WSF organization, or Action Aid (3), an 
international network based in South Africa.
– The Trade union branch: the French CFDT (2) and the Italian CGIL (2).
– Finally, the Fondation Rosa Luxembourg, with ties to the German party 
Die Linke, which had just inaugurated its regional off ice for West Africa 
in Dakar, or Etiquess, a French collective in favor of sustainable develop-
ment supported by a general council, also had 2 salaried representatives 
among those surveyed at the Forum site.
If we compare the organizations distinguished by the presence of salaried 
employees with those that stand out by the number of their volunteers, we 
observe three characteristic groups in the alter-global world:
– Organizations represented chiefly by employees, which is particularly 
the case of certain northern trade unions.
– Organizations represented more by their volunteers: ATTAC, Amnesty 
International, CCFD Terre Solidaire, Babels (the network of volunteer 
translators and interpreters), Red Cross, Peuples solidaires, CADTM, 
Scout movements, Survie, Mouvement de la paix, CIMADE, as well as 
Senegalese associations.
– And f inally, a very small number of associations that are strongly 
represented by both types of members: Caritas/Secours Catholique, 
ENDA and Action Aid. The thoroughly central role they play in 
WSFs is thus explained by their ability to position themselves at 
the interface of the world of salaried associative staff, especially in 
the development sphere (and hence the national and international 
funding that supports it) and mobilization on behalf of the interests of 
the South. This is particularly typical of ENDA, which was the central 
Senegalese organization, whose members, like Taouf ik Ben Abdallah, 
were key organizers of the WSF in Dakar. ENDA is at the same time a 
very large development organization, and a small but active part of 
it is composed of activists with a long history in the African radical 
left.
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This analysis based on the organizations named by respondents gives us a 
good idea of the “heavyweights” in the alter-globalization movement, but 
it does not offer a clear picture of the relative weight of the main organiza-
tional categories. This information was provided by another survey question 
in which participants were asked to indicate the type of organizations to 
which they currently or previously belonged.
Table 8.3  Current or former membership in organizations, as a % of survey 
respondents at the WSF in Dakar (n= 1069)7
Ex-member Member
human rights 5.8 28.6
humanitarian /development aid / international 
solidarity
4 24.9
Political parties 16.3 24.2
against neoliberal globalization 4.3 22.3
Women’s rights & Feminism 4.2 21.6
environmental/antinuclear/Sustainable development 3.5 19.5
right to education, education for all 2.7 18.5
antiracism /immigrants/right of asylum 4.7 17.9
Women’s associations 3.5 16.4
Pacifist / anti-war 5 14.8
trade unions 4.5 14.8
youth movements (e.g. scouts), Students 10.6 14.6
residents’ rights, community struggles, Squats 2.9 14.5
Peace-building & Post-conflict 2.1 14.3
anti-aidS 3.8 14.3
religious organizations and communities 2.8 13.1
anti-colonialism 2.1 12.1
Pan-africanism 2.1 11.7
Peasants / Farmers 3.1 10.9
alternative media 2.2 10.8
Personal / Social help 2.1 10.6
health 2.1 8.7
unemployed or homeless people and undocumented 
people’s organizations
3.5 7.6
consumer rights 1.4 7.4
lGbt 0.8 4.5
cooperatives, tontines, microcredit 2.5 4.5
communists 1.5 3.7
maoists 1.6 3
anarchists / autonomists 1.8 2.8
trotskyists 0.7 2.2
7 “Are there any groups in the following list that you belong to now or belonged to in the past?”
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The f irst group of organizations, which includes nearly or more than 1 activ-
ist in 5, involves human rights, political parties, international solidarity 
(humanitarian or development aid), anti-neoliberal economic globalization, 
women’s rights and feminism, environmental and anti-nuclear issues and 
right to education. This confirms the influence of this central branch in 
the alter-globalization movement.
The second group of organizations encompasses between one sixth 
and one tenth of the respondents. It is made up of women’s associations, 
pacif ists, antiracists and defense of foreigners, youth movements, trade 
unions, residents’ rights, peace-building and post-conflict, anti-AIDS and 
personal aid, religious organizations, anticolonialists, Pan-Africanists, 
peasants, and alternative media.
As one can already sense, this overview does not present the full picture 
of extremely varied national and continental activist traditions. How are 
we to grasp the links between these organizations and the national and 
social spaces to which the survey respondents belong?
8.2 Organizational space and social space
To understand more fully the space formed by these organizations and the op-
positions that arise between them within the activist universe, it is particularly 
useful to perform a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), consistent with 
a relational conception of social space. As described in Chapter 3, MCA not only 
helps to represent complex data sets but also to seize and represent polarities 
within a social space, and in doing so, to map the social space. According to the 
principle of descriptive statistics, it condenses information by making factors 
emerge that summarize the greatest amount of information and provide a 
graphic representation, through factors, of the whole set of variables under 
consideration. Here we propose a comprehensive overview of the memberships 
in organizations by projecting them as illustrative variables onto an MCA of 
the socio-demographic properties of the survey respondents.8 The first two 
axes contain 23% of the information. We then classified them in an ascending 
hierarchy, through a statistical procedure9 that maximizes variance among 
groups and minimizes intra-group variance, resulting here in nine profiles.
8 Sex, nationalities grouped together by continent while nevertheless distinguishing two 
dominant nationalities (French and Senegalese), occupational categories, age groups, religion, 
educational level.
9 Proposed by SPAD.
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Figure 8.2  MCA of the Socio-Demographic Variables (Reduction of Modalities) 
Axis 1-2
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This MCA concentrates 23% of the information.10 Axis 1 opposes French, 
and more broadly Western, respondents, age (≥ 60), indicating no religion, 
to Senegalese Muslims, with little education (≤ high school diploma), 
unemployed. Axis 2 contrasts young people under age 30 who are college 
students and usually unemployed during their studies, at the bottom of 
the factorial map, to a population between 45 and 59 years of age, with an 
educational level below or equal to a high school diploma, def ined more 
by their occupation (farmers).
Let us now project the memberships in groups as illustrative variables 
onto this MCA.
The projection of organizational memberships reveals very clearly the 
aff inities between national origin, socio-demographic characteristics and 
belonging to specif ic groups.
From the standpoint of signif icant illustrative memberships, Axis 1 is 
characterized f irst by the opposition between:
– On the left-hand side of the factorial map, salaried employees of 
organizations who belong in particular to associations involving 
international solidarity, antiracists, human rights, antiglobalization, 
and environmentalists, as well as pacif ists, anarchists, and alternative 
media. This portion of the axis is also more signif icantly driven by 
10 Our interpretations are based on signif icant contributions and squared cosines.
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volunteer members, a proof that the cleavage is def ined less by the 
material dimension of their ties to the association than by the idea of 
active participation, which is meaningful for the respondents.
– On the right-hand side of the factorial map, organizations of women, 
Pan-Africanists, and the anti-AIDS struggle, medical and personal aid, 
as well as cooperatives and youth organizations, and people who are 
far less frequently organization employees or volunteers.
Axis 2, again from the standpoint of these signif icant memberships, 
contrasts:
– In the upper quadrants of the factorial map, survey respondents belong-
ing mainly to women’s and feminist associations and trade unions who 
more often received funding to attend the Forum. In particular, we 
f ind people belonging to associations of consumers, Pan-Africanists, 
cooperatives, peasants, human rights, etc. There are more volunteers, 
members of organizations working to promote health, education, and 
pacif ism.
Figure 8.3  Organizational memberships: significant illustrative variables of the 
MCA mapped onto the socio-demographic variables compared with 
the modalities of Axis 1-2
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– In the lower quadrants of the factorial map, survey respondents charac-
terized f irst as not belonging to organizations or as not indicating the 
name of their organization, except youth organizations in the main.
The lower right-hand quadrant of the factorial map is marked by young 
Senegalese def ined f irst by their membership in youth organizations. In 
the upper right-hand quadrant, we f ind once again a Muslim, Senegalese 
population, with little formal education, made up of peasants, employees, 
and manual workers who are mainly members of associations of peasants, 
women, consumers, Pan-Africanists, health, education, and anti-AIDS as 
well as religious organizations. One can also observe the influence of small 
Maoist organizations typical of the background of Senegalese activists.
The aff inities between national and organizational memberships un-
derscore the importance of not thinking abstractly about what it means 
to belong to an organization and instead trying to specify the meaning of 
the organizational memberships according to these parameters. Here we 
propose to rank them in an ascending hierarchy (as we did in Chapter 3 
on protest practices) based on this population.11 This yields 9 clusters that 
make it possible to ref ine the observation of aff inities between groups and 
nationalities as well as the results, through comparison of the MCA above.12
These clusters, together with the MCA, give us a clearer grasp of the 
various activist populations that coexist within the Forum. But how can we 
go beyond noting these categories of organizational membership to grasp 
the relationships between the organizations themselves?
8.3 Understanding the affinities between organizations
The notion of a multi-organizational f ield (Curtis and Zurcher, 1973) has 
long demonstrated the advantages of analyzing a space of organizations to 
show how they are interrelated. The aim here is not to base our reasoning 
on the cleavages that oppose one organization to another but rather on the 
ties that can help us understand which organizational memberships are 
best explained by others.
11 We would remind the reader that the clustering process is carried out by minimizing 
variance among potential groups and minimizes intra-group variance, based on variables 
that create the most distance, whether active or illustrative in the MCA. Charts showing the 
signif icant modalities for each class can be found in the appendix.
12 For reasons of readability, and contrary to Chapter 3, we did not project the 9 clusters onto 
the factorial map.
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An initial approach consists in testing the links between group mem-
berships one by one in a logistic regression, after reducing the response 
variables to yes or no.13 Starting with the case of membership in a human 
rights group, here is how we proceeded:
Table 8.5  Explanation by logistic regression of membership in a Human Rights 
organization
Pseudo r² of mcFadden14 0. 283
reading: the model accounts for 28.3% of memberships in human rights group. the 
variables that explain the 28.3% figure are as follows:
Variable: membership group Odds ratio15 Lower limit Upper limit
Peace and pacifism 3.765 2.380 5.955
international solidarity (humanitarian 
and development)
1.904 1.333 2.720
antiracism and rights of foreigners 3.128 2.150 4.550
against neo-liberal globalization 1.890 1.309 2.729
Pan-africanism 2.353 1.429 3.874
right to education 2.484 1.678 3.676
consumer protection 3.328 1.676 6.609
reading: a participant who is a member of a “Peace-building, Post-conflict” organization 
is 3.8 times more likely to belong to a “human rights” organization than if he/she were not 
a member.
We analyzed all organizational memberships in the same manner by ob-
serving the most signif icant coeff icients. Furthermore, given the number 
of organizations involved, we decided to observe all groups to which at 
least 1 person in 5 belonged, with an R2 indicating a large percentage of 
explained variation and to observe the organizations – even small ones 
– with the highest odds ratios in explaining membership in other groups. 
Indeed, it was interesting to look at the organizations with limited member-
ships that occupied larger spaces in larger groups. Thus, belonging to a 
Trotskyist organization multiplied by 4.15 the probability of belonging to 
13 Belongs or has belonged: “yes” / “no reply” assimilated to a “no”. The following results were 
obtained with SPAD software using a binary logistic regression method for stepwise selection 
of variables.
14 Indicator of the percentage of variation explained by the model.
15 As a general rule, an odds-ratio signif icantly below 1 indicates a negative influence of the 
explanatory variable on the dependent variable, and an odds-ratio signif icantly above 1 indicates 
a positive influence. The conf idence interval of an odds-ratio containing 1 indicates a variable 
of little interest.
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an anti-neoliberal globalization organization and by 4.86 the probabil-
ity of belonging to an organization of the unemployed or undocumented 
immigrants; membership in an LGBT organization increased by 9.1 the 
probability of belonging to anarchist or autonomist groups, etc. We carried 
out similar analyses for all the organizations that multiplied (R2>0.3) the 
probability of belonging to another group.16 The combination of these two 
reasoning processes resulted the following graph:



































[10%-15%] of surveyed persons
> 20% of surveyed persons
< 10% of surveyed persons and a signicant link with bigger groups belongingOther
reading: a link that starts from an organization indicates a strong explanation for membership 
in another organization; a link that arrives at an organization indicates it can be explained in 
particular by membership in another organization (r² of mcFadden > 0,3). the figure in parenthe-
ses indicates the number of links. all families of organizations that include more than one survey 
respondent in 10 have been kept in the diagram and only the small organizations with strong 
explanatory power have been represented.
These activist aff inities, which are statistically isolated, appear to be 
consistent with what we have learned about the alter-global world and 
activist tendencies using a more ethnographic approach: they reveal an 
anarchist, libertarian tendency that tends to f ind fulf illment particularly 
16 We have not mentioned the good coeff icients when they designate a redundancy: e.g. 
communists and Maoists, AIDS and healthcare, peace and pacif ism, women and feminists, 
antiracism and human rights, etc.
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in alternative media as well as the influence of former Maoists, particularly 
Africans, in large education associations and of Trotskyists in movements 
of the unemployed or specif ically alter-global organizations. The branch 
encompassing human rights, alter-globalization, and international solidar-
ity organizations obviously plays a central role, with the women’s rights and 
environmental spheres of influence slightly less centrally linked, despite 
their ability to attract sizable troops.
This chart proves to be very similar to the diagrams proposed by Fillieule 
and Blanchard (2005: 164) and Sommier and Combes (2007), both of which 
insist on the centrality of the branch of environmentalists, international 
solidarity, human rights advocacy, and organizations specif ically opposed 
to neoliberal globalization in the alter-global constellation.
This is by no means a neutral observation, in that it may give an advan-
tage or disadvantage to national groups within the international activist 
space. Indeed, the hierarchy of organizational memberships is not the same 
in every country or continent.
In order to grasp more fully the role of these organizations in specif ic 
contexts, we now propose to switch back to the national level (or continental 
level for the Latin Americans). Here is how organizational memberships 
were distributed among the Senegalese, French, and Latin American 
participants at the Forum.
The contrast between the membership structures of these three popula-
tions is striking: whereas political parties, feminist or women’s groups, 
and youth, peasant, and educational rights organizations dominate on 
the Senegalese side, memberships in international solidarity, human 
rights, antiglobalization and environmental organizations preponderate 
among French participants. The Latin Americans confirm the specif icity 
of national conf igurations of organizations. In this case, the number of 
organizations that include more than one fifth of survey respondents among 
their members is greater (8 compared with 5 for the Europeans), and the 
role of religious organizations and communities testif ies to the widespread 
influence of liberation theology on the continent.
If we compare this membership structure with Figure 2 above, we note 
that the associations which are most centrally positioned and form the 
core of the most dense relationships are those to which the French and 
Western participants in general belong – but not the Senegalese, except 
for associations promoting rights to education (which obviously benef it 
from the opportunities opened up by the “Education For All” campaign 
in Africa, which has channeled a portion of international public policy 
funding to this sector). One interpretation of the f inding that Senegalese 
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activists were more isolated from the central networks might be that many 
participants were encountering the WSF for the f irst time17 and had not 
(yet) had a chance to develop as many network ties as other participants. 
One could speculate that if another WSF was held in Dakar or nearby, the 
network patterns would look more like those of the other national/regional 
groups. For instance, Byrd et al. found that over time the networks at the 
WSF changed as groups developed relationships and learned to use the 
forums to develop cross-cutting ties (Byrd, Scott, and Jasny, 2010).
This also helps us to understand why the Latin Americans appear to 
occupy a structurally intermediate position here: they are present in large 
numbers within the central constellation of alter-globalization organiza-
tions and at the same time, unlike Westerners, they can speak on behalf of 
the South. Thus we see more clearly how they came to think of themselves 
structurally as intermediaries between the African continent and Europe.18
Finally, the importance of political party membership in the Senegalese 
activist space also underlines the effects of gaps or even misunderstand-
ings between activists in international situations: what some individuals 
experience as their essential membership may very well be considered 
secondary by others. This is revealed, in particular, about the Senegalese: 
when activists acquire social capital materialized by membership in an 
association or even better the management of an association (e.g. a women’s 
organization), they may soon be encouraged to join a political party, espe-
cially the party currently in power, eager to strengthen its activities as a 
power broker. Conversely, other party memberships appear either as more 
central to the political identity of activists (the Workers’ Party, Trotskyist 
organizations, the Green Party, etc.) or as former memberships that were 
replaced by reinvesting in associative-type organizations.
Observing the diversity of organizational memberships within an interna-
tional event therefore requires thinking about more than the importance and 
influence of organizations “in general.” In addition to raising the signif icant 
issue of material support for action, it also reveals how misunderstandings 
and gaps play out behind the main blocs of organizational memberships. 
The central position assumed by some organizations in the alter-global 
sphere can be accounted for by their “multi-purpose” role as employers and 
generalists, capable of capturing funds from the very development industry 
17 The number of persons saying they had never participated in such an event amounted to 
51.2% of the Senegalese (compared with the general ratio of 33.1% in the global population).
18 As shown in Chapter 7 by Isaline Bergamaschi, Héloïse Nez, and Tania Navarro.
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they criticize and supporting advocacy campaigns while at the same time 
attracting people who allow themselves greater freedom to engage in radical 
politics in other spaces. Finally, the unequal distribution of resources and 
know-how among organizations explains why some are in a better position 
to provide a base – quite often a base of women, young people and peasants 
of the South – at major international activist events.





This chapter revisits learnings social scientists can draw from “no-replies.” 
The uneven propensity to answer amongst the international population 
surveyed during the 2011 WSF discloses the extent to which interviewees 
evolve in different realms. Indeed, actors’ socialization shapes their 
linguistic, social and symbolic references. Our conclusions thus bring 
to the fore a decisive challenge that transnational mobilizations have to 
face: proposing sound and federative ways of describing the world.
9.1 Why and how to inquire about “no-replies”
Can any survey claim to have replies to all its questions? “No-replies” 
concern everyone who designs, processes, or analyzes a survey. It is one of 
the few topics that epidemiologists, psychologists, and sociologists could 
profitably discuss, as this complex issue is widespread in the social as well 
as medical sciences.
Early on, researchers realized the extent to which replies depended on 
questions – and even more on how those questions were formulated (Barr, 
1972). This weakness has been well documented, but the cognitive mecha-
nisms underlying the considerable variations in replies (e.g. depending on 
the order of the questions) are still poorly understood. Even today, a good 
deal of research work simply brushes aside “no-replies” (Kanas and Tubergen, 
2009; Nagel, 2010). The limits of this practice are nevertheless obvious, not 
least because respondents who do not reply generally have particular char-
acteristics that are likely to bias the results (Cheung et al., 2006; Kotaniemi et 
al., 2001; Smith et al., 1999). A sizable literature has developed to offset these 
pitfalls by “correcting” biases induced by no-replies after the survey. We 
might mention, among others, econometric techniques: Bayesian inference 
(Rubin, 1987; ) multiple imputation (King, et al., 2001), or latent variable 
analysis (O’Muircheartaigh and Moustaki, 1999, see also Graham, et al. 2012).
These efforts to “rectify” the results (Goyette and Mullen, 2006; Kreuter 
et al., 2010) are part of a statistical approach to no-replies. The main goal is 
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to produce estimates or imputations to “f ill in” missing data with plausible 
values (Pilmis, 2006). Such practices seem questionable from the social sci-
ence point of view and might raise legitimate doubts on the very possibility 
to surmise the answers of those who never answer questionnaires. Rather 
than “f illing in” the holes, this chapter proposes to study what such holes 
disclose. In this respect, the WSF survey makes it possible to extend on the 
international scale, a fruitful reflection conducted at the national level. It 
sheds a different light on the assumption that “a simple statistical analysis 
of ‘no-replies’ offers information about the meaning of the question, as 
well as the category of people questioned, the category being def ined as 
much by the probability of having an opinion at all as by the conditional 
probability of having a favorable or unfavorable one” (Bourdieu, [1972] 1979). 
How do such patterns evolve when the survey population is international 
and multilingual?
9.2 A panorama of “no-replies” in the WSF survey
The analysis of the “no-replies” in the WSF survey is promising because they 
concern few questions, and those questions prove to be of a particular type. 
On the whole, the questionnaires were filled out quite thoroughly, especially 
if researchers are interested in sociographic variables. The factual questions 
were answered by virtually all survey respondents, with a very low rate 
of no-replies (less than 3% for questions regarding age, sex, and level of 
education, less than 6% for the question about the feeling of belonging to a 
religion). Even the two questions pertaining to voting in elections were very 
largely f illed in, along with the question about membership in a political 
party1 (with no-reply rates of less than 3.5% and 2.5%, respectively).
Survey-taking conditions were thus good enough to ensure that, despite 
the diverse languages and nationalities, the factual questions were clearly 
understood – and properly answered. The good response rates to the ques-
tions on political participation confirm that the survey teams succeeded in 
establishing a climate of trust conducive to receiving replies to such ques-
tions. Moreover, the context in which the survey was conducted was quite 
favorable, as the schedule of activities generally offered participants free 
time. Finally, the questionnaires were f illed out more fully when they were 
administered by the survey team rather than self-administered, suggesting 
1 “Are you (or have you ever been) a member or a political party (or of a youth political 
organization)?”
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a positive relationship between researcher and survey respondent, or even 
the guiding role of the researchers.
The gaps become especially evident when we examine opinion questions 
as opposed to factual questions, according to the distinction proposed by 
Alain Desrosières (2005). Opinion questions were unevenly answered and 
sometimes generated high no-reply rates (more than 40% for certain items). 
This is not surprising as no-reply rates are usually unevenly distributed 
among questions. The resulting uneven distribution of bias (Groves, 2006) 
thus deserves a closer look. The excellent rate of replies to factual questions 
allows researchers to produce a detailed prof ile of survey respondents 
and therefore to elucidate the reasons why they avoid answering certain 
questions. Here we will analyze (1) whether or not the specif icities of the 
non-respondents explain their no-replies; (2) to what extent the singular 
traits of the international population of respondents defy the traditional 
framework for analyzing no-replies; (3) what the no-replies reveal about 
the alter-global movement.
9.3 Do the conditions of participation shape the modalities of 
participation?
The database allowed us to compare the prof iles of activists who came 
to the WSF from all over the world. It soon became apparent that this 
Forum was not a spontaneous gathering of individuals who had come on 
their own. Indeed the great majority of participants came on behalf of an 
organization2 (73.5% of survey respondents). Thus they did not come in 
a purely private context but within an organized framework to represent 
a structure or group (or at least they thought they were representing a 
structure). While the great majority of participants came on behalf of an 
organization, more than 60% of the total survey population also belonged 
to a structure involved in organizing the Forum. The event seems to have 
been orchestrated by and for a limited number of organizations (rather 
than individuals) – so much so that the Forum widely resembled a profes-
sional gathering designed by and for an associative sphere that used it as 
a platform for encounters, discussions, and meetings – in short, for work. 
Thus, nearly one third of the participants (30.6%) came to participate in 
meetings with their partners or donors (38% of those who came on behalf 
of an organization).
2 Question 8: “Did you come on behalf of an organization?” No/Yes.
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Depending on the context, one and the same actor had to mobilize 
different roles from his/her repertoire of identities (Goffman, 1959), 
sometimes for strategic purposes (Siméant, 1994: 50). Taking part in a 
gathering as a professional rather than in a personal capacity and coming 
with one’s organization (55%) or with one’s colleagues (16%) rather than 
with acquaintances (3%) or as a family (4%) had an impact on the way 
participants approached the Forum. How did the conditions of participa-
tion shape the manner of participation? Did the professional dimension 
supplant the political dimension? How does the function of representation 
(coming on behalf of an organization) affect the representative? Is it a 
favorable context for expressing political opinions? Is coming on behalf 
of an organization compatible with publicly acknowledging one’s support 
for violent practices? This seems doubtful, based on comparison of the 
f irst cross-tabulations.
The individuals who came on behalf of an organization appear to display 
perceptibly different opinions from the rest of the participants. The “repre-
sentatives” are more cautious and prefer petitions to sit-ins; they more readily 
condemn the use of violence or do not give an opinion. Do they really have 
different inclinations and are they less radical? (as Chapter 3 by J. Siméant 
shows). Or are their stated opinions modified by the situation? These individu-
als were surveyed at an event they were not attending in a personal capacity 
(and one of the very first questions in the survey reminded them of that fact). It 
is understandable that the replies reflected this difference. Indeed, there were 
significantly more no-replies among those who came to perform a representa-
tive function than among those who had come in a personal capacity.
In this context, the no-replies can be interpreted as compliance with a 
duty of discretion (Pilmis, 2006). Indeed, participants who came on behalf 
of an organization also gave fewer replies to specif ic questions about 
their political opinions. There is a clear gap between the few no-replies 
concerning participation in elections (only 4% of “no-replies:” more than 
96% of survey respondents answered both questions on this topic)3 and 
the far greater silence on the next question concerning the party for 
which they voted (17% of “no-replies for the third question).4 How can 
we explain the sudden drop of 13 points when the questions directly 
follow one another in the questionnaire? The duty of discretion remains 
3 Q22. “In general, do you vote in elections?” 96.8% of replies.
 Q23. “Did you vote in the last national elections in your country?” 96.9% of replies.
4 Q24. “Did you vote for the ruling party (or a member of a ruling coalition) or an opposition 
party?” 83.2% of replies.
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an avenue of analysis: of the 163 survey respondents who did not specify 
whether they voted for an opposition party or a ruling party, 77% came 
to the WSF on behalf of an organization. The representative function 
(coming on behalf of an organization) may hamper the inclination to 
express one’s own political opinions – especially if they are radical (as 
the charts below suggest).
Illustration 9.1  Responses to questions on protest practices (Q25) in % (N= 1069).
No-replies
No and i refuse to do it
No but i could do it
Yes, i did
No-replies
No and i refuse to do it
No but i could do it
Yes, i did
No-replies
No and i refuse to do it











































































These initial elements suggest that the fact of coming “on behalf of an or-
ganization” may dissuade participants from expressing their own personal 
political preferences. When it is a question of asserting one’s opinions to 
a third party, the context matters (Eliasoph, 1990). “No-reply” to specif ic 
questions regarding political preferences is a constant in surveys using 
questionnaires (Pilmis, 2006: 11). It is not always a neutral act to put forward 
publicly one’s own political tendencies. The distortions induced by social 
desirability are well-known (Grémy, 1987). Pollsters are familiar with the 
need to rectify the bias induced by reluctance to declare one’s political 
preferences, a fortiori if they are extreme. Here the no-replies regarding 
violent practices may be partially linked to this bias.
A no-reply is nevertheless a complex phenomenon and a closer analysis 
yields much more information. We therefore propose to show what this 
area of inquiry teaches us about the population of WSF participants, the 
workings of the WSF itself and the obstacles that its participants have yet 
to overcome.
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9.4 When “no-replies” question the question
To understand the logic leading to no-replies, we sought to identify which 
types of questions more readily prompted no reply (cf. chart).
Illustration 9.2  Completion rates by question (N= 1069).



















Q28: Opposition or ruling party
Q21: means to fight neoliberal globalisation
Q3: Identification to the anti-globalization mvt
Illustration 9.3  Replles and no-replles to three opinion questions (N= 1069).
The party for which you voted was
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
“Which political party did you vote for” (Q28)
NR Ruling party Opposition party
16,74
“According to you, what should be done to control neoliberal globalization” (Q21)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Strengthen national goverments
Strengthen regional or sub-regional organizations
Strengthen the United Nations
Build new institutions that involve civil society
Develop and encourage local initiative






‘’To which extent do you identity with’’ (Q3)
An organization/group in particular
A particular branch of this movement
The global justice movement as a whole




NR Strongly disagree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree
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Why do we observe such strong variations between questions and within 
questions? The gap seems signif icant enough to be heuristic: if we consider 
the last question (Q21), almost half of respondents did not answer at least 
one item (47.6% of the total sample). The last three questions were framed 
as indicated in the following chart:
What particular features explain why these questions were answered 
less often than the others? A classical point of view insists on the specif ic 
cultural capital required to form and then express a consistent opinion on 
political issues. Since the 1970s, authors have emphasized that the ability 
to formulate an opinion about political concerns is unevenly distributed 
among the population and hence among respondents (Converse, 1976; 
Bourdieu, 1979). In this perspective, the propensity to express a political 
opinion varies according to the respondents’ level of instruction, which 
led Pierre Bourdieu to conclude that the probability of answering any 
political question was comparable to the probability of going to a museum 
(Bourdieu, 1979) To sum up, these f indings aim to account for, f irst, the 
different completion rates of factual questions and opinion questions 
(variations between questions); and second, it assumes that no-replies to 
political questions are due to lower levels of instruction (variations within 
questions).
Such an approach offers a consistent way to discriminate among more or 
less completed variables in our survey. We can actually draw a continuum 
of no-replies rates: lowest for the more factual questions (age, sex, and 
occupation), increasing for political questions, and reaching a peak for 
abstract questions. The diff iculty of taking a stance on abstract matters 
(Lipset and Schneider, 1987) can be related to the “cognitive diff iculty” of 
specif ic political topics (Converse, 1976). Discriminating among questions 
according to the effort required to produce an answer might partially 
explain why the most abstract questions triggered the highest no-reply 
rates. Nevertheless this perspective totally fails to account for differences 
of completion rates observed within one and the same question. If “political 
competence” matters, our data challenges the classical interpretation that 
conflates political skills with the level of formal instruction.
Within this atypical population – highly educated and committed – 
the traditional angles of analysis do not account for the strong variations 
observed. Inequalities seem to be polarized along other dividing lines. 
Nationality appears to be far more discriminating than educational or 
political capital. Thus we tried to predict the probability of (not) replying 
to Question 21 (“What should be done to control neoliberal globalization?”). 
Using three successive models, we were able to test the percentage of 
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dependent variation (level of instruction, social capital, and nationality). 
We can see that nationality alone explains a much greater percentage of 
the variations observed than the other two indicators we tested (4.8% 
compared with 1.8% for education and 3.7% for social capital; cf. table 9.1 
for a detailed view of the proxies used).
Table 9.1  No-replies to the question (Q21): “What should be done to control 
neoliberal globalization?” (three simple linear regressions with one 
explanatory variable).
9.5 Level of instruction, social capital, and political 
competence
The international survey population in 2011 enables a heuristic reexamina-
tion of Bourdieu’s seminal position that “political competence (…) is a function 
of a person’s level of education” (Bourdieu, 1979: 126; Laurison, 2007). In 
fact, the level of education in the case of the WSF survey by no means 
exhausts the question. In particular, because the level was notoriously high 
for the survey sample as a whole: 75.3% declared they had an undergraduate 
level (less than 7.6% of respondents stated they had left before completing 
secondary school, 15.8% declared a level of instruction below a high school 
diploma, 2.8% did not reply).5 In this respect, such high levels of instruction 
for the whole sample confirm the overselection of African activists who 
accede to the international spheres (Siméant, 2013a).
Of course the propensity to reply varies with the level of education, but 
this correlation does not hold automatically or for all the questions. The 
no-reply rate is thus lower among survey respondents who left at the end 
of primary school than the no-reply rate of respondents with a high school 
5  Only the 30 survey respondents who did not reply do not appear in the chart on the following 
page but they are included in all the subsequent calculations.
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diploma (46.6%) or an undergraduate education (40.1%). This supports the 
idea that the signif icance of the level of education is not uniform across 
nationalities (as we saw in the Introduction and in Chapters 1 and 3). Does 
that mean we should reject the idea of political competence – or that 
such competence is distributed differently within this atypical population? 
What are the dividing lines among these generally highly educated survey 
respondents that would explain the difference in their replies to one and 
the same questionnaire?
Social capital also proves to be fundamental, but here too the specificities 
of the survey population tend to diminish the relevance of analyzing no-
replies from this angle. A very high overall level on this point as well (and 
low variations in terms of social capital for the survey population) does not 
account for the strong variations in the no-replies observed.6 As our aim here 
is not to take a position in the abundant debates regarding social capital, we 
would therefore refer readers to the discussion proposed by Portes and Vick-
strom (2011). Following these authors, I have adopted a classical definition 
of social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which 
are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1986: 248).
We consider aff iliations to institutionalized organizations as a proxy 
(imperfect but instructive) to test this hypothesis. Indeed, we observe a 
statistical link between the probability of answering abstract questions 
and the level of social capital (approximated on the basis of the number 
of associations in which the respondent is involved). This proxy of social 
capital is a much better predictor of the propensity to reply than the level of 
instruction. Yet the relation seems neither linear nor systematic (otherwise 
we would observe a positive slope assessing the increasing propensity to 
reply with the increasing number of non-prof it organization aff iliations 
declared). The model proposed below conf irms that neither the level of 
instruction nor the social capital is signif icantly correlated with no-reply 
rates. Nationality def initely exerts the strongest effect.
The considerable disparities between nationalities suggest several 
avenues of analysis, and we propose to explore three of them here: (1) the 
feeling of political competence is unequally distributed within the various 
6  Thus the average number of associations to which the respondents currently belong (or 
previously belonged) is high and quite homogeneous: between 4.1 and 4.8 for all the respondents 
except Asians (7.1) and citizens of the Americas (5.8). The effect of selection (linked to distance in 
particular) no doubt played an important role: the Asians who came to Dakar were well-known 
as activists. The low numbers of the latter groups (22 and 131 of respondents, respectively) limit 
their weight in overall estimates.
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nationalities surveyed; (2) the observed variations are linked to linguistic 
constraints inherent in administering questionnaires to such a diverse 
population; (3) nationality reflects something else, such as the respondents’ 
world of political socialization.
9.6 Feeling of political competence and nationality
The uneven propensity to reply to abstract questions according to the na-
tionality of the respondents reveals a definite cleavage between Europeans 
and nationals from other continents, especially Africa, who showed far 
less inclination to respond. At the very least, the data suggests that the 
Table 9.2  Explaining No-Replies to opinions questions (comparisons of models)
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propensity to grasp this type of question and recognize oneself in the 
proposed responses is socially and also geographically situated. Although 
these disparities are seldom discussed, they reveal basic dynamics that 
shape transnational mobilizations.
Fighting against North-South inequalities does not mean we are totally 
free from them ourselves – on the contrary. The participants at this Forum 
revealed an unusually keen awareness of the international process of division 
of labor in which they are trapped. They always know that borders are not 
the same for all of them (Siméant, 2013a). This critical view of their own 
position seems to be confirmed when we look at respondents’ opinions on 
North-South inequalities (within established North-South networks). The 
participants who make the most critical assessment of their own South-
North networks are mostly Africans.7 Though transnational movements 
may not exactly replicate world-system stratif ication (Smith and Wiest, 
2005), they do not change out of the blue. When it comes to carrying out an 
assessment (not only of problems but of solutions as well), such inequalities 
may be part of an uneven feeling of legitimacy. The extreme interpretation 
of this idea is summed up by the terse statement that “‘Interest’ or ‘indif-
ference’ towards politics (…) is commensurate with the reality of this power 
(…) indifference is only a manifestation of impotence” (Bourdieu, 1984: 405).
This formulation is too lapidary, although it is plausible that the feeling 
of having a legitimate and sound opinion on political matters is unevenly 
distributed among such a transnational population. The idea of political 
competence mostly emphasizes the way social stratification is reflected 
within polls. Here, the international scale merely modif ies the dynamics of 
social stratif ication and thus calls for a pinch of sociological imagination to 
propose satisfying explanations. The WSF survey provides an unusual op-
portunity to assess the extent to which the cleavages between the dominant 
and the dominated may be polarized along different lines, depending on the 
scale at hand. We have underlined here the importance of national origins 
but we certainly need further investigation to understand how nationality 
is intermingled with other relevant forms of capital. These stimulating areas 
of research concerning the uneven distribution among nationalities of the 
feeling of legitimacy and other forms of immaterial capital seem to have 
been seriously neglected by the empirical literature. To what extent is this 
linked to the notorious diff iculties involved in conducting surveys among 
multilingual populations?
7  60% of the most pessimistic opinions were expressed by African participants. Nevertheless, 
the headcounts are small (38 persons), thus limiting the reliability of this trend.
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9.7 Conducting surveys in several languages: methodological 
challenges
“Cultural and organizational constraints weigh on surveys too” notably 
because “questionnaires rely on the cognitive and linguistic categories of 
respondents” (Desrosières, 2007). The discrepancies observed within na-
tional populations when it comes to designing surveys on political matters 
are merely wider and deeper in a plurinational population (Schwarz et al., 
2010; Stoop et al., 2010; Thornton et al., 2010). Forty years of experience have 
made it possible to document the pitfalls of carrying out nationwide opinion 
polls – within populations that share the same language and a certain 
number of common references (cultural, political, etc.) (Fillieule et al., 1997). 
All these aspects help to explain why the problems are compounded by 
conducting surveys at international events (Siméant, 2013a).
In this respect our survey contributes to an ongoing reflection about 
cross-national data collection: for instance, the Gallup project deals with 
similar issues, but on a larger scale. The Gallup enterprise endeavors to 
conduct worldwide surveys and already covers more than 160 countries. 
Their way of dealing with the translation of subjective questions consists 
in favoring dichotomous response categories (Harkness et al., 2010: 535). In 
our view, this approach conflates errors of measurements and rules out any 
possibility of understanding them. Yet debates over suitable approaches 
illustrate the growing awareness of the caveats raised by translating ques-
tions, especially subjective ones. Conversely, we would argue in favor of 
protocols to cope directly with those diff iculties instead of eluding them by 
oversimplif ication. For instance, an upstream “country-specif ic” analysis 
can be fruitful (Thornton et al., 2010). In this respect, the very process 
implemented by our research team to design the questionnaire is innovative 
and promising.
In designing the WSF questionnaire and more broadly putting together 
our multilingual survey team itself, we were aware of the diff iculties 
involved in making the questionnaire accessible to speakers from all over 
the world. Before overseeing the translation into f ive languages, we f irst 
reduced the proportion of opinion questions in the questionnaire compared 
with the previous surveys conducted at alter-global gatherings (see I. Som-
mier’s contribution). The relevance of collecting factual information was 
widely confirmed by the survey results. The questionnaire was above all 
the fruit of a joint effort. From the outset, the team comprised French, 
English, Spanish, and Wolof speakers. The team’s Senegalese researchers 
and doctoral students were asked to collaborate at various stages and in 
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particular to give us their reactions to the questionnaire, its structure 
and its items. Their contributions certainly helped us make our questions 
more comprehensible, for example with regard to religious membership. 
Nevertheless, it was not always possible to f ind equivalent expressions for 
everything.
9.8 Insurmountable difficulties? Different worlds of meaning
Let us focus for a moment on one of the questions that received the most 
no-replies, which was formulated as follows: “In your opinion, what should be 
done to control neoliberal globalization?” The sharpest differences in attitude 
revealed by this question were those of the two largest sub-populations: 
Senegalese and French (who together made up 48.8% of our respondents). 
The phrase “control neoliberal globalization” is not commonplace in Senegal. 
Whereas the expression had been repeatedly employed at recent mobiliza-
tions in France and broadcast by the media, it was seldom used in West 
Africa. What can be grasped through qualitative studies is sometimes hard 
to objectify in quantitative terms. We are by no means in a position to offer 
proof here, but a small example based on the media in these two countries 
may help to illustrate our point. “Rue89” and “Seneweb” are online informa-
tion sites that are very popular among young people in France and Senegal, 
respectively. A search for the expression “neoliberal globalization” yielded 
254 hits at “Rue89” but only 6 at “Seneweb” (the most recent dated back to 
2008 and two of the six results were from foreign sources). At the same time, 
“Seneweb” posted a very large number of articles on the WSF in February 2011 
(5,330 results!), in which it talked more readily about the “struggle against 
capitalism” or “against imperialism” than against “neoliberal globalization.” 
This is not solely a question of methodological problems. The example sug-
gests that some aspects of the diversity of WSF participants were irreducible. 
An expression that would have made more sense to Senegalese association 
members would no doubt have lost its force for French activists.
Senegalese and French WSF participants have been socialized in differ-
ent political worlds and endowed with different linguistic capital. This does 
not involve mastering a foreign language, but a much more fundamental 
relationship to language. Politics is f irst – and perhaps above all – a way 
of talking about the world. Because our survey questions used categories 
or language and thought derived from the French political, activist, and 
cultural context, they had a different resonance for Senegalese participants, 
including those with equivalent social capital.
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The case of West Africa is fascinating in this regard, because it was 
not necessarily relevant to translate the whole questionnaire into Wolof. 
Incidentally, few Senegalese participants (7%) wanted to reply to the survey 
in Wolof. While their choice of language may have been due to the national-
ity of the survey administrators, it may also have been linked to the fact 
that Senegalese political life often plays out in French at the national level 
(much less often at the local level). Newspapers are published in French 
and French is still the administrative language, the off icial language as 
well as the national language in a land where the Soninke refuse to speak 
Wolof. So much so that many socio-economic words and phrases do not 
exist in Wolof or in Soninke and political discussions in ethnic languages 
are sprinkled with French expressions. These French words and expressions 
are not those commonly used in the French media (in France, who knows 
the term délestage?).8 Clearly, it is not so much a question of the language 
(French, English, or Soninke) as of a world of meaning incorporated in political 
language (Eliasoph, 1990). Informal discussions, speeches, public meetings 
and debates, and the media contribute daily to the ongoing redefinition of 
political language and expressions that, brandished as banners, polarize 
discussions and even thinking.
9.9 Conclusion: what no-replies reveal
The WSF survey conf irms that this type of event brings together actors 
caught up in diverging approaches stemming from material concerns. 
Those who were able to make the journey to Dakar were not necessarily 
the most radical: they were often those who belonged to organizations 
capable of f inancing their participation. This context shaped the prof ile 
that respondents wanted or decided it was wise to show survey administra-
tors. These factors spurred us to analyze the no-replies more closely. The 
WSF survey made a major contribution on this point by showing how a 
transnational population defies the traditional analytic framing of surveys 
by questionnaires. Here no-replies cannot be explained by a lower level of 
formal education or less social capital. The inequalities among participants 
seem to be organized along different lines. More analyses – especially 
qualitative – would be necessary to understand more fully what “national-
ity” encompasses or perhaps even hides (as Chapter 3 demonstrates). In 
8 The term designates a power cut and is frequently used in Senegalese media (2,250 search 
results on “Seneweb,” 8 search results on “Rue89”).
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the meantime, our analysis confirms the extent to which “transnational 
mobilizations also have a local dimension, which is geographically and 
socially situated” (Mayer and Siméant, 2004).
We wanted to analyze no-replies because no aspect of the WSF survey 
should be ignored. Thus, the distribution of no-replies can be interpreted 
not only from a methodological standpoint but also per se as information. 
It suggests the diff iculties faced by participants at transnational mobi-
lizations, particularly in developing a common language. The obstacles 
encountered at European social forums (Doerr, 2012) are compounded by 
the transcontinental dimension of a World Social Forum. The multiplica-
tion of transnational political platforms gives this linguistic issue greater 
importance. The way political debates are translated shapes the way people 
engage in politics on the supra-national scale (Doerr, 2008). Indeed, how to 
formulate the stakes of the struggle is in itself a challenge. Politics is a way 
of putting our experience into words; political socialization is also the 
convergence of ways of thinking and talking about the world.
No-replies tell us a great deal about the semantic dimension of politics
This reflection on national variations is essential: a growing body of evidence 
is shedding light on how national contexts affect respondents’ involvement 
in surveys. Psychologists are exploring how different socialization processes 
feed differences in “situated cognition” that shape attitudes towards surveys 
(Schwarz et al., 2010: 177). Using their own vocabulary, social scientists have 
noted that survey participation has “cultural and national” components 
(Stoop et al., 2010: 9). We propose instead to think in terms of framing. In 
this respect, the WSF survey has paved the way to understanding more fully 
how primary socialization shapes actors’ perceptions – and hence cognition 
of their environment. An interdisciplinary perspective would stand to gain 
by combining sociology, anthropology, and psychology.
Indeed, actors’ socialization shapes their social, symbolic, and linguistic 
references. Those dimensions are intermingled. “The content of a speech is 
inseparable from its form,” and this whole makes sense only in a specif ic 
social context (Eliasoph, 1990: 465). Groups have their own systems for 
describing their environment and an element can hardly be isolated from 
its context without affecting its very meaning. If questions concerning age 
or sex can easily be translated, a phrase like “neoliberal globalization” has a 
specif ic (and more meaningful) sense in the linguistic, social, and political 
realm of a given group. The short time period in which questionnaires 
are administered merely reinforces the role of predetermined categories. 
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In this context, political opinions, especially when publicly expressed, 
seem virtually inseparable from linguistic framings, which are themselves 
socially situated.
Here the social researcher can intervene as a “translator,” accounting 
for the way the actors’ expressions are shaped by the context (Eliasoph 
and Lichterman, 1989). The willingness of respondents from eighty-seven 
countries to participate in our survey is assessed by the time they devote to 
answering our questions, as well as by the average high rate of completion. 
The sparse no-replies are in themselves informative. They suggest that one 
of the ongoing challenges facing antiglobalization activists is a linguistic 
one: proposing sound, unifying ways of describing the world is crucial. No-
replies, so unevenly distributed, are meaningful: they suggest that even 
if those participants wanted to meet – and actually did meet – they still 
have to develop a common language to denominate their environment, 
their enemies, and their goals. This challenge is in itself of paramount 




We hope that the readers will use this book in multiple ways, as there are 
indeed different ways to read it.
Obviously the book intends to contribute to the literature on transna-
tional moments in general, and alter-global movements in particular. It 
hopes to participate in the cumulativity, or at least comparativeness, of 
different surveys carried out about social forums and other transnational 
activist gatherings, about their composition and the diverse reasons of 
the participation there, a f ield well studied in particular by Donatella 
della Porta, Isabelle Sommier, and others. With other previous works, this 
book will have underlined the role of degree holding activists, and NGO 
employees, in the architecture of alter-globalism. It also conf irms how 
groups and organizations matter (Fisher, 2005) in the general logistic of 
transnational activism and as providers of resources.
Maybe what could be the more specif ic contribution of our book, regard-
ing the sociology of transnational social movements, lies in the attention 
paid to place, to the division of labor in activism, and to methodology.
The point here was not only to observe a WSF in an African setting (as 
already done by other scholars, Jackie Smith and her colleagues in par-
ticular, or ourselves). Of course understanding the diversity of the people 
gathered under the alter-global banner is important. But the issue is not 
only an ethical one, that of observing symmetry between activists from 
the North and from the global South. It is also to understand the material 
and intellectual conditions of the participation to such events in a situation 
which is also asymmetric: in terms of training of activists, of the resources 
they enjoy, and also of the issues that seem relevant to them. Here division 
of labor and place effects appear intertwined, as it is the very distance 
between activists coming from different national settings that worsens 
classical effects of division of labor in activist organizations, with the risk of 
not hearing so well all their voices, as, also, the issue of professionalization 
is particularly large in the NGO sector so active in Africa.
Observing that fact does not entail a pessimistic judgment about activ-
ists: it is also a way to understand what are the central positions in the 
alter-global world, assumed by some organizations that are simultaneously 
employers, generalists, able to obtain funds from the development industry, 
to lead advocacy campaigns and at the same time to secure a sometimes 
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more radical orientation, be it in their base or amongst their leaders. This 
also explains how it is possible to bring a base made up very often of women, 
young people, and peasants from the South at major international activist 
events. This central role of generalist organizations, such as Caritas/Secours 
Catholique or Oxfam, must be kept in mind to understand not only the 
material support for action, but also the misunderstandings and gaps played 
out between participants. Those misunderstandings should not however 
be considered only negatively; they are also working misunderstandings for 
action, as the study of relations between activist of different nationalities 
reveals. It explains how the same slogans can mean very different things; 
it also enlightens the paradoxes of the link between nationalism, anti-
imperialism and internationalism. Paying attention to activist diversity 
also explains the central role of nationalities or geographical origins in 
WSF, such as Latin Americans in general and Brazilians in particular, 
not only because of their anteriority in the WSF process, but also as they 
comparatively benefit from more resources than their African counterparts, 
but are also in a position to speak on behalf of the global South, contrary 
to their northern allies.
Paying attention to place and space does not mean that all politics is 
always local politics, but rather that all politics should be localized, to 
understand which local effects come into play in any activist situation, be 
it local, national, or international. To start with the Senegalese example, 
the fact that the WSF was held in a moment of concern about the intentions 
of president Wade to turn for a third mandate also contributed to the 
audience and the ongoing structure of the movement “Y’en a marre,” who 
frontally challenged Wade, with the motto “Wade dégage” (Wade clear 
off!”).
Another aspect of our book is to suggest different methodological en-
deavors to study transnational social movements, hence the use of Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering to 
study populations in a situation of militancy. This is by no way an attempt 
to suggest there should be any magic bullet in methodology, but it appeared 
to us as a very good way to suspend unequivocal reasoning on the direction 
of causality. MCA makes it possible not only to represent complex data sets, 
which is an issue when one deals with international populations, and doing 
so, to map polarities in a given situation. We were determined however to 
use the World Social Forum held in Dakar not only as an opportunity to 
“catch” a population, but also to examine the theatrical dimension of the 
event, hence to pay attention to the performance and representation issues 
at stake, as the Goffman inspired chapter proves. This is also a way to defend 
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the idea that quantitative analysis and thick ethnographic description can 
enrich each other.
The book, we hope, and if one agrees with a decompartimentalized con-
ception of the social sciences, could therefore be a contribution in sociology 
to the study of transnational social movements but also to the general study 
of activism, to African studies, and to understanding how the industry of 
development transforms African societies and their relation to politics. It 
was not only an opportunity to study the alter-global movement. Recalling 
the material dimension of activism or the paradoxes and diff iculties of 
transnational activist cooperation should by no means be considered as a 
way to blame the victim or to be suspicious about activists and how they 
muddle through the diff iculties of acting together in contexts of inequal-
ity. Rather, we perceive it as a possible position of the social sciences: by 
explaining the pragmatic paradoxes in which activists are caught, this can 
give them an opportunity to appropriate this knowledge and de-dramatize 
what is so often the basis for conflicts between them.

 Technical appendix: Surveying 
an international event through a 
multinational team
The quantitative part of our study is based on a survey of 8 pages and 56 
questions; the English version is reproduced at the end of this appendix. 
Although heavily inspired both from questions used by Sommier and 
Agrikoliansky (2005) and Della Porta (2009), and for some of them from 
the World Values Survey, the conception of the questionnaire was also 
collective within the research team, in order to address issues relative 
to specif ic national contexts (for instance, what could be the questions 
measuring religious practice when comparing someone praying f ive times 
a day, like a pious Muslim, to someone going once a week to his place of 
worship – which in France would mean a strong adhesion to Catholicism?).
The questionnaire included a large biographical portion pertaining to the 
respondent’s international experience, funding of travel expenses, position 
in the organization, status as an employee (or not) of an NGO, etc. The 
multinational composition of the research team (48 researchers, from the 
f inal year of master’s degree to academics, from 8 nationalities1), along with 
our attention to linguistic diversity, guaranteed not only the extensive reach 
of the study but also its acceptance by an activist audience sometimes eager 
to denounce ethnocentrism. It also gave rise to numerous heuristic debates 
over the coding of socio-professional categories, which corresponded to 
different realities depending on the nationalities surveyed.
To achieve a balance among respondents and keep away from highlighting 
English- and French-speaking participants, we conceived and distributed 
the questionnaire in f ive languages: English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, 
and Wolof (the national language of Senegal). This meant planning both 
self-administered and administered questionnaires (since speaking only 
Wolof is more or less equivalent to being illiterate and therefore being 
unable to even read Wolof).
Between February 6th (opening ceremony and inauguration march) 
and the 11th, the questionnaire was handed out to nearly 1,100 people: this 
meant that every member of the team had to administrate around 25 
1 Mostly from France and Senegal, but also from Algeria, Italy, Australia, Mexico, Ecuador, 
and Colombia.
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questionnaires in 6 days, which was the guarantee of a quality work as 
the questionnaire was particularly long (56 questions, 305 variables), and 
also allowed the team member to carry out their own research through 
interviews, observation, and ethnography.
The administration of the questionnaire was twofold, as it was a theoreti-
cal choice to avoid overselecting academically inclined participants at the 
event, and therefore we administered the questionnaire either at workshops 
or at other forum locations.
A selection was done of surveying 100 of the nearly 900 workshops in the 
program, trying to respect the thematic and geographic proportions in the 
sample. If a workshop was canceled the pollsters would call their referent 
to have another attributed. Once in the room or under the tent, in order to 
avoid the classical biases of selecting participants who the pollsters would 
feel close to (in terms of gender, race, class, age, etc.), each pollster had to use 
a set of random routines to select the persons to whom the questionnaires 
would be addressed. Choosing f irst a person waiting at the beginning, then 
the 5th nearest to the door, in the case of refusal his/her neighbor near the 
door, and that twice again. Once the workshop had begun, beginning with 
the second rank from the left, in the case of refusal his/her neighbor, and 
again in the case of refusal; then 4th rank on from the right, in the case of 
refusal his/her neighbor, and again in the case of refusal; then 6th rank in 
the middle, in the case of refusal his/her neighbor, and again in the case of 
refusal; then back to the 8th rank on the left, etc. Everyone had learned the 
same sentence in f ive languages to explain the survey to the interviewee: 
“Hello, I am participating in a collective research from the universities 
of Dakar, Paris Sorbonne, and Saint-Louis. Would you mind answering 
this questionnaire?” (if yes) “My questions will bear on your trajectory, 
your participation to the World Social Forum and social movements, your 
perception of social struggles.” Everyone had learned the same sentences 
in four languages at least.
Another part of the survey was directed to people outside the workshops, 
either in marches, resting places or small food shops. Another routine was 
adopted then to select the interviewees. During marches one had to select 
the 5th person counted before a banner, and then his/her neighbor if he/she 
refused to answer. For other places a route had to be chosen, the pollster 
had to stop after three drinking/eating places, to poll the person who had 
just paid, then his/her neighbor if he/she refused to answer, then to stop 
after three free rest places (under a tree, on a bank or stairs, or on the 
side of the road, interviewing the f irst person at the right of a group, and 
then the next; then stop after three activist stands, 3rd person on the left, 
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etc.; then stop after three sales outlets, poll the person who had just paid, 
and then back to the routine of the beginning. Pollsters had to present 
themselves with this sentence, memorized in the f ive languages: “Hello, 
are you here for the Forum?”2 (if yes) “I am participating in a collective 
research from the universities of Dakar, Paris Sorbonne, and Saint-Louis. 
Would you mind answering this questionnaire?” (if yes) “My questions will 
bear on your trajectory, your participation to the World Social Forum and 
social movements, your perception of social struggles.”
At the beginning of the interview, one had to follow the formulation of 
the questions strictly in the order of the questionnaire. Then, and only if 
the interviewee said he/she did not understand, the meaning of a question 
could be explained.
It is important to note that the opposition between surveying in and 
outside workshops is not exactly the same as between administered and 
self-administered questionnaires, even if people preferred to f ill out the 
questionnaires in workshops in order not to bother others. But typically, 
a Wolof speaker would need to answer questions from a Wolof speaking 
pollster, talking discreetly. On the other hand, some people preferred to f ill 
out the questionnaires themselves while having a drink outside, for instance.
Each anonymous questionnaire was stamped as “self-administered” 
(if the person had f illed it out alone) or “administered,” mentioning the 
workshop where it had been collected (which authorized specif ic exploita-
tions), if it included annotations (this often happened in self-administered 
questionnaires, the usual mode of administration in workshop, where 
people sit, take notes…).
Each evening, every pollster (including the editors of this book) gave 
back their questionnaires, indicating his/her name, the proportion of 
administered and self-administered questionnaires, the total number of 
persons solicited (in order to estimate the response rate, which was 73%), 
and indicated the diff iculties and reactions to the survey, which were 
analyzed during the collective evening debrief ings.
We would f inally like to underline the value of multinational research 
teams combined to a lack of more plentiful funding, which obliged us 
to keep the division of labor to a minimum within our research group. 
These moments of scientif ic and communitarian utopia, marked by shared 
enthusiasm, helped to create a really committed research team, in which 
everyone had done some coding… A good way of keeping in mind all the 
steps of the scientif ic approach!
2 In order to poll people who identif ied with the WSF even if not being in the workshops.

 General data on participants
• 1,069 questionnaires coded for 1,100 questionnaires obtained and 1,506 
persons contacted
• 24% administered and 75% self-administered questionnaires (info 
lacking on 1% of the questionnaires)
• Languages: English 17.5%, Spanish 8%, French 67%, Portuguese 4.5%, 
Wolof 2.5%
• Gender: 56.5% men, 40% women (info lacking on 3.5% of the 
questionnaires)
• Age: average age 40 years, median age 38 [17;80] 1st quartile = 28 years. 
3rd quartile = 52 years
• Nationalities: French (20%) and Senegalese (28%) in majority, all other 
countries between 0.2 and 4.5%. Continents: Africa 50%, Europe 32%, 
Americas 12.5%, Asia 2.25%, Oceania 0.25%, No reply 3%
• Professions and occupations:
• 39.5% managers and liberal professions (many managers in associa-
tions and teachers)
• 24% mid-level occupations
• 17.5% teachers
• 47% work full-time
• 11.5% work part-time
• 8% in precarious employment
• 16% pupils or students
• 9.5% retirees
• 6.5% unemployed
• 1.6% at home
• Education: 77.5% university degrees (52.5% with a master’s or a doctoral 
degree)
• Organizations: A majority of interviewees (69.5%) declare they have 
come on behalf of an organization
• Identification with the alter-global movement: A lot 51% ; moderately 
31% ; a little 14%
• Religion: 60% of the interviewees declare they belong to a religion, 
mostly Islam (34%) and Christianity (22.5%). 64% the interviewees say 
they are believers, 9.5% agnostics, and 20% atheists and non-believers.

 Appendix to Chapter 8 on groups and 
organizations : Clusters obtained by 
Ascending Hierarchical Clustering
Tables of the signif icant modalities for each cluster. The active variables are 
underlined; the others are illustrative. Group memberships are transformed 
in a binary variable: Yes (is or has been a member) / No (or no answer).
Cluster 1 / 9 (number of people: 166 – Percentage: 17.03)
Cluster 1 is made up almost entirely of French participants working in 
management and higher professional positions with a high level of educa-
tion, indicating no religion, very often volunteers (75%), particularly in 
international solidarity or antiracism organizations. It is made up primarily 
of women and marked by widespread lack of membership in the organiza-




% of the modality 
in the cluster
member of a Pan-africanist group no 97.59
nationality France 95.78
member of a peasant group no 93.37
member of an aid group no 93.37
member of a women’s group no 92.17
member of a group against aidS no 91.57
member of group for the right to education no 86.14
member of a youth group no 83.13
degree upper cycle of 
higher education
79.52
volunteer in an organization yes 75.30
Occupation managers and 
liberal professions
69.88
religion no reply 69.88
Gender Woman 60.24
member of an international solidarity group yes 40.36
member of an antiracist group yes 30.72
age ≥ 60 30.12
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Cluster 2 / 9 (Number of people: 92 – Percentage: 9.44)
Cluster 2 is made up almost entirely of Latin American managers and high- 
and mid-level professionals, with a high level of education, indicating no 
religion, very often salaried employees of an organization (75%), members 
of a party, age 30-60, and often belonging to alternative media.
Variable /abbreviation Characteristic modalities % of the modality 
in the cluster
nationality by continent americas 97.83
religion no reply 76.09
degree upper cycle of higher education 66.30
Occupation managers and liberal professions 58.70
member of a party yes 54.35
age [30;44] 46.74
Salaried in an organization yes 43.48
age [45;59] 38.04
Occupation mid-level occupations 38.04
member of an alternative media yes 21.74
Cluster 3 / 9 (Number of people: 104 – Percentage: 10.67)
Cluster 3 (10.7% of the sample) is made up almost entirely of very well-
educated Europeans (non-French), working in management and higher 
professional positions as well as intermediate professions. Women form 
the majority of this population. They do not specify any religious aff iliation 
and tend to belong to pacif ist and environmental organizations, often as 
salaried employees, though there is also a small percentage above age 60.
Variable /abbreviation Characteristic 
modalities 
% of the modality 
in the cluster
nationality by continent europe 100.00
member of a Pan-africanist group no 94.23
member of an aidS group no 93.27
member of group for the right to education no 87.50
religion no reply 77.88




Occupation managers and liberal 
professions
49.04
name of the organization no name given 45.19
Salaried in an organization yes 45.19
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Variable /abbreviation Characteristic 
modalities 





member of a pacifist group yes 32.69
member of an ecologist/anti-nuclear/ 
sustainable development group
yes 31.73
age ≥ 60 22.12
Cluster 4 / 9 (Number of people: 84 – Percentage: 8.62)
Cluster 4 (8.6% of the sample) does not indicate any profession. This 
population consists of very young Senegalese with at best a high school 
diploma. They are not defined by any organizational membership, whereas 
membership in a human rights, antiracist or antiglobalization organization 
or volunteer work for an organization correlates negatively with being part 
of this group.
Variable /abbreviation Characteristic 
modalities 
% of the modality 
in the cluster
Occupation no reply 100.00
member of an antiracist group no 88.10
member of a group against neoliberal 
economic globalization
no 85.71
member of a human rights group no 77.38
volunteer in an organization no 55.95
nationality by continent Senegal 45.24
age < 30 40.48
degree baccalaureate, end of 
high school
35.71
Cluster 5/9 (Number of people: 70 – Percentage: 7.18)
Cluster 5 (7.2% of the sample) is made up of employees and manual workers. 
They are mostly middle-aged Muslims and Senegalese, whose organiza-
tional memberships are mainly in political parties, trade unions, women’s 
associations, and cooperatives.
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Variable /abbreviation Characteristic 
modalities 
% of the modality 
in the cluster
Occupation employees and manual 
workers
100.00
member of an ecologist/anti-nuclear/ 
sustainable development group
no 87.14
Salaried in an organization no 82.86




member of a party yes 55.71
nationality Senegal 47.14
age [45;59] 38.57
member of a worker’s union/ trade 
union
yes 34.29
member of a women’s group yes 34.29
member of a cooperative/ microcredit/ 
tontine group
yes 25.71
Cluster 6 / 9 (Number of people: 162 – Percentage: 16.62)
Cluster 6 (16.6% of the sample) is made up of Africans with master’s or 
doctoral degrees, working in management or in intermediate professions, 
age 30-44, who tend to be strongly committed to Christianity. They are, in 
fact, the “international Africans” at forums, a population widely employed 
by NGOs that promote human rights and international solidarity or focus 
on health, peace, AIDS, media, etc.
Variable /abbreviation Characteristic 
modalities 
% of the modality 
in the cluster
nationality by continent africa 93.83
name of an organization name given 80.86
degree upper cycle of 
higher education
66.67
Occupation managers and 
liberal professions
64.20




member of a human rights group yes 50.00
religion christianity 43.83
Salaried by an organization yes 38.89
member of an international solidarity group yes 37.04
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Variable /abbreviation Characteristic 
modalities 
% of the modality 
in the cluster






member of a feminist group yes 32.72
member of group for the right to education yes 28.40
member of an aidS group yes 27.78
member of a Pan-africanist group yes 26.54
member of a women’s group yes 26.54
member of a peace building or post-conflict 
group
yes 23.46
member of a health group yes 19.75
member of an aid group yes 17.90
Cluster 7 / 9 (Number of people: 122 – Percentage: 12.51)
Cluster 7 (12.5% of the sample) is made up primarily of Senegalese, Muslim 
men, who have fewer diplomas than the preceding group, tend to work in 
intermediate professional positions and have been more influenced by 
Maoism.





did the organization pay for 
the trip to the WSF?
no 63.11
Occupation mid-level occupations 52.46
age [30;44] 45.90
age [45;59] 38.52
degree 1st cycle of higher education 35.25
degree baccalaureate, end of high school 31.97
member of a maoist group yes 9.84
Cluster 8 / 9 (Number of people: 55 – Percentage: 5.64)
Cluster 8 (5.6% of the sample) is made up of middle-aged Muslim Senegalese 
with little formal education. They belong to women’s or feminist organiza-
tions, cooperatives, and religious groups.
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Variable /abbreviation Characteristic modalities % of the modality 
in the cluster
Occupation Peasants and craftsmen 100.00
Salaried in an organization no 90.91
name of an organization name given 81.82
degree baccalaureate, end of high school 78.18
religion islam 58.18
nationality Senegal 54.55
member of a women’s group yes 45.45
member of a feminist group yes 43.64
age [45;59] 38.18
member of a cooperative/ 
microcredit/ tontine group
yes 34.55
member of a peasants’ group yes 30.91
member of a religious group yes 27.27
Cluster 9 / 9 (Number of people: 120 – Percentage: 12.31)
Cluster 9 (12.3% of the sample) includes those identif ied in the lower 
right-hand quadrant of the factorial map: young, unemployed Senegalese 
Muslims, who are typically members of youth organizations.
Variable /abbreviation Characteristic 
modalities 
% of the modality 
in the cluster
Occupation none (stay at home, 
unemployed, etc.)
100.00
age < 30 98.33
member of a worker’s union/ trade union no 95.00
Salaried in an organization no 94.17
member of a peace building or post-conflict 
group
no 91.67
member of a pacifist group no 89.17
member of a women’s group no 88.33
member of an antiracist group no 87.50
member of a feminist group no 84.17
member of an international solidarity group no 82.50
member of a human rights group no 80.83
did the organization pay for the trip to the WSF? no 69.17
member of a party no 69.17
nationality Senegal 56.67
religion islam 55.83
volunteer in an organization no 46.67
degree 1st cycle of higher 
education
45.83
name of an organization no name given 44.17
member of a youth group yes 40.00
 Questionnaire for participants to the 
Dakar World Social Forum
Researchers from the Cheikh Anta Diop (CREPOS, Dakar), Paris 1 
Panthéon-Sorbonne (CESSP and CEMAF, Paris), and Gaston Berger 
(Saint-Louis) universities are carrying out a research on participation in 
the World Social Forum. This survey will complete the current knowledge 
on social movements and the global justice movement – especially in Africa. 
If you wish to contact us to share questions or reactions, you can email at 
enquete-fsm-dakar@bbox.fr.
We thank you for helping us fulf ill this task and for offering us approxi-
mately 30 minutes of your time to f ill out this questionnaire.
THE DATA WILL BE REGISTERED AND TREATED ANONYMOUSLY.
Date/time of distribution: ! _ ! _ ! o’clock ! _ ! _ ! 02 2011
Place: 1¨ Opening ceremony 2¨ In a workshop
 3¨ During a march  4¨  Outside the workshops 
(organization stalls, snack bar, 
other…).
__________________________________________________
1) Have you taken/ did you take part in global justice, or anti-neoliberal 
globalization mobilizations in the past ten years (before this World 
Social Forum)? If yes, how many times?






a.  Yes, as organizer 1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
b. Yes, only as participant 1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
c. Yes, as contributor 1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
1¨ No, I have never taken part in this kind of event
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2) If yes, did at least one of these events take place in a country different 
from your own? (two possible answers)
Once Between 
2 and 5 
times
Between 





a. Yes, but on the same continent 1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
b. Yes, but on another continent 1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
3) To which extent do you identify with: 
Greatly Reasonably Partially Not at all
a.  The global justice 
movement as a whole 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
b.  A particular branch of 
this movement 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
c.  An organization/group 
in particular 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
4) In regards to your participation in the Forum (multiple choices 
possible):
1¨ I have participated in the preparation of the Forum as organizing 
member/by participating on a regular basis to preparatory meetings 
(local/national/international)
2¨ I have participated from time to time to preparatory meetings 
(local/national/international)
3  ̈I contribute to and/or participate in the organization of a conference
4¨ I have chatted/been in contact on a regular basis through the 
mailing lists
5¨ I participate as a volunteer to the material/ practical organization/ 
logistics
6¨ I came to gather information in the workshops and conferences
7¨ I came to make some contacts
8¨ I am speaking at a workshop
9¨ I wish to contribute to the discussions
 10¨ I came to represent my organization
11¨ Other: Please clarify ……………………………………………………………...
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5) Are you a member of one (or more) of the organizations/groups that 
have taken part in the preparation, and/or participate in a conference 
(plenary, seminary, or workshop) of the World Social Forum?
1¨ NO ¨ YES (If yes, which one(s)?………………………………)
6) In the following list, are there groups in which you are or were in-
volved in the past?
Yes, I have 
taken part but 
no longer do so
Yes, I currently 
take part and 
consider 
myself an active 
member
Yes, I currently 
take part and 
consider myself a 
passive member
a.  Women’s rights 
and feminism 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨
b.  Women 
organizations 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨
c.  Pacif ism/
anti-war 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨
















h. Peasants 1¨ 2¨ 3¨
i. LGBT 1¨ 2¨ 3¨
j.  Antiracism /
defense of 
immigrants/
right of asylum 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨
k. Anticolonialism 1¨ 2¨ 3¨
l.  Fight against 
AIDS 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨
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q. Pan-Africanism 1¨ 2¨ 3¨
r. Workers’ unions 1¨ 2¨ 3¨
  If yes, please 
indicate which 
one (as well as 
the country)
 …..……………………










u.  Alternative 
media 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨




w.  Personal aid/ 
social aid 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨
x. Trotskyites 1¨ 2¨ 3¨
y. Communists 1¨ 2¨ 3¨
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z.  Anarchists/ 
Autonomous
1¨ 2¨ 3¨
aa. Maoists 1¨ 2¨ 3¨
ab. Healthcare 1¨ 2¨ 3¨
ac. Consumer rights 1¨ 2¨ 3¨




……………………… 1¨ 2¨ 3¨
1¨ I do not 
take part in any 
organization/group
7) With whom did you come to this World Social Forum?
1¨ Alone 2¨ With close friends  3¨ With acquaintances 
/ neighbors
4¨ With work colleagues 5¨ With my family
6¨ With my organization/group/movement
8) Did you come on behalf of an organization? 1¨ YES 2¨ NO
If yes, which one? ………………………………………
9) Did this organization pay for your trip? 1¨ YES 2¨ NO
10) If not, how was your trip paid for?
1¨ By another organization (Name: ………………………………………)
2¨ I paid for the trip myself
11) Are you, or have you been, a salaried employee of an organization?
1¨ YES, I have (Please indicate in which organization: 
………………………………………)
2¨ YES, I am (Please indicate in which organization: 
…………………………………..…….)
3¨ NO
12) Are you, or have you been, a volunteer member of an organization?
1¨ YES, I have (Please indicate in which organization: 
………………………………………)
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2¨ YES, I am (Please indicate in which organization: 
……………………………………..….)
3¨ NO
13) Do you take part in an international network of organizations? 
(multiple choices possible)
1¨ YES, a North-South network (Please indicate which 
network……………………………………..)
2¨ Yes, a South-South network (Please indicate which 
network………………………………..….….)
3¨ NO
14) If yes, within that/these network(s), which are the main activities 





a.  Information exchange via 
Internet 
1¨ 2¨
b.  Trips, meetings, gatherings with 
the partners of the network 
1¨ 2¨
c. Financing or funding 1¨ 2¨
d. Training












a.  … work(s) on an egalitarian 
basis when it comes to speech, 
responsibility sharing, f inancial 
resources management 
1¨ 2¨
b.  … intend(s) to work on an egali-
tarian basis but do(es) not always 
succeed 
1¨ 2¨
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c.  … there is a strong contradiction 
in this/these network(s) between 
the working principles and 
inequality in practice 
1¨ 2¨
16) Have you taken part in the following events in the past twelve months? 
YES NO
a.  Protests/events in your country against 
your governments’ policy?
1¨ 2¨
b.  Protests, movements against interna-
tional or regional institutions (G20, IMF, 
etc.) 
1¨ 2¨
c.  Local or regional social forums on conti-
nental themes 
1¨ 2¨
17) Do you have the feeling that you have been personally discriminated 
during your lifetime? (whether due to your origin, real or supposed, your 
physical appearance, your religion, your gender, your sexual preferences, 
your political views, or other)
1¨ No 2¨ Yes (If yes, please clarify…………………………………………)
18) Do you have/hold the political refugee status? 1¨ YES 2¨ NO








Not at all 
activists
a. My close friends 1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
b. My parents 1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
c.  My acquaintances/
colleagues 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
20) During this WSF, to which action(s) do you plan to participate or have 
you already participated? (multiple choices possible)
1¨ To the conferences, plenaries, seminaries or workshops
2¨ To the assembly of social movements
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3¨ To the events preceding the WSF, parallel or partially associated 
gatherings (Please clarify ……….…………………………………………………
………………………………..…)
4¨ To marches or protests  5  ̈to meetings with your “partners” and/
or “sponsors”
6¨ To festive events (parties, concerts, etc.)
7¨  Others (Please clarify…………………………………………………………… 
……………)




Disagree Agree Strongly 
agree
a.  Strengthen national 
governments 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨





1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
c.  Strengthen the United 
Nations
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
d.  Build new institu-
tions that implicate/ 
involve civil society at 
the continental and 
international levels 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
e.  Develop and encourage 
local initiatives 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
22) Are you, or have you been, a member/adherent of a political party (or 
a youth political organization)?
1¨ YES, I am currently member/adherent to a party
2¨ YES, I have been member/adherent to a party but no longer am
3¨ NO, I have never been member/adherent to a party
A) If yes, could you indicate which one(s)? (Please indicate the country: 
e.g. Grünen, FRG)
 …..……………………………………………………………………………………………
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B) If you are not member/adherent of a party, to which party do you 
feel closest, or least distanced? 
 ………………………………………………………………………
23) Have you been elected to carry out a political mandate?
1¨ YES, I am currently carrying out a mandate; please indicate which 
type …..………………………
2¨ YES, I have been elected in the past; please indicate which type of 
mandate: ………………………
3¨  I have been candidate but was not elected; please clarify: 
………………………………
4¨ NO, I have never been a candidate to a political election
24) What is the first significant/striking political mobilization in which 
you took part? (Please indicate the name, date and country, for example 
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26) Did you vote during the last national elections in your country?
1¨ YES 2¨ NO
27) Generally, during elections (national/federal or local), do you vote? 
Always Often From time 
to time
Rarely Never I do not 
have the 
right to vote
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨ 5¨ 6¨
28) The party for which you voted was…
1¨ A party in power (or member of a coalition in power)
2¨ An opposition party
29) Do you use the Internet… 
Every day At least 
3 times a 
week
Once a week Less than 
once a week
Never 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨  5¨
30) If yes, do you connect/ go online…




1¨  2¨ 3¨ 4¨
On your mobile phone 5¨ Other 6¨ (Please clarify………………………)
31) If yes, do you use the Internet to… 
Very often Often From time 
to time
Never
a.  … f ind general 
political, social, or 
economic data 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
b.  … animate a blog 
or a website 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
c.  … post comments 
on a website 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
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d.  … connect to 
social networks 
(Facebook, etc.)
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
e.  … participate in 
forums or chat 
lists on activist 
subjects (interna-
tional network) 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨




1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
32) How old are you? ! _ ! _ ! years old
33) Are you…. 1¨ a woman 2¨ a man
34) ou say that you personally belong to a religion?
1¨ No  2¨Yes Please indicate which religion (the denomination and 
possibly the brotherhood or designation: e.g. Tijane Muslim, 
Reformed protestant) 
  …...………………………………………………………
35) Would you would define yourself as…
1¨A believer 2¨ A non-believer 3¨An atheist 4¨ An agnostic
36) If you belong to a religion…
a. Do you go to your place of worship
1¨Every day 2¨Every week 3¨Less often 4¨Never
b. Do you attend large religious gatherings
1¨Several times a year 2¨ Less often 3¨Never
c. Do you pray
1¨Every day 2¨Every week 3¨Less often 4¨Never
d. Do you have the same religion as your parents?
1¨Yes 2¨No  2¨My parents didn’t share the 
same religion; I have one of the 
two religions
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37) About your nationality/citizenship, do you hold…
1¨ One nationality/citizenship that has always been the same
2¨ One nationality/citizenship that has changed during my lifetime 
(e.g. you have obtained a new nationality after emigrating)
3¨ a double nationality
4¨ stateless person status
38) What is your nationality/citizenship?
1¨ Senegalese (if double nationality, indicate the other nationality 
……………………………)
2¨  From another African country; please indicate which one (s) 
……..…………………………
2¨ Other; please indicate which one(s) 
 ……………………………………………………………
39) What are your parents’ nationalities?
Mother…………………………………….. Father ……………………………………..
40) Has at least one of them changed nationality during their/his/her 
lifetime? 1¨YES 2¨ NO
41) Have you lived, continuously or not, in a country different from the 
one you currently live in?
1¨ YES, less than a year 2¨ YES, more than a year 3¨ NO
42) If yes, in which country/countries, and for which reasons (profes-









a.  Professional, 
work
1¨ ……… 2¨ ………… ……………..
b. Affective 1¨ ……… 2¨ ………… ……………..
c. Exile 1¨ ……… 2¨ ………… ……………..
d. Studies 1¨ ……… 2¨ ………… ……………..
e. Trip, tourism 1¨ ……… 2¨ ………… ……………..
f. Trade 1¨ ……… 2¨ ………… ……………..
g. Healthcare 1¨ ……… 2¨ ………… ……………..
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h. Internship 1¨ ……… 2¨ ………… ……………..
h.  International 
solidarity
1¨ ……… 2¨ ………… ……………..
43) Have you had relationships in other countries than the one you cur-
rently live in? If yes, which type(s) of relationship? 
Many A few Very few None
a. Professional bonds 1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
b. Family bonds 1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
c. Friendship bonds 1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
d.  Economic and f inancial 
bonds (money transfers, 
investments…) 
1¨ 2¨ 3¨ 4¨
44) How many languages do you speak (national languages from your 
country and foreign languages)!_ !_ !
45) More precisely…
1¨ I speak only one language
2¨ I speak several languages from my country and one international 
language (Spanish, English, Portuguese, Arabic, French, Chinese)
3¨ I speak a foreign language  4¨ I speak two or more foreign 
languages
46) Which level of education have you reached?
1¨ I have never been schooled (or my schooling ended early)
2¨ End of primary school diploma
3¨ Short secondary studies (junior high school), short professional 
traineeship (2 to 4 years)
4¨ Baccalaureate, end of high school (around 18 years old)
5¨ 1st cycle of higher education  6¨  Upper cycle of higher 
education
47) Were you a student at…
1¨ Religious education schools (if yes, please clarify, e.g. Quranic school, 
Catholic high school…………………. )
2¨ Private non-religious education  3  ̈International schools or high 
schools
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48) What is (was) your profession/occupation? (Give a precise description, 
for example “primary school teacher” instead of simply “teacher”)
……………………………………………………………………………………………………….
49) What is your current professional status?
1¨ Student/secondary school/primary school
 If you have a job as well, please indicate which one: 
 ………………………………
2¨ Stay-at-home, unpaid work for family reasons, housework for close 
relatives
3¨ Unemployed or job searching
4¨ Precarious job (short-term contract, temporary work…)
5¨ Retired
6¨ Full-time job 7¨ Part-time or periodic job
50) What is (or was) your main sector of activity?
1¨ Employed in the public sector  2¨  Employed in the private 
sector
3¨ Employed in the associative sector  4¨  Employed in the 
informal sector
5¨ Agriculture  7¨  Independent/ liberal occupation (Please 
indicate, if appropriate, the number of employees 
that you have!_ !_ !_ !)
8¨ Other. Please clarify ……………………………………………………
51) Does your current professional situation meet your expectations?
1¨ Yes  2¨ No, I consider that my education could let me hope for 
better
3 ¨No, my situation satisf ies me morally but not materially
4¨ No, my situation satisf ies me materially but not morally
5¨ No, my situation is neither morally nor materially satisfying
52) What is (was) the profession/occupation of your spouse or partner? 
(Give a precise description, for example: “primary school teacher” instead 
of simply “teacher,” and the sector of activity (public, private, associative, 
independent). If several occupations (or spouses), please indicate the 
highest paid.)
………………………………………………………………… sector of activity…………….
53) What is (was) the profession/occupation of your parents? (As for you, 
please give a precise description indicate the sector of activity as well 
(public, private, associative, independent)
a. Your father……………………………………………………………….…sector of 
activity:……………..
b. Your mother………………………………………………………………... sector 
of activity:……….. …..
54) What is (was) the profession/occupation of your grandparents? (As 
for you, please give a precise description indicate the sector of activity 
as well (public, private, associative, independent).
a. Your grandfather on paternal side.……………………………………. sector 
of activity:……………..
b. Your grandmother on paternal side...………………………………….. 
sector of activity:……….. …..
c. Your grandfather on maternal side……………………………………. sector 
of activity:……………..
d. Your grandmother on maternal side ………………………………….. 
sector of activity:……….. …..
55) Where do you live?
A) In which country? ………………………………………………………………………
B) In what type of town or village do you live?
1¨  National/economic capital (Please indicate the name of the city 
..…………………………………….)
2¨ Large regional city (Please indicate the name of the city .
 .…………………………………………….)
3¨ Small town (Please indicate the name of the town 
 ..………………………………………………….….)
4¨ Large village 5¨ Small village





WE WARMLY THANK YOU FOR ACCEPTING TO ANSWER OUR QUESTIONS !
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